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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
It is with pride, relief, and not a little astonishment that 
The Modern American offers our first issue published under a 
non-white president—Mr. Barack Obama. Mr. Obama’s election 
and inauguration represent the renewal of American energy and 
the hope of increased diversity and equality in American politics. 
As the President stated on the night of his inauguration: “It’s the 
answer spoken by young and old, rich and poor, Democrat and 
Republican, black, white, Latino, Asian, Native American, gay, 
straight, disabled and not disabled—Americans who sent a mes-
sage to the world that we have never been a collection of Red 
States and Blue States: we are, and always will be, the United 
States of America.”
Mr. Obama’s election, however, does not represent the 
end of racism or the end of discrimination in America. It is a 
milestone, but only one along the road to equality. The American 
people should and will continue to question the status quo of 
American law and politics, and The Modern American hopes to 
be a strong voice in that dialog. 
This year has been an interesting one, both for America 
and The Modern American. On April 14, 2009, our Fourth Annual 
Symposium will gather renowned scholars to address the separa-
tion of church and state and the regulation of morality as it affects 
cross-cultural relations in our community. We are also proud to 
announce that our readership base continues to expand; subscrib-
ers will now be able to access The Modern American through 
V.lex, LexisNexis, HeinOnline, and the Westlaw database. In the 
spirit of environmentalism, we are pleased to continue to offer a 
green publication.
The Modern American would like to thank our former 
Executive Board and staff members who are graduating in May 
2009. We commend them for their contribution to the prevalent 
discussion of legal issues affecting minorities in out country, and 
their outstanding dedication to our publication. We encourage 
them to keep moving forward in their roles as social engineers by 
facilitating conversations about diversity and the law, and by chal-
lenging existing discrimination through education and action. 
In closing, we hope our issue inspires you to continue 
fostering the discourse on diversity and embracing everyday 
change in your community. 
  Sincerely yours,
 The Executive Board


















































TransiTioning our Prisons Toward affirmaTive Law: 
examining The imPacT of gender cLassificaTion PoLicies 




“I’m raped on a daily basis. I’ve made complaint 
after complaint, but no response. No success. 
I’m scared to push forward with my complaints 
against officers for beating me up and raping 
me. I was in full restraint when the correctional 
officers assaulted me. Then afterwards they said 
I assaulted them. All the officers say is ‘I didn’t 
do it.’ The Inspector General said officers have 
a right to do that to me. That I’m just a man and 
shouldn’t be dressing like this….”1
Bianca is a female-identified prisoner currently incarcer-
ated in the general population of a New York state men’s prison. 
Bianca’s experience is traumatic, shocking, and real. Every day, 
transgender people like Bianca face painful choices about their 
well-being in our society. Transgender people who are in prison 
have even fewer choices. Our prison system not only punishes 
them, but it further sentences them to live 
within their own bodies’ betrayal.
Modern ideas about gender have 
fast-outpaced the law. Theorists today 
describe gender identity as a complex 
reflection of how we see our genotypic, 
physical, and social selves.2 Gender expres-
sion is the manifest gender identity usually 
expressed by “masculine” and “feminine” 
choices from hair length to clothing.3 Every 
person possesses a gender identity and expresses this identity; 
many social scientists call this phenomenon “doing gender.” 4 An 
increasing number of scholars and advocates (including lawyers) 
argue that “both sex and gender are socially constructed and both 
sex and gender are socially real.” 5
Conventional notions establish a binary gender classi-
fication system: male and female. Transgender people may be 
considered a third group: their gender identity or expression does 
not conform to their assigned birth gender, and they may transi-
tion from one gender to another.6 Sexual orientation, defined by 
the gender of those to whom a person is sexually attracted, is 
a distinct identity from a person’s gender. In fact, “transgender 
people have all sexual orientations.” 7
Few statistics are available about the transgender popu-
lation.8 Nonetheless, one international transgender study found 
that 8% of respondents self-identified as a gender other than 
“male” or “female.” 9 Among the U.S. population, an estimated 
.25% to 1% of the population has undergone at least one sex reas-
signment surgery.10 Transgender women (male-to-female) are 
“1.5 to 3 times more prevalent than female-to-male” persons.11 
Our prison system not only 
punishes them, but it further 
sentences them to live within 
their own bodies’ betrayal.
Even fewer data are available for transgender prisoners. A 2005 
study shows, however, that transgender people are two or three 
times more likely to be incarcerated than the general popula-
tion.12 Many corrections departments’ policies fail to recognize 
transgender people despite this disproportionate representation.
Some areas of law enforcement are beginning to rec-
ognize gender variant people (non-gender conforming people 
who may include transgender and intersex people). Even so, law 
enforcement, particularly prison systems, are quickly discover-
ing that they are unable to adequately respond to the increasing 
number of transgender-identified and intersex people entering 
their doors. Bianca and others are subject to the constant threat 
of physical and sexual violence, creating legally inhumane and 
morally intolerable conditions. The American prison system has 
reached a moral crisis regarding transgender rights that impinges 
on basic constitutional protections13—a crisis which must be 
tackled with policy and law-making that fundamentally changes 
incarceration practices.
This article will trace how sexual 
violence related judicial and legislative his-
tory has framed and impacted transgender 
prisoners’ rights. I will first explain the pre-
vailing U.S. prisoner classification standard 
and the policy incongruence that under-
mines its intended purposes and rationales. 
Then I will then discuss the District of 
Columbia’s proposed policy, which prom-
ises to be a small step forward for prisons 
in their treatment of transgender prisoners. Finally, I will share 
recommendations for the District of Columbia and other jurisdic-
tions wishing to move forward a positive transgender prisoners’ 
rights law.
ii. sexuaL vioLence LiTigaTion and LegisLaTion 
creaTe oPening for Transgender righTs
1. Supreme Court DeCiSion reCognizeS  
FeDeral liability For expoSing tranSgenDer  
priSonerS to HigH-riSk environmentS
Transgender prisoners’ rights are a newly recognized 
area in U.S. jurisprudence. They have been deliberated largely on 
the state level, in which state prisons have more or less success-
fully addressed transgender prisoners’ needs through administra-
tive policy-making. Several court cases, however, have intervened 
to more firmly establish rights that affect transgender prisoners. 
A particular concern involves the safety of trans-women confined 
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within male populations, such as their vulnerability to sexual 
violence. Lower court decisions have variably affirmed transgen-
der prisoners’ rights to safer living conditions, but no ruling has 
definitively objected to the administrative status quo that allows 
and even promotes genitalia-based classification.
The only U.S. Supreme Court case to touch this issue 
is a 1994 case, Farmer v. Brennan. Farmer was a narrow deci-
sion holding that a federal official could be liable under the 
Eighth Amendment by acting with “delib-
erate indifference” to a prisoner’s health or 
safety, but only if she or he knew that the 
prisoner faced “substantial risk of serious 
harm.”14 The petitioner, Dee Farmer, was 
a trans-woman (male-to-female) who had 
undergone estrogen therapy, two sex reas-
signment surgeries, and was diagnosed by 
the Bureau of Prisons as having gender 
dysphoria.15 Farmer was placed with the 
general male population during a transfer 
from a state to a federal prison. Within two 
weeks, her cellmate had brutally attacked 
and raped her.16 This ruling opened federal officials to a lawsuit 
only if two things were true: if they had substantial certainty that 
a prisoner was at risk and they failed to prevent or minimize the 
risk.17 Other authors have examined the case’s constitutional ele-
ments in depth,18 so I will only examine its concrete impact on 
transgender prisoners.
Farmer was a seminal case because it affirmed trans-
gender prisoners’ right to humane confinement conditions under 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
punishment.” At the same time, Farmer was an extremely limited 
holding because of the narrow construction and application of 
the “deliberate indifference” test. The test requires a liable party 
to have actual subjective knowledge of a risk. This too easily 
favors an “ignorance” defense, and sets up a high standard for 
transgender prisoners seeking relief.
“Deliberate indifference” lies between negligence and 
malice. It is sometimes referred to as recklessness “that is more 
than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or 
safety” 20 but is “something less than acts or omissions for the 
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will 
result.” 21 Such harm must be substantial or be sufficiently seri-
ous to be considered a deprivation of rights.22 It is unclear from 
the opinion whether wrongly classifying a trans-woman alone 
constitutes a sufficiently serious deprivation, and for this reason 
is it clear how the test may apply to Farmer and other transgen-
der prisoners who may or may not come forward about sexual 
abuse. Although the Court implies that exposure to targeted sex-
ual violence may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment 
(assuming that the “deliberate indifference” test is met), it will 
fall to future cases to clarify the test’s application on transgender 
prisoners.
The Farmer Court chose not to alter the objective “delib-
erate indifference” test even though the fact that Farmer was a 
transgender person should have deserved separate attention. The 
Court rejected petitioner’s request to make deliberate indiffer-
ence an objective test, finding that “Section 1983 (which provides 
a cause of action) ‘contains no state-of-mind requirement inde-
pendent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying 
constitutional right.’” 23 By construing a federal statute in this 
way, prisoner protections are subject to a wide outcome range 
rendering inconsistent application for members belonging to vul-
nerable prison communities. A subjective test or modified objec-
tive test would have more broadly protected Farmer and other 
transgender prisoners.
Farmer’s counsel made a compelling argument about the 
adverse implications of a subjective test. The concern was that 
the absence of an objective test would per-
mit prison officials to ignore danger toward 
prisoners.24 On first impression, this argu-
ment implies a legal-gaming problem, 
especially given the nature of prison envi-
ronments whose culture is predicated on 
dominance and control. The more salient 
danger may be the confusion of issues 
due to the pervasiveness of gender myths 
in our correctional and legal institutions. 
For example, if a transgender woman is 
believed to be an effeminate gay man, then 
the “deliberate indifference” test is not met 
because an objective prison official might reasonably (though 
incorrectly) believe that the transgender prisoner is still male-
identified. Objective “reasonable” tests invariably fail new, mar-
ginalized classes of plaintiffs. They are a weak liability indicator 
for invisible or marginalized prisoners who are most at risk. A 
“deliberate indifference” standard becomes even more difficult 
to reach for transgender prisoners who must prove an official had 
1) sufficient knowledge about gender identity and gender expres-
sion and 2) an adequate appreciation for how a prisoner’s gender 
identity may expose a prisoner to a substantial harm. The likeli-
hood of a transgender prisoner proving “deliberate indifference” 
appears extremely low.
Lower court decisions have inconsistently protected 
transgender prisoners from improper classification. In Crosby 
v. Reynolds, in 1991, a female prisoner brought a Fifth Amend-
ment privacy violation suit against prison officials for housing 
her with a transgender woman.25 The Court stated that “officials 
here were confronted with a situation that had no perfect answer” 
and held that prison officials were entitled to qualified immu-
nity for reassigning the transgender woman into the women’s 
facility.26 Four years later, in Lucrecia v. Samples, a federal court 
rejected a transgender woman’s numerous constitutional viola-
tion claims, including one claiming an Eighth Amendment Due 
Process violation based on an exception allowing actions for 
“legitimate penological interests.”27 Most recently in 1999, in 
Powell v. Schriver, an HIV-positive transgender woman sued the 
prison on Fifth and Eighth Amendment grounds when the prison 
staff informed other prisoners of the plaintiff ’s gender identity. 
Although the plaintiff ’s jury award for privacy violation set aside 
by the lower court was not reinstated, the plaintiff successfully 
had her Eighth Amendment claim remanded upon the court’s 
finding that no qualified immunity existed for disclosure of her 
gender identity.28 The two latter cases (Lucrecia and Powell), 
like Farmer, involved prisoners who experienced sexual violence 
resulting from misplacement. These cases suggest that there has 
been a positive judicial evolution over the years that charts a path 
for advocates seeking greater legal recognition and protection for 
transgender prisoners.
The American prison system  
has reached a . . . crisis  
which must be tackled with 




2. priSon rape elimination aCt (“Prea”) enaCtS 
national StanDarDS DeSigneD to better proteCt 
priSonerS From Sexual violenCe
Congress is beginning to recognize transgender prison-
ers’ rights. The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 was the first 
piece of federal legislation to address prisoner sexual violence. 
Among its stated purposes, the Act aimed to “(1) establish a 
zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of rape in prisons in the 
United States” and “(2) make the prevention of prison rape a top 
priority in each prison system.” 29 To reach its goals, Congress 
established a bipartisan panel, the National Prison Rape Elimina-
tion Commission (“NPREC”), which was charged with making 
national standard recommendations to the Attorney General.30 
NPREC held eight public hearings throughout the country where 
transgender lawyers and advocates testified about the problems 
faced by transgender prisoners.31
San Francisco-based Transgender 
Law Center (“TLC”) testified in the Califor-
nia hearing entitled “At-Risk: Sexual Abuse 
and Vulnerable Groups Behind Bars.” 32 
TLC shared that in addition to rape and 
coercion, sexual violence experienced by 
transgender prisoners may include “unnec-
essary strip searches, and forced nudity, and 
harassment.” 33 Most striking was the testi-
mony that “this violence does not exist, and cannot be under-
stood, [for transgender people] in a vacuum,” 34 referring to the 
widespread transgender discrimination outside prison that leads 
to over-incarceration.35
Since PREA’s passage over five years ago there has been 
significant scrutiny over the Act’s efficacy.36 There is little evi-
dence that PREA has curbed transgender violence. Of PREA’s 
national standard recommendations, those that are most relevant 
to transgender prisoners have yet to be broadly reflected in admin-
istrative policies (discussed later in this article). For example, 
Recommendation Cl-2 on Classification Assessment provides:
During the internal classification process, 
staff assesses every inmate to determine his 
or her potential to be sexually abused by other 
inmates and his or her potential to be sexually 
abusive…Every inmate’s classification assess-
ment is reviewed and updated, as necessary, 
at regular intervals, following significant inci-
dents, and whenever new and relevant informa-
tion is available.37
This recommendation does not explicitly enumerate 
transgender prisoners, but calls for procedures that would better 
protect them from abuse by advising case-by-case consideration. 
When given the opportunity, PREA and NPREC failed to chal-
lenge genitalia-based classification policies. Instead they chose to 
draft flexible individualized policies that stop short of addressing 
transgender prisoners as a class. Although flexible classification 
policies are better than the current binary male/female system, 
discretionary policies are unlikely to improve conditions for pris-
oners whose needs remain deeply misunderstood.
iii. faiLure To Preserve Transgender Prisoners’ 
human righTs is rooTed in anTiquaTed 
geniTaLia-Based cLassificaTion PoLicies
1. genitalia ServeS aS tHe prevailing priSoner  
genDer ClaSSiFiCation StanDarD in u.S. anD FailS 
to treat tranSgenDer people Fairly
Generally, U.S. jurisdiction classifies prisoners by their 
perceived anatomical sex (genitalia): male or female.38 As articu-
lated in the Transgender Law Center’s testimony, as long as the 
inmate possesses internal and external sex organs corresponding 
with a specific sex, he or she will be housed in accordance with 
that sex.39 Genitalia-based policies represent a rarefied reality of 
gender-segregated facilities that have no place for gender variant 
people. Gender segregation itself may not be the most critical 
issue; some argue “just as culpable, and 
possibly more so, are the gendered expecta-
tions that this segregation creates.” 40 Most 
jurisdictions do not recognize transgender 
people within procedural policies—classi-
fication-based or otherwise—at all.
Some state and local jurisdictions, 
including California, Illinois, Minnesota, 
New York, Oregon, and Washington, have 
established non-discrimination policies, 
hormone treatment guidelines, and staff training requirements 
for transgender prisoners.41 But only one jurisdiction’s youth 
division, in New York, provides a self-identification classifica-
tion policy in which transgender prisoners may self-select their 
placement.42
Many prisons confront this issue with administrative 
segregation (solitary confinement) as an alternative to placement 
with the general population,43 believing it to be the best avail-
able solution.44 In reality, administrative segregation “allows a 
prisoner minimal interaction with other people, no access to jobs 
or treatment programs, and greatly restricted privileges . . . . The 
stated purpose of administrative segregation is that people being 
confined within it are a proven danger to themselves, staff, or 
other inmates the message is being sent that a person’s gender 
identity itself is threatening to the institution . . . .” 45 Gender vari-
ance has proved to be threatening to prisons that are balancing 
two imperatives: preserving order and protecting its prisoners 
and officials from violence and legal issues associated with vio-
lence. Nonetheless, transgender prisoners should not be punished 
for a dilemma that prisons have been unable to resolve.
Legislatures sometimes distinguish between post-
 operative prisoners and pre-operative prisoners.46 Post-operative 
prisoners, known as transsexuals, are transgender people who 
have had sex reassignment surgery (“SRS”) that changes a per-
son’s external anatomy from a particular sex to another.47 The 
consequence of differentiating between pre- and post-operative 
transgender prisoners is significant. Post-operative prisoners are 
usually able to be classified according to their gender identity. 
Pre-operative or non-operative prisoners are not. When prisoners 
are sorted by post-operative or pre-operative status, they are in 
reality being sorted by economic class. The umbrella term “sex 
reassignment surgery” is misleadingly simplistic because it refers 
to a large set of costly medical procedures.48 SRS tends to be 
. . . this violence does not  
exist, and cannot be  
understood, [for transgender 
people] in a vacuum . . .
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prohibitively expensive or otherwise unavailable to most people 
for a variety of reasons,49 ensuring that an overwhelming major-
ity of transgender prisoners are housed within high-risk environ-
ments, based primarily by their economic means. Another related 
problem is the post- and pre-operative distinction is a social and 
legal fiction. It makes classification results random, disparate, 
unequal, and unfair.
2. Current poliCieS Fail to treat tranSgenDer 
people equally
The high level of scrutiny directed toward gender vari-
ant people’s bodies is patently unfair and impracticable. During 
intake, gender-variant people often undergo a higher level of 
scrutiny of their bodies than others when prison and medical staff 
try to place them within the binary system.50 Simply envision 
this scenario for yourself. It may be difficult to imagine being 
classified, housed, and referred to by a gender with which you 
do not identify. It may be even harder to conceive being poked, 
prodded, and examined by several prison and medical staff to 
determine “which one you are.” Such an experience may stretch 
beyond imagination, but it may happen if your body is perceived 
to be different from other women or men. Truth is our bodies do 
not necessarily resemble one sex more than the other. After all, 
“Some women have wombs, some do not. Some men have facial 
hair, some do not.” 51 At times, our anatomical and sexual char-
acteristics bear greater resemblance across the sexes than within. 
For instance, where does a prison place a trans-woman who has 
developed breasts but has testes and a penis? Transgender people 
who may manifest sexual characteristics from “both” genders 
cannot be properly classified because no place currently exists 
for them.
A genitalia-based classification system privileges so-
called post-operative prisoners over pre-operative and non-
 operative prisoners. Existing policies provide drastically different 
fates for similarly situated people. Transgender prisoners experi-
ence extremely inconsistent treatment based on the whims of the 
staff. Likewise, non-discrimination policies designed to produce 
policy consistency and accountability are undermined by genita-
lia classification policies.
3. non-DiSCrimination poliCieS are renDereD 
ineFFeCtive by ClaSSiFiCation poliCieS
The overall prevalence of transgender discrimination, 
such as unequal access to programs or extensive verbal abuse, 
is unknown. A 2003 survey by the Transgender Law Center and 
National Center for Lesbian Rights revealed that, from a 150-
person sample, 14% of respondents reported experiencing dis-
crimination within prisons.52 Such a high report expresses the 
need for prisons’ responsiveness, and is demonstrative of the 
prisons’ failure to address bias against transgender prisoners. 
Failure to recognize transgender prisoners or their rights is an 
example of institutional discrimination by the criminal justice 
system. Until the U.S. prison system can systemically recognize 
transgender rights, isolated jurisdictional efforts will have a lim-
ited impact. Most anomalous, however, is the dual existence of 
non-discrimination policies protecting transgender prisoners and 
codified discrimination against them within some jurisdictions.53 
When jurisdictions adopt trans-inclusive non-discrimination 
policies and yet maintain genitalia-based classification, neither 
policy is effective.
Prisons and associated agencies undermine their own 
non-discrimination policy by simultaneously adopting a classifi-
cation-by-genitalia policy. There are legitimate reasons for each 
policy, which serve independent functions. Non-discrimination 
policies are part of a larger prison accountability system that 
helps protect prisoners from inequity. On the other hand, clas-
sification policies are essential for efficient procedural systems. 
On their face, these systems appear to have distinctive purposes. 
While a non-discrimination policy requires equal treatment 
among prisoners, they can also mask the existence of discrimina-
tion. If all prisoners are subject to the same procedures, including 
classification for housing and other purposes, then it may be rea-
soned that no discrimination is present. The interaction of non-
discrimination policies and genitalia-based classification policies 
in the case of transgender prisoners, however, demonstrates sys-
temic weaknesses.
 Systemic weaknesses should be remedied, not ignored. 
If the criminal justice system incarcerates large numbers of trans-
gender people, it must accept the necessity of reform to accom-
modate their needs.54 Well-intentioned efforts to recognize 
transgender people are rendered ineffective by antiquated clas-
sification policies. To address this moral and practical problem, 
the District of Columbia is offering an innovative model.
iv. The disTricT of coLumBia ProPoses a  
non-geniTaLia Based cLassificaTion sysTem
1. tranSgenDer people are tHe neweSt proteCteD 
ClaSS unDer D.C.’S non-DiSCrimination law
Patti Shaw was involved in a domestic dispute with her 
husband on October 26, 2003 in the District of Columbia. Dur-
ing booking at the police station, the officers found court records 
indicating a prior arrest under the name Melvin Lee Hammond. 
The court system did not have a way to change her name or gen-
der identification without a judge’s order, even though Patti had 
a legal name change and sex re-assignment surgery. She was 
placed in a male cellblock overnight while awaiting arraignment. 
The next morning Patti Shaw reported being sexually assaulted 
by one or more male prisoners. The incident prompted D.C. law 
enforcement to examine its criminal records system.55
Two years later, the D.C. City Council passed the Human 
Rights Clarification Amendment Act of 2005. The amendment 
added “gender identity or expression” to its non-discrimination 
law, the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977.56 The primary impe-
tus for the amendment came from a desire to clarify lawmakers’ 
original intent to protect transgender people. Public testimony on 
the Act from the Gay and Lesbian Activists Alliance (“GLAA”), 
D.C.’s major gay and lesbian rights organization, revealed that 
D.C. had historically protected transgender people against dis-
crimination based on “personal appearance.” 57 GLAA and 
transgender rights’ advocates argued that lawmakers had always 
intended to protect transgender people even though the statute 
did not identify “gender identity and expression” as a protected 
status.58
Whatever the act’s original intention, transgender D.C. 
residents needed its protection. Different Avenues, a non-profit 
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for young adults affected by violence, HIV, and discrimination, 
reported that 60% of the transgender population surveyed by the 
D.C. Administration of HIV and AIDS had a yearly income of 
$10,000 or less.” 59 The D.C. Council adopted the addition on 
December 6, 2005.60 D.C. residents like Patti Shaw were unam-
biguously included in the protection of the city’s non-discrimi-
nation law.
2. D.C.’S Department oF CorreCtionS  
propoSeD new poliCy eStabliSHeS Deliberative 
boDy For genDer ClaSSiFiCation
Led by the D.C. Trans-Coalition (“D.C.T.C.”), a trans-
gender political advocacy group, a campaign was launched to 
enforce the Human Rights Act within the city’s Department of 
Corrections (“D.O.C.”). D.C.T.C., along with other local and 
national advocates and lawyers sought to alter D.O.C.’s policy 
regarding transgender prisoners, including its classification and 
hormone therapy procedures.
On January 5, 2009, the D.O.C. issued a new directive 
revising its classification and housing policies within its opera-
tions.61 The policies’ purpose is substantially broad as it seeks 
to establish procedures appropriate for “transgender, transsexual, 
inter-sex, and gender variant persons” incarcerated by the D.O.C.62 
Like the previous May 10, 2008 policy, the directive includes 
definitions for “gender expression,” “inter-sex,” “sexual orienta-
tion,” “transsexual,” and “gender variant”; a non- discrimination 
statement, and initial intake procedures for gender determination. 
Gender determination has been a routine procedure for all pris-
oners, but the directive made it more detailed for gender-variant 
inmates. If staff believes that there is a discrepancy between a 
prisoner’s gender and genitalia after a physical examination, then 
the policy calls for more extensive protocol including a genitalia 
examination by medical staff.63
Two significant changes appeared in the new policy. 
First, transgender prisoners who wish to begin hormone therapy 
are permitted to do so with medical authorization. Although 
some other jurisdictions currently permit hormone therapy con-
tinuation, very few permit new therapy to begin while in prison. 
This change is a significant step forward for prisoners’ men-
tal and physical well-being (for those who can afford it). More 
important, however, is the second revision creating a Transgen-
der Committee. The Transgender Committee is an appointed 
D.O.C. body comprised of a “medical practitioner, mental health 
clinician, a correctional supervisor, a case manager, and D.O.C. 
approved volunteer knowledgeable about transgender issues.” 64 
It is charged to determine prisoner classification after review-
ing a prisoner’s records, conducting a prisoner interview, and 
evaluating a prisoner’s vulnerability to abuse within the general 
prison population. After an initial intake, a prisoner will remain 
in protective custody (consistent with the prisoner’s genitalia) up 
to 72 hours until classification is determined by the Transgen-
der Committee.65 These revisions reflect a sea change that cor-
responds with increased transgender visibility, advocacy, and 
understanding.
No other U.S. prison policy provides for a collabora-
tive body for gender classification, and no other peer nation66 
has an equivalent prison policy. Most similar to this model is the 
United Kingdom’s legal sex change panel process established by 
the Gender Recognition Act of 2004.67 Any person over 18 who 
wishes to legally change his or her sex must apply to a regional 
committee that considers “evidence” from medical profession-
als confirming that person’s gender dysphoria.68 An approved 
application issues a gender recognition certificate that changes a 
person’s legal documentation to reflect his or her “acquired” gen-
der.69 There is no comparable federal process within the United 
States, where birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and other legal 
documents may be changed depending on each state’s law. The 
District of Columbia has adopted the most progressive transgen-
der prisoner classification in the country to date.
v. moving Toward a PosiTive Transgender 
Prisoner righTs Law
1. enHanCing D.C.’S moSt reCent  
poliCy propoSal
Representatives from D.C.T.C., the Washington Law-
yers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and Just 
Detention International submitted several recommendations to 
D.O.C. about how to improve the new proposed policy previously 
discussed in the last section.70 Concerns evident in these recom-
mendations stress the need for more accountability, particularly 
as community advocates fear that the Transgender Committee 
will become a mere formality by declining to take an active role 
in re-classifying prisoners.
Three recommendations reflect this concern. First, 
although the Transgender Committee would conduct impor-
tant work, “further clarification [i]s needed to specify how the 
Committee will make and document its decisions.” 71 Aware that 
D.O.C. has adopted the most transgender-friendly policy in the 
country, this recommendation identifies Committee transparency 
as a key component for gauging its progress. Second, the policy 
should “explicitly state that the Transgender Committee’s recom-
mendation can be appealed.” 72 Any deliberative body without an 
appeals process lies contrary to current national standards, such 
as PREA, that recommend periodic review for vulnerable pris-
oners.73 An appeals process will ensure that transgender prison-
ers will have more opportunity to protect their rights, especially 
when a genitalia policy remains the default classification policy. 
Finally, “in some cases, placing a transgender inmate in collec-
tive protective custody with other transgender inmates may be 
the least restrictive option for maintaining the inmate’s safety, 
and therefore should be included as a possibility.”74 This recom-
mendation underlines administrative segregation problems and 
offers an alternative: a transgender housing unit. “Collective pro-
tective custody” is perhaps the fairest option compared to gen-
eral population or segregation, but it runs the risk of prisoner 
ghettoization.
Flexible self-identification remains the ideal classifica-
tion policy. Several non-U.S. jurisdictions have adopted some 
form of this policy. New South Wales, Australia, for example, 
presumes that “inmates have a right to be placed in the facility 
of their ‘gender identification’ unless it is determined, on a case-
by-case basis, that they should be placed elsewhere.” 75 Within 
this system, default classification falls on gender identity, not 
genitalia. Flexibility is essential for the same reasons discussed 
in previous sections about the complex relationships among gen-
der identity, expression, and body diversity. A trans-man, for 
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instance, may be extremely vulnerable in a male population, even 
though he is male-identified. Most importantly, self-identification 
policies do not only best serve gender variant prisoners, but are a 
reasonable management option.76
2. targeting tranSgenDer Criminalization
Self-identification prison policies affirm prisoners’ basic 
human dignity and preserve their rights under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. However, such policies alone will not fully address the issue. 
Transgender over-incarceration remains the heart of the problem. 
The criminal justice system cannot understand the increase of 
this community within prisons walls if it does not examine the 
reasons underpinning the trend.
Transgender criminalization is part of an insidious 
continuum of societal discrimination against gender noncon-
formity. The U.S. imprisoned population has grown 390% in 24 
years.77 People of color and poor people have been dispropor-
tionately affected by this increase, and “transgender and gender 
non-conforming people are disproportionately poor, homeless, 
criminalized, and imprisoned.” 78 Entrenched job discrimination, 
low income levels, and exposure to other risk factors essentially 
create a prison pipeline. Many transgender people are forced to 
commit “survival crimes” such as sex work and healthcare supply 
theft due to narrowed economic access and opportunity; and evi-
dence of police trans-profiling further compounds imprisonment 
rates.79 Opposing workplace discrimination, cracking down on 
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i. The ProLogue 1 
In the beginning was the word
And the word was Death
And the word was nigger
And the word was death to all niggers
And the word was death to all life
And the word was death to all
 peace be still . . .
In the name of peace 
They waged the wars
 ain’t they got no shame
In the name of peace
Lot’s wife is now a product of the Morton company
 nah they ain’t got no shame . . . 
Cause they killed the Carthaginians 
in the great appian way
And they killed the Moors 
“to civilize a nation” 
And they just killed the earth 
And blew out the sun in the name of a god
Whose genesis was white
And war wooed god
And america was born
Where war became peace
And genocide patriotism
And honor is a happy slave 
cause all god’s chillun need rhythm 
And glory hallelujah why can’t peace 
 be still
The great emancipator was a bigot
 ain’t they got no shame
And making the world safe for democracy
Were twenty million slaves
 nah they ain’t got no shame . . .
The rumblings of this peace must be stilled
 be stilled be still
ahh Black people
ain’t we got no pride?2 
ain’T no Peace unTiL we geT a Piece: exPLoring The 
JusTiciaBiLiTy and PoTenTiaL mechanisms of reParaTions 
for american BLacks Through uniTed sTaTes Law, 
sPecific modes of inTernaTionaL Law, and The 





As Germany and other interests that profited owed 
reparations to Jews following the holocaust of Nazi 
persecution, America and other interests that profited 
owe reparations to blacks following the holocaust of 
African slavery which has carried forward from slav-
ery’s inception for 350-odd years to the end of U.S. 
government-embraced racial discrimination.3 
* * *
The civil-rights struggle involves the black man 
taking his case to the white man’s court. But when 
he fights it at the human-rights level, it is a differ-
ent situation. It opens the door to take Uncle Sam to 
the world court. The black man doesn’t have to go to 
court to be free. Uncle Sam should be taken to court 
and made to tell why the black man is not free in a so-
called free society. Uncle Sam should be taken to the 
United Nations and charged with violating the UN 
charter of human rights. You can forget civil rights.  
. . . It is absolutely impossible to do it in Uncle Sam’s 
courts—whether it is the Supreme Court or any other 
kind of court that comes under Uncle Sam’s jurisdic-
tion. The only alternative that the black man has in 
America today is to take it out of Senator Dirksen’s 
and Senator Eastland’s and President Johnson’s juris-
diction and take it downtown on the East River and 
place it before that body of men who represent inter-
national law, and let them know that the human rights 
of black people are being violated in a country that 
professes to be the moral leader of the free world.4 
* * *
The imagination of the academic philosopher can-
not recreate the experience of life on the bottom . . . 
The technique of imagining oneself black and poor in 
some hypothetical world is less effective than study-
ing the actual experience of black poverty and lis-
tening to those who have done so. When notions of 
right and wrong, justice and injustice, are examined 
not from an abstract position but from the position of 
groups who have suffered through history, moral rel-
ativism recedes and identifiable normative priorities 
emerge . . . reparations is a legal concept generated 
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from the bottom. It arises not out of abstraction, but 
from experience.5 
* * *
I am an invisible man . . . I am invisible, understand, 
simply because people refuse to see me . . . When 
they approach me they see only my surroundings, 
themselves, or figments of their imagination—in-
deed, everything and anything except me.6 
ii. inTroducTion
Kugichagulia – Self-determination: To define ourselves, name 
ourselves, create for ourselves and speak for ourselves.7 
The oppression of people of color,8 particularly Black 
people,9 and the economic growth of America has historically 
been in direct proportion. The success, then, of American capital-
ism and imperialism has rested in the marginalization of Black 
people through chattel slavery, de jure and de facto segregation, 
and racial discrimination.10 These institutional and structural 
hindrances11 result in several challenges, including: low rates of 
home, land, and resource ownership; overrepresentation in jails 
and prisons; underrepresentation in areas of educational attain-
ment; significantly larger proportions of unemployed and under-
employed persons and low rates of business ownership; the lack 
of access to healthcare and high rates of disease contraction12; and 
single parenthood, orphanage, and the destruction and disconnec-
tion of the Black family. The perpetuation of such marginalizing 
and interweaving systems wrought ills on a people, ultimately 
dispossessing and disenfranchising the whole. Reparations, then, 
while owed as repair for previous harms and their resulting ills, 
are key to remedying the current condition and instrumental in 
closing the gap of disparity.13 While damages cannot account for 
all losses, and it is impossible to restore the aggrieved wholly, it 
is backwards to maintain a structure that profits the beneficia-
ries of a maliciously designed system, while simultaneously dis-
counting the real harms of the injured parties—American Blacks. 
Those who disagree engage in the malicious cycle that continues 
to marginalize Black people.
This indignation demonstrates ignorance of history, 
economics, and sociology, and manifests the damage of Ameri-
can imperialism and the perversion of its design. Even the lan-
guage that typifies this dynamic is inverted to further confuse 
and detract from this perpetually marginalizing structure. Such 
behavior maintains a system where the ugly become beautiful, 
the oppressed become the oppressors, and the powerful become 
the powerless. As rapper Nas describes it: “Anytime we men-
tion our history, existence or condition, they calling it reverse 
racism.”14 Brother Malcolm15 contended the same:
So I don’t believe in violence—that’s why I 
want to stop it. And you can’t stop it with love, 
not love of those things down there. No! So, 
we only mean vigorous action in self-defense, 
and that vigorous action we feel we’re justified 
in initiating by any means necessary. Now, for 
saying something like that, the press calls us 
racist and people who are “violent in reverse.” 
This is where they psycho you. They make you 
think that if you try to stop the Klan from lynch-
ing you, you’re practicing violence in reverse. 
Pick up on this, I hear a lot of you parrot what 
the man says. You say, “I don’t want to be a 
Ku Klux Klan in reverse.” Well, if a criminal 
comes around your house with his gun, brother, 
just because he’s got a gun and he’s robbing 
your house, and he’s a robber, it doesn’t make 
you a robber because you grab your gun and 
run him out. No, the man is using some tricky 
logic on you. I say it is time for black people to 
put together the type of action, the unity, that is 
necessary to pull the sheet off of them so they 
won’t be frightening black people any longer. 
That’s all. And when we say this, the press calls 
us “racist in reverse.” “Don’t struggle except 
within the ground rules that the people you’re 
struggling against have laid down.” Why this is 
insane, but it shows how they can do it. With 
skillful manipulating of the press they’re able 
to make the victim look like the criminal and 
the criminal look like the victim.16
Rapper and activist Immortal Technique simply encap-
sulates the idea of deconstructing the language and systems of 
the oppressor through revolutionary empowerment—a sentiment 
present in the philosophies articulated above: “My revolution is 
borne out of love for my people, not hatred for others.”17 It is 
understandable that a pervasive backward sentiment continues to 
inform and foment a malicious infrastructure in both law and 
society, unfortunately to the detriment of an already historically-
maligned people. This paper, then, explores the usage of interna-
tional law and American law under the auspices of international 
law to access reparations and facilitate the carving out of self-
 determination for Black people. This presents a unique irony 
where the law is applied as an inversion of its design since it has 
historically protected others’ rights while marginalizing Black 
people.
Kara Walker, Camptown Ladies, May 1, 2006.
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iii. an hisToricaL overview of The  
framework of disPossession of american 
BLacks and The need for reParaTions
To tell the truth, the proof of success lies in a whole social struc-
ture being changed from the bottom up. The extraordinary impor-
tance of this change is that it is willed, called for, demanded. The 
need for this change exists in its crude state, impetuous and com-
pelling, in the consciousness and in the lives of men and women 
who are colonized. But the possibility of this change is equally 
experienced in the form of a terrifying future in the conscious-
ness of another “species” of men and women: the colonizers.18
The Transatlantic Slave trade,19 the beginning of Maafa, 
the African Holocaust, lasted from the 15th century to the 19th 
century, and brought enslaved Africans to America shortly after 
the settlement of Jamestown, Virginia in 1607.20 The Thirteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ended the practice of slav-
ery in 1865 after the Civil War,21 though the marginalization of 
Black people persisted long after. Through a series of de jure 
and de facto mechanisms of racial segregation—manifested in 
Southern Black Codes and Jim Crow laws,22 the practice of racial 
discrimination continued throughout the country. These laws 
marginalized Blacks, dispossessing them of civil and political 
rights in fair trials23, enfranchisement24 and equality of educa-
tion, and use of public and private facilities.25 The discriminatory 
mechanisms also denied American Blacks economic, social, and 
cultural rights, affecting their access to employment, housing and 
property ownership, healthcare, the expression of their culture 
and heritage, and their right to life, generally.26 Many of these 
inequities continue, and their unequal effects are easily linked to 
the enslavement and ownership of Africans.
These practices, resulting in the detachment of Ameri-
can Blacks as right-bearers, stakeholders, and full participants in 
a purportedly democratic society, illustrated that access to citi-
zenship and entitlement to rights required something more than 
Black people possessed. This is evident because they were still 
not guaranteed the full promise of these rights after the passage 
of legislation and adoption of court rulings. Collectively, Ameri-
can Blacks continued to face structural impediments, not often 
overcome by individual successes (though they are celebrated), 
because of the traditional lack of value ascribed to the people. 
This development of a Black underclass ultimately disconnects 
Blacks from society.27 Whiteness,28 then, as a social construct 
provided subjectively positive value, democratic participation, 
and general acceptance in the society, particularly applied in con-
nection with citizenship. This privilege is compounded by centu-
ries of imperialism and concomitant devaluation of communities 
of color, specifically the Black community.
Since America’s political and economic traditions are 
based on a system of private property and capitalism, borne of 
thinkers like John Locke, democratic participation is premised 
on property ownership.29 Property is a natural right derived 
through labor, with ownership contingent upon “useful” develop-
ment and value of the land.30 This natural right31 precedes gov-
ernmental sovereignty, based on a social contract in which the 
people consent to being governed. As such, the government is 
subject to the will and volition of the people32—presupposing 
the people’s right to revolution.33 This ultimately connects fun-
damental rights (including the right to revolt or hold government 
accountable),34 democratic participation (governmental access 
and engagement),35 and value (societal contribution and intrinsic 
worthiness),36 to ownership of private property. The benefactors 
of this oppressive structure designed it for their own success (and 
continued success for their progeny) by directly exploiting37 and 
dispossessing enslaved Africans of private property ownership 
and depriving them of control over their own labor. The govern-
ment sanctioned this system, and White society perpetuated it. 
It deprived enslaved Africans of property ownership (inhered 
value in this society)40 and subjected them to the expropriation 
of their work.41 The direct result of this systemic marginalization 
influenced the place Black people stand in today—deprivation 
of access to democracy, citizenship, and participation in gov-
ernmental functions,42 and the intrinsic value43 manifested in 
subjective conceptions of cognizable societal contributions and 
“earned” wealth.
Extending the elimination of American Blacks’ demo-
cratic participation for almost four centuries,44 these economic, 
political, white supremacist, and governmental systems funda-
mentally led to the incapacitation of Black self-determination in 
this country. The harm done is three-fold: (1) American Blacks 
were denied value45 and worth, which in a zero-sum framework 
of capitalism protects whiteness and privilege46 as a core value 
(this dictated Black inability to engage in the development and 
execution of the democratic and political processes that have sus-
tained this society and government); (2) they were deprived of the 
capacity to acquire capital and resources to sustain a living for 
themselves and their descendants,47 and (3) they were deprived 
of this right so long that there have not been sufficient gains to 
overwhelm the ills designed to marginalize them.
iv. an overview of The fighT for reParaTions 
for american BLacks
Mr. Backlash, Backlash who do you think I am. You raise my 
taxes and freeze my wages, send my son to Vietnam. You give me 
 second-class houses, second-class schools; do you think that all 
colored people are just second-class fools. Mr. Backlash, I’m 
gonna leave you with the blues, yes I am. When I try to find a 
job, to earn a little cash. All you got offer is your mean old white 
backlash, but the world is big, big and bright and round. And 
it’s full of other folks like me who are black, yellow, beige, and 
brown. Mr. Backlash, I’m gonna leave you with the blues, yes I 
am. When Langston Hughes died, when he died he told me many 
months before, he said Nina keep on working till they open up the 
door. And one of these days when you made it and the doors are 
open wide, make sure you tell ‘em exactly where its at so they’ll 
have no place to hide. So Mr. Backlash, Mr. Backlash, Hear me 
now, someone in here, yeah somehow, someway. I’m gonna leave 
you with the blues.48
The fight for Black reparations began in the 16th cen-
tury in pre-colonial African rebellions, demanding reparations 
for the enslaved Africans traded throughout the New World.49 
The struggle was documented in other periods including: (1) pre-
and post-Reconstruction, (2) the beginning of the 20th century, 
(3) the Marcus Garvey Back to Africa Movement, (4) the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and (5) today, as the 
post-Civil Liberties Act era, beginning in 1989.50 These periods 
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brought about increasingly polarized attitudes, particularly dur-
ing the pre- and post-Reconstruction periods and the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s.51 The existence of affirmative 
action changed only the dialogue of reparations, and did not avert 
the goals of those seeking repair for the damage caused by the 
racially-perverse and oppressive systems under American gov-
ernance, which diminished the collective capacity of American 
Blacks for self-determination.
The pre- and post-Reconstruction reparations move-
ments can be characterized in consonant terms with the move-
ment of abolitionism. Not all abolitionists favored reparations 
for enslaved Africans in the pre-Reconstruction period, or freed-
men in the post-Reconstruction period. The central arguments for 
reparations generated mostly from this group (though surely the 
marginalized persons themselves were ardent supporters of repa-
rations, an idea typically lost in the historical characterization, 
as Levitt points out).52 In the pre-Reconstruction period, Special 
Field Order No. 15 issued by General William Tecumseh Sher-
man, on January 16, 1865, provided that 485,000 acres of white-
owned land would be taken and redistributed to more than 18,000 
newly freed Black families. This granted them possessory titles 
to the land and settled them respectively, on 40-acre plots and the 
loan of a federal government mule to work the land.53 General 
Sherman did not have congressional authority but acted lawfully 
under his power through the Freedman Act.54 In 1865, after the 
assassination of President Lincoln, President Andrew Johnson 
revoked the orders and pardoned many white Southerners for 
their treasonous secession.55 The order became popularized56 in 
American history, by proponents of reparations as the promise of 
40-acres and a mule for Black families.57 
White people became more vocal supporters of repara-
tions for the enslaved African,58 as when Congressman Thaddeus 
Stevens demanded land be redistributed to provide remedy to 
American Blacks for the ills of slavery, and to combat one of 
the central problems of the South: “a landed gentry and a land-
less proletariat.” 59 In 1861, Stevens introduced a bill to Congress 
authorizing the President to seize Confederate lands to redis-
tribute to the formerly enslaved Africans.60 In 1865, President 
Johnson, reversed this legislative victory for enslaved Africans 
and restored lands to their white antebellum owners.61 The repa-
rations movement came to a halt in the 1880s as a result of his 
stifling.62 Johnson’s actions single-handedly undermined the 
beginning of the cause for Black reparations at a crucial point in 
time, circumventing a true Reconstruction.
The reparations movement at the beginning of the 
20th century persisted in various capacities. Industrialization of 
Northern cities and the birth of Black ghettos encouraged the 
growth of the movement in cities. The cause for Black repara-
tions in rural and agrarian areas grew due to land reform during 
Reconstruction, sharecropping, and partition, voluntary, and tax 
sale of heirs’ property—all contributors to Black rural land loss 
(all from the design of (White) business interests—protected and 
facilitated by the American legal system).63 This played a signifi-
cant role in the increasing marginalization of American Blacks.64 
Reparations in this period were borne not just from past injus-
tices, but from contemporary wrongs, including malicious gov-
ernment and complicit white-owned industry action against the 
interests of American Blacks.
The reparations movement was simultaneously cham-
pioned and eclipsed by the Marcus Garvey Movement. Marcus 
Garvey called for pan-Africanism of Black people and the for-
mation of a Black homeland.65 This was the major focus of his 
Universal Negro Improvement Association (“UNIA”).66 Garvey 
also favored reparations for the exploitation of Black labor and 
saw this as critical to generating funding for the creation a Black 
homeland.67 But, the movement lost footing when Garvey was 
indicted for mail fraud and deported to Jamaica68 (with much 
speculation that his indictment was a political tactic by the White 
power structure to defray Black economic and social mobility). 
One of the Founders of UNIA, Queen Mother Audly Moore, con-
tinued championing the cause for reparations, and is commonly 
recognized as the mother of reparations.69 She sought redress and 
reparations of American Blacks through the American democratic 
structure.70 Others focused on the attainment of civil and politi-
cal rights, and this cause expanded in the subsequent period.
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, like 
the turn of the century movement, included reparations for ills 
perpetuated against American Blacks under the marginalizing 
governmental structure, as part of the focus on economic devel-
opment.71 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote:
No amount of gold could provide an adequate 
compensation for the exploitation and humili-
ation of the Negro in America down through 
the centuries . . . . Yet a price can be placed 
on unpaid wages. The ancient common law has 
always provided a remedy for the appropriation 
of the labor of one human being by another. 
This law should be made to apply for American 
Negroes. The payment should be in the form of 
a massive program by the government of spe-
cial, compensatory measures, which could be 
regarded as a settlement in accordance with the 
accepted practice of common law.72 
Though their mechanisms and means of attaining Black self-
 determination were different, both Dr. King and Malcolm X 
agreed. Brother Malcolm contended:
If you are the son of a man who had a wealthy 
estate and you inherit your father’s estate, you 
have to pay off the debts that your father incurred 
before he died. The only reason that the present 
generation of white Americans are in a posi-
tion of economic strength . . . is because their 
fathers worked our fathers for over 400 years 
with no pay . . . . We were sold from plantation 
to plantation like you sell a horse, or a cow, or 
a chicken, or a bushel of wheat . . . . All that 
money . . . is what gives the present generation 
of American whites the ability to walk around 
the earth with their chest out . . . like they have 
some kind of economic ingenuity. Your father 
isn’t here to pay. My father isn’t here to col-
lect. But I’m here to collect and you’re here to 
pay.73
The Black Manifesto, penned at the National Black 
Economic Development Conference74 in 1969 demanded, “Fif-
teen dollars per nigger,” or “$500 million from White Christian 
churches and Jewish synagogues.” 75 James Forman, once leader 
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of the Student Nonviolent Coordinat-
ing Committee (“SNCC”), contended 
that this amount be assessed against 
the groups for their participation in the 
exploitation of the American Negro 
who was, “kept in bondage and polit-
ical servitude and forced to work as 
slaves by the military machinery and 
the Christian church working hand 
in hand.” 76 It is notable that, with 
the deaths of civil rights leaders like 
Medgar Evers (1963), El Hajj Malik 
El-Shabazz (1965), and Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. (1968), among others, 
there was a strong collective support 
of reparations for American Blacks 
within the Black community77 (with 
some exceptions), but also by white 
individuals and groups. This is remi-
niscent of the Reconstruction period 
where White abolitionists supported 
Black reparations, probably because 
of the polarizing nature of the social 
climate.
In the post-Civil Liberties 
Act era, there was renewed vigor in the reparations movement, 
after the passage of an act formally apologizing and provid-
ing reparations to Japanese- Americans interned during World 
War II.78 Though the marginalization of Japanese-Americans 
was egregious, it did not arise to the level nor continue for the 
length of chattel slavery of enslaved Africans and the continued 
marginalization of their descendants in America.79 Reparations 
activists felt that these reparations were a victory for marginal-
ized groups, generally, but in some respect, represented contin-
ued contempt for American Blacks, by acknowledging concrete 
harms exacted against one group for a period of several years and 
refusing the acknowledge the harm done to another—concrete 
and enduring—for centuries.80 Though the Civil Liberties Act of 
1988 did nothing substantive for the goals of black reparations, it 
still increased fervor for the cause.
In 1989, Representative John Conyers and in the early 
1990s Massachusetts State Senator William Owens introduced 
reparations legislation,81 that failed to garner enough support. 
Conyers’ proposed legislation required the U.S. government to 
(1) acknowledge the fundamental inhumanity and injustice of 
 slavery, (2) establish a commission to study the effects of eco-
nomic and racial discrimination against formerly enslaved Afri-
cans, (3) study the impact that these institutional disparities have 
had, and (4) allow the Commission to make recommendations to 
Congress for the redress of harm. Conyers has introduced HR 
40 every year since.82 In the 21st century, many city councils 
have passed resolutions to urge Congress to consider reparations 
for slavery, in support of Conyers’ bill.83 Other coalitions have 
organized to develop strategies on how best to pursue efforts for 
reparations.84 There have been many unsuccessful claims for 
reparations for American Blacks in U.S. courts.85 The cases in 
the following section had some measure of success or present a 
unique opportunity to gain some ground in this struggle for repa-
rations, to counteract the pernicious system of marginalization 
that plagued American Blacks, and this country, for centuries.
vi. cLaims for reParaTions  
Through The  
uniTed sTaTes LegaL sTrucTure
The whole commerce between master and slave is a 
perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, 
the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and 
degrading submission on the other. Our children see 
this, and learn to imitate it; for man is an imitative 
animal . . . For in a warm climate, no man will labour 
for himself who can make another labour for him. This 
is so true, that of the proprietors of slaves a very small 
proportion indeed are ever seen to labour. And can the 
liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have 
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds 
of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God? 
That they are not to be violated but with his wrath? 
Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that 
God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever: that 
considering numbers, nature and natural means only, 
a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of 
situation, is among possible events: that it may become 
probable by supernatural interference! 86
In examining the U.S. legal structure and con-
sideration of reparations, two things must be considered: (1) will 
it actually work and (2) who will reap the benefits.87 The com-
mitment (or lack thereof) to racial justice in the U.S. places those 
seeking repair from racial discrimination in a peculiar predica-
ment. Judging from the past, reparations through the U.S. legal 
structure would prove useless since it has been U.S. law that has 
oppressed American Blacks.88 This does not mean that repara-
tions will never be won, just that other avenues may need to be 
explored. Some contend that the difficulty in assessing whom 
reparations should benefit overcomes the need to provide them, 
but this does not justify the beneficiaries of these marginalizing 
institutional systems, keeping the ill-gotten wealth themselves.89 
In working towards a world without privilege, repair must be 
given to those so severely damaged.
Identifying plaintiffs for claims has not been as diffi-
cult as opponents have depicted. The class of claims that have 
been dismissed throughout the years have identified individuals 
or classes of people harmed by de jure and de facto discrimi-
nation and racial segregation. For those who contend American 
constitutional and contractual issues of privity, standing, and 
nexus preclude damages outside of these structures, some sug-
gest examining the reparations issue in a broader perspective. 
Critical legal scholar Mari Matsuda suggests the structure below, 
similar to a class action suit:90
 The standard legal  A claim in reparations
 claim resembles:  looks like this:
 Plaintiff A  Plaintiff Class A
 (individual victim)  (victim group members)
 v.  v.
 Defendant B  Defendant Class B
 (perpetrator of recent  (perpetrator descendants
 wrong-doing)  and current beneficiaries  
  of past injustice)
Photo credit unknown, Peter, an 
enslaved Black man, whipped by 
his overseer, taken April 12, 1863.
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This is because according to Matsuda:
Several components of the standard legal claim 
are not apart of the second illustration. First, 
the horizontal intragroup connections are 
absent. Not all members of the group are simi-
larly situated. Some are rich, some poor. Some 
feel betrayed, others do not. Some are easily 
identified as group members, others have weak 
claims to membership.
a. inDiviDual ClaimS For reparationS  
From ameriCan blaCkS, Statutory ClaimS, anD 
legiSlative proviSionS For reparationS
But you did everything you could to be ill-informed by develop-
ing the art of forgetting.91
Civil suits for damages have been marginally more suc-
cessful than claims for reparations from the ills of slavery. What 
is unique about the following claims is that they seek repara-
tions for ills not from slavery, but practices that deprived them of 
resources already acquired, with the exception of the Ohio case. 
These can be examined, then, as claims for restitution, which 
are not very far-removed from claims of reparations, as they 
are more akin to suits alleging race-based wrongdoing through 
exploitation, deprivation, or marginalization, which are a kind 
of Black reparations. Kennedy presents a unique parameter with 
which to examine the future of reparations because it was a tort-
based claim based solely on deprivation and access to a funda-
mental resource. The cases are included because it is beneficial 
to examine attempts at restitution through the law for race-based 
wrongs exacted against American Blacks, as many civil rights 
cases were based on negative rights—government and indus-
try restraint from discrimination and segregation—and positive 
rights to the extent of provision of education, not recompense for 
such wrongs.
a. Pigford v. glickman : 91 RepaRations foR  
Black faRmeRs
This case was a class-action lawsuit of Black farmers 
from fifteen states against the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”).93 It resulted in a settlement of $2.25 billion awarded 
to the plaintiffs for the denial of federal benefits,94 discrimina-
tory USDA lending practices, and ultimately lost land for Black 
farmers.95 The consent decree in the class-action suit was thought 
“fair, adequate and reasonable” by Judge Paul L. Friedman, since 
it provided discharge of farmers’ outstanding USDA debt, injunc-
tive relief, and the receipt (for some) of $50,000 cash payments 
(less $12,500 in taxes to the IRS).96 The Judge acknowledged, 
however, that the case would “not undo all that has been done,” 97 
since the 401 claimants named in the case98 only wanted their 
land back.99
There are more than 66,000 Black farmers today who 
were excluded when they missed notifications of the lawsuit in 
1999.100 In February of 2005, some of them met with the Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee on civil rights hearings, 
hoping to urge Congress to develop a legislative solution to the 
discriminatory practices.101 This case represents some recognition 
of wrongdoing and move towards recompense through the U.S. 
legal structure. It has, however, failed to fundamentally address 
the needs of the petitioners, evidenced by the value of land in 
America102 in comparison with $37,500 allotments, especially 
when a good tractor costs at least that much.
B. kennedy, et al. v. city of Zanesville, et al.: 103 
eveRy DRop counts
Sixty-seven of the Black residents of the predomi-
nantly Black neighborhoods of Coal Run and Langan Lane, Ohio 
won a $10.9 million lawsuit104 against the local government 
for intentionally denying them public water service for almost 
fifty years,105 though they lived within one mile of public water 
lines.106 White residents on the same street were extended the 
public water service, and one of the Muskingum County Com-
missioners informed the Black residents that they would not get 
water “until President Bush drops spiral bombs in the holler.” 107 
This deprivation fundamentally speaks to the marginalization of 
American Blacks.
c. RosewooD, floRiDa: Recompense?
In 1923, a race riot occurred in Rosewood, Florida after 
a White woman falsely claimed to have been raped by a Black 
man.108 A mob of Whites took to the streets and destroyed an all-
Black neighborhood, burning houses to the ground and killing 
six Black residents.109 In 1994, the state of Florida passed the 
Rosewood Compensation Act paying each of the nine survivors 
of the tragedy $150,000, and establishing a college fund.110 The 
Rosewood community, however, was never rebuilt, and twenty-
five to thirty families lost their homes to the violence.111 Here 
there was a failure to account for the economic value of all 
losses. Again, we see that while debts must be assessed for egre-
gious acts, monetary compensation does not account for making 
persons whole again.
D. alexander, et al. v. oklahoma, et al.: 112  
Black wall stReet
In Tulsa, in 1921, a race riot was sparked on a similar 
basis as that in Rosewood, Florida.113 A White woman alleged to 
have been raped by a Black man (the veracity of the claim was 
contested, but at this time the only proof of falsity was his word 
against hers), and again a white mob took to the streets.114 Three 
hundred people were killed and a good deal of the Greenwood 
District, recognized as Black Wall Street, because of the promi-
nence of its businesses and the accumulation of Black wealth,115 
was destroyed.116 This included over 600 businesses, churches, 
restaurants, movie theaters, libraries, schools, private airplanes, 
a hospital, bank, and other public goods.117 The estimated prop-
erty damage was $1.5 million (in early 20th century dollars), not 
accounting for the loss of life and livelihood, and the cost of the 
marginalization of Black people.118
A 2001 report by the state of Oklahoma assessed that 
$12 million in damages should be awarded, but the state gover-
nor decried the ability of the state to pay for “past mass crime[s] 
committed by its officials on the state’s behalf.”119 The Oklahoma 
state legislature responded by passing the 1921 Tulsa Oklahoma 
Race Riot Reconciliation Act, awarding more than 300 college 
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scholarships to the descendants of Greenwood residents.120 A 
lawsuit was filed by five of the elderly survivors with the assis-
tance of Professor Charles Ogletree (Harvard law professor, for-
mer director of the Public Defender Service for the District of 
Columbia) and the late Johnnie Cochran (represented OJ Simp-
son in his double-homicide case).121 The plaintiffs were more 
interested in securing resources in education and healthcare than 
financial capital,122 but their suit was thrown out. The courts cited 
the exhaustion of the statute of limitations,123 and the Supreme 
Court refused to grant certiorari. Professor Ogletree appealed 
to Congress to extend the statute of limitations for the case,124 
though there has not been a response to date.
Statutory and legislative provisions for reparations have 
not gained winning ground, though they seem like viable sources. 
None have been wholly successful as damages in individual suits 
have at times proven. Damages have been grossly less than what 
they should be. Statutory claims through citizen-suit provisions 
have been less than marginally successful, but the most promising 
options seem to be: (1) The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 
28 USC § 1346(b)(1); (2) The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981; or (3) The Civil Rights Act of 1979, 28 U.S.C. § 1983.125 
They each still require the constitutional meeting of standing and 
jumping through the other hurdles as required by American juris-
prudence.126 Still, the main problem with these statutes is in their 
application.
The FTCA, commonly used for toxic torts claims, can-
not overcome the retroactivity that only allows its use for harms 
occurring after January 1, 1945.127 Though marginalization of 
American blacks occurred after 1945, this presents a serious 
impediment to obtaining the amounts owed by the beneficia-
ries of Black marginalization, including the American govern-
ment since the 16th century. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 seems 
more promising as it was designed to protect the rights of newly 
enslaved Africans and their progeny.128 It is however, unlikely, 
that this statute would prove helpful as the ensuing 142 years 
since its adoption have been filled with the failure of the govern-
ment (and at times government facilitation in marginalization) to 
protect the rights of Black people from racial discrimination and 
de jure and de facto segregation.
The Civil Rights Act of 1979, commonly known as 
§ 1983,129 has not been helpful for Black people, particularly 
in the criminal context. We consistently see the abuse of state 
actors, particularly state police and prosecutorial misconduct 
towards Black people in the civil, but particularly in the criminal 
context. The recent Oscar Grant, Jena Six, Sean Bell, and Genar-
low Wilson controversies and in a larger context, the failure of 
the government to protect Blacks of the lower 9th Ward of New 
Orleans in the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina tragedy, dem-
onstrate the abuse of state power against Blacks. In short, it is 
not likely that § 1983 would be a viable source of reparations for 
American Blacks.
The legislative capacity for reparations could be viable 
if enough political capital is established. The historical actions of 
this country and its responses to racial justice seem problematic 
if seeking a result through this avenue; though it is more likely to 
generate a result than a court ruling awarding Black reparations 
for the harms of slavery. While we wait for the outcome of Alex-
ander, to see if a Congressional extension of the statute of limi-
tations is provided, we can look to the past successes within the 
political arena. As assessed with Representative Conyers’ efforts, 
legislation too is a disappointing avenue of redress.
vii. examinaTion of reParaTions Through 
sPecific modes of inTernaTionaL Law
While the U.S. is a state party to the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),130 and can be held 
accountable for violations under the auspices of its provisions 
(particularly as a nation that adopted and agreed to respect human 
rights),131 the Covenant requires the exhaustion of all state and 
administrative remedies.132 As outlined above, citizen-suit provi-
sions under specific statutes and civil suits for damages can be 
wholly denied or granted in part. When suits are partially won, 
this creates a greater challenge for remedies under the Covenant, 
as the state has provided some sort of relief to the claimants. 
Similar to the ICCPR state-party membership, the U.S. is 
required to observe jus cogens peremptory norms under the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).133 In this case, 
the U.S. has continuously violated this provision by its systemic 
and systematic discrimination against American Blacks. Again, 
these claims must first be exhausted in federal courts,134 but this 
is problematic because the U.S. debates the binding nature of the 
UDHR.
viii. examinaTion of reParaTions Through  
The covenanT for The eLiminaTion of aLL forms 
of raciaL discriminaTion (“cerd”)
The U.S. became a state party to the Covenant for the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 
1994.135 The International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination required all states parties 
member to the Covenant to refrain from marginalization and the 
denial of rights (negative rights) and to provide guarantees and 
protection (positive rights) for everyone (not just citizens) in its 
territories and under its jurisdiction.136 States parties must also 
condemn propaganda against specific racial and ethnic groups,137 
provide particular economic, social, and cultural, and civil and 
political rights,138 incorporate “immediate and effective mea-
sures in the field of teaching, education, culture, and information” 
with the intent of combating prejudice and promoting cultural 
understanding,139 and provide remedies through its courts, leg-
islation, and institutions,140 among other very progressive mea-
sures.141 While CERD provides the opportunity for state parties 
to denounce their membership in writing (effective one year after 
the date of receipt by the UN Secretary-General)142 and does 
not provide for military force, the phenomenon of globalization 
places an incredible amount of pressure on states, particularly 
Western states (specifically those who denounce other nations 
for their human rights violations) to preserve some semblance of 
equality for their own legitimacy and transparency in the global 
socio-political marketplace.
CERD also has the force of requiring states parties 
to submit reports to the Committee every two years.143 They 
accept reports from groups and individuals claiming to be vic-
tims of actions by states parties,144 though petitioners must have 
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exhausted all domestic remedies before seeking redress through 
CERD (this is not so if domestic proceedings have been unneces-
sarily long).145 The Committee also views reports of non-profit 
organizations and others citing issues prevalent in the state party 
with respect to CERD to give them a more full picture of happen-
ings there. States parties must also undergo review by the Com-
mittee for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
comprised of eighteen committee members of “good moral 
standing.”146 Committee members are those serving of their own 
accord and not nationals to the particular state party under review. 
The Committee submits recommendations and the state party 
must submit written explanations or statements of clarification 
citing how they have complied with the recommendations by pro-
viding remedies for violations or explaining how they will.147
CERD, then, as a mechanism requiring some account-
ability and transparency from its states parties, provides a more 
hopeful measure for American Blacks to seek recourse through 
reparations, particularly with an international audience. As a 
party to CERD the U.S. is subject to Committee Evaluations and 
reports after the submission of their reports148 and since reports 
are designed to monitor the success of states in eliminating racial 
discrimination within its jurisdiction, they provide powerful evi-
dence of an entire nation’s noncompliance with the Covenant, 
their racial inequities, generally, and recourse for wronged par-
ties. The Committee of CERD has found multiple violations for 
the two reports the American government has submitted since 
enacting the international provision (it should have been eight 
reports by 2009 since the U.S.’s membership in 1994, though 
the U.S. submitted its fourth, fifth, and sixth report in a single 
document). It seems likely that the problems found by the Com-
mittee will be helpful in developing the contentions for which 
American Blacks seek redress. The Committee commented on 
the disproportionate amount of Blacks and Latinos incarcerated 
in America’s jails and prisons, as well as police brutality, particu-
larly applied to minorities.149
The Committee also highlighted the severe disparity in 
access and retention of education and employment (particularly 
because affirmative action has been under attack), in addition to 
discriminatory housing and lending practices, racial profiling, 
zero tolerance and three strikes measures that disparately impact 
minorities (Blacks and Latinos in particular), voter discrimination 
and disenfranchisement, violence against migrants and minority 
women, abuse of non-citizens during detention, racial bias in 
capital punishment, failure to enforce federal ameliorative stat-
utes, inferior provision of healthcare/medical services disparately 
impacting minorities and women, diminished protection of work-
ers’ rights, and insufficient provision of civil remedies, among 
many other problematic and systemic violations of CERD.150 In 
its most recent 2007 report to the CERD Committee, the U.S. 
mentions Hurricane Katrina in relation to equitable housing stat-
ing that, “concern has been expressed about the disparate effects 
of Hurricane Katrina on housing for minority residents of New 
Orleans,” asserting that, commentators found that Katrina was a 
result of “poverty (i.e. the inability to evacuate) rather than racial 
discrimination per se.”151 As if the two could be separated into 
clean boxes whereby those victimized by government and other 
designers and beneficiaries of the oppressive systems and struc-
tures, get to choose how they are discriminated against—either 
by race or class. More often than not in this country, the latter is 
informed by the former, and they are inextricably bound to one 
another. In this respect, reparations provide an interesting dimen-
sion to examine this privileged denial of blame, fault, or ben-
efit against the marginalization of Black people, people of color, 
poor people, and particularly poor people of color. In this respect, 
CERD has been useful in requiring some kind of response for the 
blatant and disparate treatment of American Blacks.
The most attractive prospect of CERD’s vitality in the 
cause for reparations is the Committee’s indictment of the U.S. 
on its interpretation of no violation for actions that have not been 
proven to be intentionally discriminatory despite their impact.152 
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9 I will refer to those traded in the Transatlantic system of free labor as enslaved 
Africans, not slaves: slavery was their condition, and defined and typified their 
treatment but did not constitute their existence. I posit that their resounding 
strength and the resilience of their progeny are a testament to this. I will refer to 
the descendants of enslaved Africans in the U.S. as Black people or  American 
Blacks throughout this paper. It is my fundamental belief that “African-
 Americans” is yet another distinction crafted by the majority to characterize a 
people they have historically marginalized and misunderstood. Black inheres at 
the core of our identity because it connects us to other members of the African 
Diaspora, and largely characterizes our familiar yet distinct conditions. Nikki 
Giovanni encapsulates my sentiment best, “For me the noun is Black; American 
is the Adjective.” nikki giovanni, RaciSm 101 at 54 (1994).
10 See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Brown vs. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); 
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (demonstrating the history of de jure and 
de facto segregation and racial discrimination in the U.S.).
11 While some would argue, that institutional impediments are only part of the 
problem (a large part), and that there should also be a focus on building the 
esteem of Black people to address community needs, I will not address that dis-
cussion here, though I agree. I will say that the two are not mutually-exclusive, 
and I believe that we must combat institutional harms by tearing down structural 
strongholds and also building up the love, connectedness, unity, compassion, 
and trust of our community in order to carve out self-determination. The paper 
is limited to discussion of governmental wrongs. Though I recognize the finite 
nature of reparations—that they will not repair all of the damage caused to both 
enslaved Africans and their descendants in America, they certainly provide a 
sound beginning to attaining kujichagulia.
12 Though it will not be explored fully in this work, there is an argument to 
be made that the instruments of gentrification and ghettoization of urban 
 communities promote population density (by respectively pushing urban Blacks 
This particular aspect seems encouraging because the standard 
for proving intentional discrimination domestically, essentially 
requires the demonstration of malintent almost through the cer-
tainty of physical documentation, because the domestic impact 
standard is so limited. It does not account for the subjective and 
normative sociological orientations of humans injected into their 
laws and their interpretation of them. The truth is that this criti-
cal part of examining harms against groups based on the impact 
of racial prejudice (instead of the victimized demonstrating the 
intent of the victimizer) is unlikely to become inhered in the 
American system of jurisprudence. This is particularly because 
of the state of race relations in this country, and the status of 
Black people today.
Among other ills plaguing the Black community, in 
2004, 25% of Black people were living below the poverty line,153 
since 2007, 40.9% of America’s prisons and jails were populated 
with Black bodies with Blacks incarcerated at rates 5.6 times that 
of Whites,154 and recent Supreme Court cases affirmed limita-
tions on voluntary integration,155 a severe detriment to Black 
education when taken in conjunction with the reality of no fun-
damental right to education or second look given to educational 
funding as a means of de facto segregation.156 To boot, the latter 
is exacerbated by laws like No Child Left Behind, which absolve 
government of responsibility to provide critical educational fund-
ing, good teachers, and adequate school buildings, among other 
critical entities, to facilitate the learning and engagement process 
of Black children. The effect of connecting such a dire reality 
(with empirical illustration) to systemic harms caused by chattel 
slavery and harms perpetuated by this society, is too hard a pill 
to swallow for the beneficiaries of this system. As such, while 
CERD is seemingly an attractive legal prospect for remedying 
harms, it serves more as a public, international indictment of the 
U.S.’s refusal to eliminate forms of racial discrimination, and the 
country’s continued commitment to racial injustice.
The problematic application of CERD is again, the 
requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted,157 which 
places the precarious nature of the condition of a people back 
into the domestic courts that have not time and again failed 
them. One hope is that in the increasingly global politicization 
of nations, more care will be given to the perception of domestic 
policy abroad. Though the past eight years have been even more 
difficult generally, hope for grassroots leadership at this junc-
ture to play a critical role in remedying past wrongs and current 
marginalization, seems more feasible. It is understood that move-
ments come from the bottom up—not just with presidencies or 
Congressional majorities and the same is true for the success of 
securing reparations for the marginalization of American Blacks. 
For whether the battle for reparations is won or not, the penulti-
mate goal of carving out the self-determination of Black people 
will provide the peace and begin the healing the community so 
desperately needs. 
ix. ePiLogue 
I want my people to be free, to be free, to be free, want 
black people to be free, to be free, to be free. . . . That’s all that 
matters to me, that’s all that matters to me.
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into outlying areas and warehousing them within other areas) and increase the 
likelihood of the passage of communicable diseases. It is to be said that personal 
responsibility in the form of diet, and exercise, in addition to either employer 
or state responsibility for facilitating access to regular health check-ups, play a 
pivotal role in general disease prevention. Prophylactic protection, education, 
and awareness play a critical role as it relates to the contraction of HIV/AIDS 
specifically, in America, so personal responsibility is most definitely a factor in 
preventing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, education is not the only factor  
in disease contraction and passage, generally, as population density has 
 historically been linked to communicable disease transference, even and includ-
ing  HIV/AIDS.
13 Some argue that reparations ought not be ‘given’ to Black people, but my 
 discussion is premised on the fact that reparations are owed not rewarded. 
Beyond the historical contextualization that follows, I try not to engage in 
providing “reasoning” for reparations, but attempt to demonstrate how marginal-
ization affected other aspects of life and why reparations are the beginning of 
an equitable remedy for American Blacks. There exists a heated and polarized 
debate, centrally focused on two sides: black and white (not surprisingly). 
 Detractors argue that reparations should not be paid to American Blacks princi-
pally because (1) slavery is over and American Blacks should improve their own 
condition (2) not all White people owned enslaved Africans and the descen-
dants of those who did they should not be subjected to paying the debts of their 
ancestors, and (3) Black reparations establish a slippery slope of wrongs to be 
corrected with no tenable end in sight. I will not debate or provide responses to 
these contentions specifically, though it could be said the larger nature of the 
paper speaks to them. They are easily negated by understanding that (1) repara-
tions are assessed as repayment for a debt owed not a charity won, (2) beneficia-
ries of the design of this American system currently profit from the construct of 
their ancestors, and (3) specific models of past reparations paid to other groups 
marginalized by the American government demonstrate that such assessments, 
can in fact be made if government is willing to admit obvious wrongs. I find 
such assertions lacking in insight, history, and understanding of the structural 
effects of enslavement on the condition of American Blacks, and posit that 
reparations are more to repair harm done, though they can be used to improve a 
condition; these are separate distinctions. Though this ignorance is troublesome 
to me, my goal here is not to “educate” or “enlighten” those who don’t under-
stand. I only aim to provide my own prescription to black self- determination 
in America to the scholarship of proponents of reparations, so that the analysis 
focuses on international mechanisms of grappling with remedies to counteract 
the plight of my people in the existing global economy.
14 naS, N.I.*.*.E.R. (The Slave and the Master), on naS (Island Def Jam Music 
Group 2008).
15 Malcolm X will intermittently be referred to as Brother Malcolm or El Hajj 
Malik El-Shabazz, the name he used towards the end of his life after his journey 
to Mecca. I use Malcolm X because that is the familiar historical recognition of 
him, while El Hajj Malik El-Shabazz is his formal name and Brother Malcolm 
describes my personal affinity for our Black shining prince.
16 Malcolm X, Speech (Feb. 13, 1965), in malcolm x SPeakS: Selected 
SPeecHeS and StatementS 164-65 (George Breitman ed.,1990).
17 immoRtal tecHnique, The Poverty of Philosophy, on RevolutionaRy vol. 1 
(Viper Records 2005) (2001).
18 fRantz fanon, Concerning Violence, in tHe WRetcHed of tHe eaRtH 36 
(2004).
19 “The word “Maafa” (also know as the African Holocaust) is derived from a 
(Kiswahili) word meaning disaster, terrible occurrence or great tragedy.  
The term today collectively refers to the 500 hundred years of suffering of peo-
ple of African heritage through Slavery, Imperialism, Colonialism, Oppression,  
Invasions and Exploitation.” http://www.africanholocaust.net/html_ah/ 
holocaustspecial.htm. Maafa is an indictment on the benefactors of Black 
marginalization—it immortalizes the intentional degradation of Black people.
20 joHn ReadeR, afRica: a BiogRaPHy of tHe continent 377-390 (1999). 
Consequently, Virginia was the first of the 50 states to apologize for the 
 enslavement of Black people in America with the passage of House Joint Reso-
lution 728 in 2007, on the 400th anniversary of the settlement of Jamestown.  
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+ful+HJ728H2. Maryland, North 
Carolina, and Alabama issued apologies through resolutions in the same year 
either through their respective legislatures. http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,276724,00.html. These are the only four states to formally apologize for 
the dehumanization of American Blacks through chattel slavery.
21 u.S. conSt. amend. XIII, § 1.
22 Ronald L. F. Davis, From Terror to Triumph: Historical Overview, available 
at http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/resources/pdf/From_Terror_to_Triumph.pdf.
23 This was crucial particularly in state courts where Black people (including 
civil rights activists, typically) consistently faced due process rights  violations. 
They faced all-white juries, had little access to legal counsel, and had no 
guarantee of a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in 
addition to obviously not having equal protection under the laws.
24 See Veterans of the Civil Rights Movement, Civil Rights Bill Passes in the 
House, http://www.crmvet.org/tim/ timhis64.htm#1964cra64h; Daniel Levitas, 
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15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the National Voting Rights Act of 
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foster disenfranchisement. Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed the 
unequal application of voter registration requirements based on race, as another 
measure of protection for Black voters. This protection is recognized as not 
holistic because the provision did not eliminate violence against those who 
attempted to vote, did not prevent gerrymandering and annexation of districts, 
did not combat police and state suppression of Black voters, did not address 
voter intimidation of non-state actors, roll-purging, and literacy tests designed to 
exclude Black Southern voters, and did not guard against economic retaliation 
exacted by Whites angry with Black voters. Many of these problems persist 
today).
25 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) 
(granting Blacks access to public facilities like schools, movies, private movie 
theaters, restaurants, and hotels, etc.).
26 Though mechanisms like the Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protect 
against discrimination in employment (outlawing race as a discriminatory 
factor in granting employment and promotion) and the Fair Housing Act, Title 
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, guards against discrimination in  housing 
(outlawing race as a mechanism for not selling or renting), there are no provi-
sions to provide access to either of these “protections” or any other of the 
above-mentioned. Though the creation of federal government entities monitor 
the implementation of the law, respectively the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), in their existence, discriminatory practices still persist, and there 
is no available mechanism for access to these entities.
27 Jeremy Levitt, Black African Reparations: Making A Claim for Enslavement 
and Systematic De Jure Segregation and Racial Discrimination Under Interna-
tional Law, 25 S.U. L. Rev. 7 (1997).
28 Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack (1988), 
in claSSRoom conveRSationS: a collection of claSSicS foR PaRentS and 
teacHeRS 169, 169-177 (Alexandra Miletta and Maureen Miletta, ed., 2008) 
(contending that the disadvantages of people of color, particularly those histori-
cally marginalized, are inverse to the overprivileges of Whites, because racism 
goes beyond individual acts, and is incorporated into entire systems that purport 
to be objective, but confer privileges to those with white-skin, regardless of 
other factors contributing to their lives. In addition, Whites are taught not to 
 recognize or notice this. She asserts that this privilege cannot be easily quanti-
fied, though she lists fifty examples of benefits of the privilege, and refers to 
them as “an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in 
each day, but about which I was ‘meant’ to remain oblivious. White privilege 
is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, 
codebooks, visas, clothes, tools, and blank checks.”).
  The oblivion inhered in the knapsack of White privilege provides the 
opportunity to freely disparage and disregard anything outside of the  dominant 
culture, as the privilege is elusive and easy to ignore for its recipients. McIntosh 
further posits that whiteness protects from backlash, alienation, hostility, and  
distress and allows the projection of those things onto people of color. 
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White ness enables a certain level of comfort for its beneficiaries to the direct 
disadvantage of others, while creating a society that ignores this privilege and 
provides the added benefit of touting a meritocracy when no such system, in fact 
exists. Some of the privileges provided by whiteness like: not having to educate 
your children on systemic racism for their own daily protection; knowing that if 
a cop pulled you over or the IRS audits you, you were not singled out because 
of your race; possessing the ability to avoid spending time with people whom 
you were trained to mistrust or mistrust your kind or you; having the  ability to 
purchase or rent a house in an area which you can afford to live should you  
need to move; possessing the ability to do well in a challenging situation 
without being called a credit to one’s race; the certainty that asking to speak to 
a person in charge (anywhere) that the person will be of your race; the ability 
to find  academic courses and institutions which give attention only to people 
of your race; and the ability to feel welcomed and “normal” in the usual walks 
of life, public, institutional, and social; among other facts not listed here, or in 
the fifty tenets by McIntosh, are benefits of whiteness. Such systems are active 
and embedded, and must be deconstructed and examined to assess whether 
the privilege encompasses a facet of life that should be enjoyed by all, or is 
simply an unearned power that has no place in society. McIntosh recommends 
consciousness and raising levels of saliency and awareness to begin this process 
of reversal or the unpacking of the white privilege knapsack).
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Of Property, in Second tReatiSe of civil goveRnment, § 45 (1690).
30 Id. §§ 32-35, 38, 39, 40.
31 Id.
32 Id. § 42.
33 joHn locke, Of the Ends of Political Society and Government, in Second 
tReatiSe of civil goveRnment, § 123 (1690); tHe declaRation of indePen-
dence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (providing “[t]hat whenever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to 
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such prin-
ciples and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely 
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34 joHn locke, Of Civil and Political Society, in Second tReatiSe of civil 
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35 Id. § 123.
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§§ 22-23 (1690) (asserting that man’s state of nature is to be free, thereby 
presenting  himself as an opponent of slavery). Still, he describes a paradigm of 
a state of war (akin to American slavery) and drudgery (likened to the bondage 
of the Israelites in Egypt), but contends that the duration of both, at best are 
ephemeral, while acknowledging their existence. It seems odd to describe the 
condition of a people as short in duration when systems are designed to continu-
ally oppress them, and ironic when his theories were central in legitimating this 
oppression. Locke’s other theories connecting property, government, and politi-
cal participation, too, create the inescapable condition of chattel slavery at worst 
and involuntary servitude and feudalism at best.
38 u.S. conSt. art. I, § 2 (stating that originally, the Constitution demonstrated 
that slaves could not have ownership or possession even in themselves, because 
they were not whole persons. This clause details the tax apportionment and 
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“three-fifths of all other persons,” a legacy of the compromise between Northern 
and Southern States at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 in developing the 
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of persons for purposes of maintaining a Southern relevance in national politics, 
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This clause was rendered moot after the passage of the 13th Amendment); see 
angela daviS, The Legacy of Slavery: Standards for a New Womanhood, in 
Women, Race, & claSS 5 (1981) (Enslaved men and women were viewed as 
profitable labor-units, not human beings in the American chattel race-based 
slave system).
39 See u.S. conSt. art. I, § 2. (sanctioning slavery); see McIntosh, supra note 
28, at 171-172 (demonstrating that slavemasters were not the only profiteers 
of the race-based economic system because other whites benefited from the 
subjugation of the enslaved Africans monetarily and sociologically, and still do 
in some capacity or other through their white-skinned privilege).
40 locke, supra note 29, §§ 32-35, 38, 39, 40.
41 The expropriation and undervaluation of Black labor specifically refers 
to the use of Blacks in chattel slavery for the development and sustaining of 
industry, agriculture, and the economic system, without or with little monetary 
compensation, aside from the “provision” of despicable housing and clothing, 
and oftentimes the inedible remains of the food of their White contemporaries. 
 Further, the Black intellectual and creative capacities were co-opted for the 
 benefit of white society, in the same respect as the theft of their physical labor.
42 tHe declaRation of indePendence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
43 locke, supra note 29, §§ 32-35, 38, 39, 40.
44 Though 1776 marked the beginning of what we now recognize as the U.S. 
Government, the former colonies were not fault-free where these practices  
were instituted overnight under the newly confederated states. They carried  
their treatment of Blacks and valuation of the people-group from their colonial 
settlements in the New World over into the newly formed American government, 
so that when there is discussion of marginalization of the American Blacks,  
we must account for the years preceding the formal organization of the nascent 
American government. For purposes of considering reparations, the colonies 
themselves profited from the free labor of Blacks as well, and instituted the 
practice of disconnecting Blacks from participation in society-building and 
sustaining institutions.
45 See locke, supra note 29, §§ 32-35, 38, 39, 40 (demonstrating that value is 
contrived).
46 McIntosh, supra note 28, at 171-172.
47 u.S. conSt. art. I, § 2. Before the 13th Amendment, referring to enslaved 
Africans and their inclusion in determining apportionment for state represen-
tation in the Congress: Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several states which may be included within this union, according 
to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, 
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons [emphasis 
added]. No right to enslaved African ownership (particularly no right to self-
possession) or citizenship; Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 393-394 (1857) 
Stating:
A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought 
to this country and sold as slaves, is not a “citizen” within the 
 meaning of the Constitution of the United States. When the 
Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the 
States as members of the community, which constituted the State, 
and were not numbered among its “people or citizens.” Conse-
quently, the special rights and immunities guarantied to citizens 
do not apply to them [ . . . ] The only two clauses in the Constitu-
tion which point to this race treat them as persons whom it was 
morally lawfully to deal in as articles of property and to hold 
as slaves. Since the adoption of the Constitution of the United 
States no State can by any subsequent law make a foreigner or 
any other description of persons citizens of the United States, 
nor entitle them to the rights and  privileges secured to citizens by 
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nor entitle him to sue in its courts, nor to any of the privileges 
and immunities of a citizen in another State. The change in 
public opinion and feeling in relation to the African race which 
has taken place since the adoption of the Constitution cannot 
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change its construction and meaning, and it must be construed 
and administered now according to its true meaning and intention 
when it was formed and adopted.
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cuTTing funds for oraL conTracePTives:  
vioLaTion of equaL ProTecTion righTs and The disParaTe 




Cutting funding for oral contraceptives has far reaching 
implications for women, including adverse impacts on women’s 
health, negative economic impacts on society, and constitu-
tional violations. In a country whose governmental health plans 
(Medicare and Medicaid) reimburse men’s costs for Viagra®,1 it 
is hardly appropriate to deny women access to prescribed oral 
contraceptives that have traditionally been defined as supplemen-
tary services falling under the umbrella of primary care.2 Due 
to the wording of a provision within the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005, some contend that non-profit clinics and campus health 
centers can no longer offer oral contraceptives at reduced rates.3 
This article will show how decreasing funding for oral contracep-
tives violates equal protection and embodies a disparate impact 
in relation to women’s health for Medicaid and Title X beneficia-
ries—low-income Americans who would benefit from access to 
contraceptives and other preventative health-care services. 
Part I of this article addresses the history, uses, and eco-
nomics of oral contraceptives. Part II highlights the government’s 
role and policies in funding oral contraceptives over the past 35 
years. Part III discusses the present regulatory landscape, includ-
ing The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”), the Department 
of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) proposed regulations, 
Prevention Through Affordable Access Act, and Title X. Finally, 
Part IV shows how the history, politics, and regulations culminate 
in a violation of the Constitutional right to equal protection.
i. oraL conTracePTives: hisTory,  
uses, economics
a. HiStory
Oral contraceptives are relatively recent forms of con-
traception.4 Between 1950 and 1954, Gregory Pincos, a scientist, 
and John Rock, a renowned Harvard obstetrician and gynecolo-
gist, developed a chemical contraceptive and performed the first 
human clinical trial.5 The “Pill” regime that they established (21 
days on progesterone to inhibit ovulation, 7 days to menstruate) 
is still in use today.6 The “Pill,” called Enovid, was approved by 
the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for the 
treatment of severe menstrual disorders.7 
In the 1960’s, the FDA approved the first oral birth con-
trol pill.8 The FDA required Searle pharmaceutical company 
to complete field trials for all doses of its oral contraceptive, 
Enovid.9 Ortho Pharmaceutical introduced its first oral contra-
ceptive in 1963. By 1965 the “Pill” became the leading method 
of pre-conceptual and reversible contraception in the United 
States.10 
During the 1970’s, United States Senator Gaylord 
Nelson convened Senate hearings on the safety of the “Pill.”11 
The FDA ordered that all oral contraceptive packages contain 
information detailing possible side effects.12 By 1988, the FDA 
recognized additional potential benefits of oral contraceptives, 
including decreased incidence of the following: ovarian cancer, 
endometrial cancer, pelvic inflammatory disease, ovarian cysts, 
and benign breast disease.13 
In the twenty years since the FDA recognized additional 
potential benefits of oral contraceptives, manufacturers have 
received FDA approval to use oral contraceptives for the treat-
ment of acne and for the severe condition of premenstrual dys-
morphic disorder (“PMDD”).14 Oral contraceptives have been 
used to treat a variety of conditions and are proven to positively 
affect many aspects of women’s health, including preserving 
fertility. 
b. uSeS anD beneFitS oF birtH Control pillS
Over the past 50 years, the FDA has recognized poten-
tial benefits in the area of women’s health, such as decreased 
incidence of the following: ovarian cancer, endometrial cancer, 
pelvic inflammatory disease, ovarian cysts, mid-cycle pain (dys-
menorea), heavy bleeding and benign breast disease.15 Manu-
facturers have also received FDA approval to distribute oral 
contraceptives for the treatment of acne and for PMDD.16 Physi-
cians regularly prescribe oral contraceptives for other debilitat-
ing conditions such as polycystic ovarian syndrome (“PCOS”), 
and endometriosis.17 These conditions, as well as PMDD, may 
cause irregular menstrual cycles, increased risk of high blood 
pressure, diabetes, high cholesterol, and infertility. These physi-
cal and emotional conditions may be mitigated by taking oral 
contraceptives, which are proven to preserve fertility.
One of the most threatening conditions to a woman’s 
fertility is endometriosis, a condition in which deposits of endo-
metrium (uterine lining) are found outside the uterus.18 It is a 
common disorder, yet it is one of the most enigmatic gynecologic 
diseases.19 Endometriosis occurs when endometrial tissue outside 
the uterus responds to changes in hormones,20 breaking down and 
bleeding like the lining of the uterus does during the menstrual 
cycle.21 This breakdown of tissue often creates adhesions (scar 
tissue), which causes tremendous pain and binds surrounding 
organs together.22 Aside from surgery, the most common way to 
control symptoms of endometriosis and shrink existing implants 
is through the use of oral contraceptives.23 
As indicated, the uses of oral contraceptives extend 
far beyond the indication for contraception. Ironically, PMDD, 
PCOS, and endometriosis have been shown to cause infertility.24 
Oral contraceptives, however, have been shown to temper these 
conditions enabling a woman to retain her reproductive abilities.25 
24 The Modern AMericAn
C. tHe eConomiCS oF birtH Control
The present cost of oral contraceptives is high.26 The 
cost to society, however, of preventing college students and low-
income women from purchasing them at a reduced rate is even 
higher.27 In 2004, researchers estimated a net public savings of 
$4.3 billion by clinics through averting 1.4 million unintended 
pregnancies.28 This number does not include the costs of infertil-
ity treatments or the cost to treat the escalation of other diseases 
(Type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease) not associated with 
PMDD, PCOS, and endometriosis.29 
Funding from Medicaid programs and Title X of the Pub-
lic Health Service Act has helped millions of women maintain a 
healthy reproductive life.30 In fact, almost 
seventeen million women in the United 
States utilized these publicly subsidized 
services in 2002.31 The federal and state 
governments spent a combined $1.26 bil-
lion on reversible contraceptive services.32 
Yet, despite these health benefits and sub-
stantial savings, the government enacted a 
provision that has forced pharmaceutical 
companies to stop providing oral contra-
ceptives at reduced rates.33 
At a time when demand for sub-
sidized contraceptives has increased, public funding for family 
planning clinics has stagnated.34 Exacerbating this situation is the 
unwillingness of many pharmaceutical companies to continue to 
provide oral contraceptives to the public system funded by Title 
X at a relatively low cost.35 This appears to be the result of the 
2005 DRA revamping the average manufacturer price (“AMP”) 
formula and altering the 340B drug-pricing program. The Omni-
bus Reconciliation Act of 1990 established AMP and Best Price 
for use in the Medicaid program.36 Thereby, sales by a manufac-
turer of covered outpatient drugs below ten percent of AMP were 
generally excluded from Best Price.37 In 1992, the 340B program 
that was created when the Public Health Services Act (“PHSA”) 
was amended to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide 
prescription drugs at reduced prices to “covered entities.” 38 
Calculating pharmaceutical costs for a 340B program 
is a semi-complex formula based on the AMP that is provided to 
the Center for Medicare/Medicaid Services (“CMS”).39 AMP is 
defined as “[t]he average price paid to manufacturers by wholesal-
ers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade.” 40 
The lowest price available from “the manufacturer to any whole-
saler, retailer, provider, health maintenance organization, or non-
profit or government entity, with some exceptions” is considered 
the Best Price.41 Although Best Price is required to be reduced 
to account for price adjustments such as rebates and discounts, it 
does not include prices charged to certain federal purchasers.42 
The two factors involved in calculating 340B price are the AMP 
and a “rebate percentage” (consideration of both the AMP and 
the Best Price reported to CMS).43 This calculation is the “ceil-
ing price” formula for brand name pharmaceuticals (AMP for the 
previous month—15.1% discount off the AMP) considered by 
CMS.44   
Beginning in 2007, seemingly small language changes 
in the DRA impacted the calculation of AMP, Best Price, and 
limited the number of facilities that qualify for discounted 
prices on birth control.45 The concerns over that the AMP, which 
pharmaceutical companies providing covered outpatient drugs are 
required to calculate and submit to CMS, is not affected by the 
increase in customary portion of the new formula were directed 
at how pharmacies would be reimbursed.46 The Office of the 
Inspector General (“OIG”) and the General Accounting Office 
(“GAO”) found that this new formula may “result in reimburse-
ments to pharmacies that are below pharmacy acquisition costs.” 
Specifically, the DRA of 2005 requires manufacturers to report 
AMP and Best Price to CMS on a monthly basis compared to the 
previous quarterly basis and imposes several important changes 
regarding AMP and Best Price calculations.47 However, the act 
has a provision that extends the “exclusion of customary prompt 
pay discounts [to wholesalers].” 48 This means that the AMP is 
not affected by the increase in customary 
prompt pay wholesaler discounts.49 There-
fore, the language should have no effect 
on pharmaceutical manufacturers ability 
to continue providing oral contraceptives 
to public health and campus health clin-
ics, because the prices these facilities pay 
are not included in the AMP, Best Price, or 
ceiling price calculations. 
Equally important is the limitation 
that certain entities will be excluded from 
the calculation of the AMP and the “rebate 
percentage” on which pharmaceutical companies base their prof-
its.50 These entities include those defined in section 340B(a)(4) 
of the Public Health Service Act; intermediate facilities for the 
mentally retarded; a State-owned or operated nursing facility; 
and any other entity determined by the Secretary of DHHS to be 
a safety net provider.51 The Office of Pharmacy Affairs oversees 
the 340B pricing program and its administration.52 Entities that 
have been identified as qualifying 340B organizations under the 
Social Security Act and the Public Health Services Act (“PHSA”) 
include: federally-qualified health centers; a family planning 
project receiving a grant or contract under Section 1001 of the 
PHSA; and any entity receiving assistance under section 318 (42 
USCS § 247c) (relating to the treatment of sexually transmitted 
diseases).53 
Even if campus health centers do not qualify as 340B 
organizations, the Secretary of DHHS has the discretion to deter-
mine what facilities qualify as safety net providers to which the 
sales of drugs at nominal prices would be appropriate based upon 
four factors.54 The factors are: 1) facility or entity type; 2) the 
nature of the services provided; 3) the patient population served; 
and 4) the number of other facilities or entities eligible to pur-
chase at nominal prices in the same service area.55 Based upon 
these criteria, it is reasonable for the Secretary to include campus 
health centers as qualifying entities.
By interpreting the language to mean a 340B quali-
fying facility does not include community health and college 
health centers as an exclusion when calculating the AMP and the 
“rebate percentage,” and interpreting the language that exempts 
certain “safety net providers” to exclude family planning clinics; 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, including Organon, the maker of 
Cyclessa® and Desogen® oral contraceptives, made an economic 
decision not to provide drugs at a discounted rate.56 Despite the 
company being unhappy about increasing the prices for colleges, 
“Nick Hart, Organon’s executive director of contraception, says 
they were forced to make ‘a business decision’ after the law went 
Yet, despite these health  
benefits and substantial savings, 
the government enacted a 
provision that has forced 
pharmaceutical companies to  
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contraceptives at reduced rates.
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into effect.” 57 As a result, women who were paying between 
$3–$10 per month for oral contraceptives are now paying nearly 
900% more for the same prescription.58 
Sadly, this price increase was unnecessary. The deci-
sion of pharmaceutical companies to stop offering low-priced 
oral contraceptives to health centers and clinics was an inde-
pendent decision that the DRA of 2005 did not mandate.59 On 
the contrary, four types of entities, including 340B qualifying 
facilities and certain safety net providers determined by the Sec-
retary of DHHS, were excluded from the best price determina-
tion (meaning that pharmaceuticals offered at reduced rates to 
these four types of entities would not be included in the price 
determination).60 Additionally, Congress passed a provision to 
delay the application of new payment limits for multiple source 
drugs under Medicaid until September 30, 2009.61 Therefore, the 
AMP or the “ceiling price” is not impacted by the DRA.62 
Pharmaceutical companies’ interpretations of the DRA 
of 2005 have affected over three million college and low-income 
women.63 Many hard-working women can no longer access FDA 
approved methods of birth control, including oral contracep-
tives.64 The only entities benefiting are manufacturers and savvy 
entrepreneurs through higher prices and arbitrage opportunities.65 
Overall, there is no logical explanation for repealing access to 
low price oral contraceptives based on the statutory language of 
the DRA of 2005.
ii. governmenT funding and PoLicies reLaTed  
To oraL conTracePTives
It is hard to fathom that President Dwight Eisenhower 
stated in 1959 that birth control “is not a proper political or gov-
ernment activity or function or responsibility” and emphatically 
added that it is “not our business.” 66 Only five years later, Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson pushed legislation for federal support 
of birth control for the poor.67 During the Nixon administration, 
this trend continued.68 Title X of the Pub-
lic Health Services Act (“Family Planning 
Services and Population Research Act of 
1970”) authorized the Secretary to make 
grants to and enter into contracts with pub-
lic or nonprofit private entities to assist in 
the establishment and operation of volun-
tary family planning projects, appropriat-
ing $180 million between 1971 and 1973.69 
The only method of birth control not 
entitled to funds was a surgical abortion 
because it was not considered a preventive 
family planning service.70 Under the Ford Administration, Con-
gress extended grants for comprehensive public health services71 
and expressly defined “community health centers” as entities that 
provide primary health services and referrals to providers of sup-
plementary health services.72 Primary health services included 
family planning, and supplemental health services included phar-
maceutical and health education services.73 The Secretary could 
“make grants to public and nonprofit private entities for projects 
to plan and develop community health centers which will serve 
medically underserved populations.” 74 Clearly, there was a com-
mitment to ensure that women received the care and treatment 
they needed to preserve their reproductive health.
Under the Reagan Administration, public and nonprofit 
entities encountered a setback in funding, in light of the conflict-
ing interpretations of Title X equating oral contraception with 
surgical abortions.75 However, the language, on its face, confirms 
that the intent of Congress was not to equate the two.
In 1988, the Secretary of DHHS promulgated new regu-
lations to differentiate between Title X programs and abortions,76 
emphasizing that “the purpose and the demonstrated effect of con-
traceptive counseling is to promote the use of contraception.” 77 
Unfortunately, DHHS also adopted regulations (the “Gag Rule”) 
prohibiting Title X facilities from providing information, coun-
seling, or referrals concerning abortions.78 During the first 18 
years of the Title X program, the Act was interpreted to mean that 
the funds could not be used to perform abortions, but it did not 
restrict the ability of clinics to provide counseling or referrals.79 
In 1991, the Supreme Court stipulated that, by clearly 
defining “family planning,” the regulations clarify that Congress 
intended Title X funds to be expended to support preventive fam-
ily planning services.80 According to the General Accounting 
Office, the majority of clients of Title X-sponsored clinics are not 
pregnant and their services include and were restricted to physi-
cal examinations, education on contraceptive methods, precon-
ceptional counseling, and general reproductive healthcare.81 The 
Clinton Administration recognized that, while abortions are not a 
method of family planning, the “Gag Rule” endangered women’s 
lives and health by preventing them from receiving accurate med-
ical information from their physicians.82 Consequently, the “Gag 
Rule” was repealed.83 
iii. The PresenT reguLaTory LandscaPe’s  
roLe in The crisis
Without publicly funded clinics providing contraceptive 
services, there would be 1.4 million more unintended pregnan-
cies and 49% more abortions annually in the United States.84 
Moreover, for every $1.00 spent to provide 
services in the nationwide network of pub-
licly funded clinics, $4.02 is saved in Med-
icaid birth costs.85 
Unfortunately, the pharmaceuti-
cal companies’ unwillingness to offer oral 
contraceptives at nominal prices to publicly 
funded clinics has created a birth control cri-
sis.86 Now, millions of women are paying up 
to nine or ten times what they were paying 
before, if they can afford it.87 The compa-
nies’ decisions undermine the benefits under 
Title X and are detrimental individually on women’s reproductive 
health and collectively on our nation’s economic welfare.88 
a. title x v. Dra
Statutes or provisions relating to the same individual 
or class of individuals, or to a closely allied subject or object 
may be regarded under the rule of in pari materia,89 to ascer-
tain and effectuate Congressional intent by proceeding upon the 
supposition that several statutes were governed by one spirit and 
policy and were intended to be consistent and harmonious.90 
In the present case, Title X and section 6001 of the DRA, both 
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provisions related to funding, should be read together for the 
intent of  providing funding so all women could have access to 
reproductive healthcare, family planning, and preconceptional 
birth control.91 
1. title x: settled Policy
Since 1970, the purpose of Title X has been to assist in 
making voluntary family planning services available to all per-
sons by enabling public and non-profit private entities to plan and 
develop comprehensive programs. Understanding the need for a 
high standard for ethical delivery of services, Title X required 
that clients be offered a broad range of contraceptive methods.92 
Today, Title X supports approximately 4,400 out of 7,700 family 
planning clinics, serving nearly five million women.93 The cur-
rent guidelines were developed in conjunction with the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist (“ACOG”) and require 
a complete physical exam (including Pap test) and education 
about the importance of preventive care.94 Title X is indicative 
of settled policy that women should have access to reproductive 
healthcare, family planning, and preconceptional birth control. 
2. 2005 dra – effective January 2007
An unintended consequence of the DRA, specifically 
Section 6001, is that health centers no longer receive prescription 
contraceptives at a nominal or base price. Because there is a pro-
vision in the DRA that insulated publicly funded health clinics 
from paying a higher premium and in turn exempted these prices 
from the AMP calculations, there is no acceptable explanation 
for this consequence. The only explanation proffered by the phar-
maceutical companies is that they made a “business decision” to 
no longer follow established legislative precedent. Furthermore, 
Congress has done nothing since the implementation of the DRA 
to rectify the situation. The result is that the objective of Title X 
and Medicaid is being undermined while pharmaceutical manu-
facturers are realizing higher profit margins.
The provisions in section 6001 of the DRA should be 
construed to mean that because of the “safe harbor” exempting 
nominal sales pricing to certain entities from being included in 
the calculation, Congress intended to preserve the Title X objec-
tive, while not adversely impacting the reimbursement of phar-
maceuticals through Medicaid. It is imperative that Congress 
continue to uphold the original legislative intent of providing 
access to high quality contraceptive services and preventive care 
to young and low-income citizens.95 
b. DHHS initiativeS to unDermine women’S 
reproDuCtive HealtHCare FunDing
In the summer of 2008, the Bush Administration called 
on DHHS to draft new rules that would severely restrict women’s 
healthcare options by defining “abortion” so broadly that it would 
encompass many types of birth control, including oral contra-
ceptives.96 The DHHS proposal defined abortion as “any of the 
various procedures—including the prescription, dispensing and 
administration of any drug or the performance of any procedure 
or any other action—that results in the termination of the life of 
a human being in utero between conception and natural birth, 
whether before or after implantation.” 97 This definition defies 
Congressional intent and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
abortion.98 
In addition to posing serious threats to the reproductive 
health of millions of uninsured and low-income Americans, the 
language could prevent health facilities from guaranteeing their 
patients access to the full range of comprehensive reproductive 
healthcare.99 On July 15, 2008, several Senators signed a letter 
addressed to the Secretary of DHHS urging reconsideration of 
the regulations.100 One argument was that the proposed defini-
tion would allow common forms of contraception such as the 
birth control pill to be classified as abortion, thereby denying 
contraception to women who need it.”101 In a follow-up letter, 
they emphasized the medical definition of pregnancy,102 spe-
cifically that a pregnancy does not begin until a fertilized egg 
implants itself to the uterine wall,103 and most modern forms of 
birth control work by blocking implantation.104 Calling a pre-
implanted fertilized egg a “human being in utero” is incorrect.105 
Ultimately, confusing the definitions of contraception and abor-
tion would wreak havoc on law, regulations, and policy.106 
C. prevention tHrougH aFForDable aCCeSS aCt 
The Prevention Through Affordable Access Act was 
introduced in the House of Representatives107 to clarify any ambi-
guity in the DRA language and protect student health centers and 
public or nonprofit private entities providing health services.108 
It received bipartisan support and aimed to “rectify an allegedly 
flawed condition in the DRA, which caused national pharmaceu-
tical companies to stop selling birth control to college clinics [and 
publicly funded health clinics] at discounted prices.”109 Both the 
House and the Senate versions of the bill were introduced and 
referred to Committees nearly a year ago.110 No other action has 
been taken since the initial introduction.111 
iv. The 2005 dra – vioLaTion of equaL 
ProTecTion 
In December 1961, it was still a crime to use birth con-
trol in Connecticut.112 Boldly, C. Lee Buxton, M.D. and Estelle 
Griswold opened four Planned Parenthood Clinics.113 Their arrest 
brought national attention to anachronistic state laws, which cul-
minated in a 7–2 ruling by the United State Supreme Court that 
Connecticut’s law prohibiting the use of birth control was uncon-
stitutional, violating a couple’s right to privacy.114 Eisenstadt v. 
Baird made it clear that a state cannot impede the distribution of 
birth control to an unmarried person, thus striking down a Mas-
sachusetts law.115 Less than a year later, the Supreme Court ruled 
on one of the most controversial issues of our time—abortion.116 
These judicial precedents not only set the tone for the adoption 
of Title X, but also laid the foundation for recognizing women as 
a protected class.
a. equal proteCtion analySiS
The fundamental question under consideration is 
whether there is something in the DRA requiring pharmaceutical 
companies to no longer offer nominal pricing on oral contracep-
tives to public, non-profit, and campus health clinics. The Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides 
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that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.117 
Fundamentally, equal protection deals with “governmental clas-
sifications that deprive a certain class of persons of benefits that 
persons in other classes are entitled to receive, or that subject 
a certain class of persons to burdens that are not imposed on 
persons in other classes.”118 By making oral contraceptives 
unavailable because of the exorbitant cost, women are the class 
of persons being deprived of benefits of reproductive healthcare 
and family planning they are entitled to under Medicaid and Title 
X.119 Although men also use the same federally funded centers, 
they do not carry the burden of paying more for prescriptions 
under the DRA.
On its face, the DRA does not discriminate because it 
contains no explicit gender classification language.120 However, 
just because it is facially neutral does not mean it is free from dis-
crimination. The difference is that courts will not merely assume 
that the DRA is intentionally discriminatory; instead, evidence 
of discrimination must be found through its administration and 
purpose or effect.121 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court 
held that even if a law “be fair on its face and impartial in its 
appearance, [equal protection will still be violated] if it is applied 
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an 
unequal hand.”122 There, equal protection was denied when the 
discrimination and public administration of the law was found 
to be illegal. 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 
dealt with discriminatory intent in the purpose and effect of a law 
giving preferential treatment to veterans.123 There, the Supreme 
Court asserted that proof of discriminatory “impact provides ‘an 
important starting point,’ but purposeful discrimination is the 
condition that offends the Constitution.”124 
The DRA must be considered in pari materia with Title 
X and Medicaid when considering the administration and pur-
pose and effect of the law. The situation of women being denied 
access to affordable oral contraceptives because of the AMP cal-
culation is akin to the situation in Yick Wo and distinguishable 
from Feeney. In fiscal year 2006, the Medicaid program spent 
$1.3 billion for family planning services, and Title X funds con-
tributed $215 million to approximately 7,683 clinics.125 Each 
year, approximately seven million women received contracep-
tive services.126 Of the total number of 
patients treated, men accounted for only 
5% of the overall caseload.127 Here, 
Congressional intent points toward 
the “evil eye and unequal hand” and 
“purposeful discrimination” because 
Congress knew the DRA AMP formula 
was being applied in a way that denied 
women access to oral contraceptives to which they were entitled 
under federal programs.128 Congress also knew of executive ini-
tiatives to equate oral contraceptives to a surgical abortion.129 
Therefore, the discrimination against women, public administra-
tion, and purpose and effect of the DRA should be violations of 
equal protection.
For purposes of the DRA, the classifying factor distin-
guishing between two similarly situated classes is gender, which 
receives intermediate scrutiny. Men’s access to prescriptions 
related to reproductive health has not been rendered inaccessible 
due to cost while women’s prescriptions for oral contraceptives 
have been affected by the DRA. 
When assessing a statute under an intermediate scru-
tiny level of review, two operative parts must be considered—
the “means” and the “ends.”130 The “ends” or the objective the 
government seeks to achieve must be actual and important. The 
“means” or the classification the government has used must be 
“substantially related” to the ends. Here, the means (the gender-
based reproductive health access exclusion) and the ends (pre-
sumably, reducing Medicaid spending by $4.7 billion between 
2006–2010) can be compared to United States v. Virginia, where 
the Supreme Court subjected Virginia Military Institute’s (“VMI”) 
male-only admissions policy to intermediate scrutiny.131 
The Court determined that Virginia’s male-only admis-
sions policy to VMI was not “substantially related” to the 
state’s objective of maintaining the adversative method, and the 
objective of educating “citizen soldiers” was not “substantially 
advanced by women’s categorical exclusion, in total disregard 
of their individual merit.”132 Likewise, the federal government’s 
gender-based reproductive health access exclusion in the DRA 
is not “substantially related” to the objective of spending reduc-
tion. For every tax dollar spent on contraceptive services, $3.00 
in Medicaid costs for pregnancy-related healthcare and medical 
care of newborns is saved, 1.3 million unplanned pregnancies are 
avoided, and without publicly supported services, there would be 
an annual increase of 40% more abortions.133 Furthermore, the 
DRA defies the purpose of other statutes, Title X and Medicaid, 
which have ensured women’s affordable access to oral contracep-
tives in relation to reproductive health and family planning for 
over a quarter of a century. When a heightened level of scrutiny is 
applied, economic reasons are not enough to uphold a statute as 
constitutional. Therefore, in terms of the DRA, the government 
has failed to demonstrate the requisite “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” for denying women access to affordable oral con-
traceptives to which they are entitled under federal law.134 
A final step in the “means/ends” analysis is the assess-
ment of the concepts of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusive-
ness. A law is over-inclusive when it applies to some situations 
that do not serve its objectives.135 Conversely, a law is under-
 inclusive when it “does not apply to some situations that do serve 
its objectives.”136 The DRA, although it contains no express 
language regarding gender differentiation and denial of access 
to oral contraceptives, can be seen as over-
 inclusive because it affects all women procur-
ing oral contraceptives from federally funded or 
campus health clinics, including those individu-
als not traditionally covered under the umbrella 
of Title X or Medicaid. There is a strong likeli-
hood that the classification will meet the appli-
cable means test.
As a matter of public policy, we, as a nation, want women 
to have affordable access to oral contraceptives. As a plurality 
of the Supreme Court acknowledged 35 years ago, “our Nation 
has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”137 
 Public policy has been defined as “the principle of law which 
holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency 
to be injurious to the public or against the public good.”138 Pre-
venting access to oral contraceptives for the treatment of medi-
cal conditions that inhibit women from being productive and 
efficient citizens, for family planning purposes, which in turn 
decreases abortion rates and government costs, and for discourag-
ing healthy living at every stage of life are acts that are injurious 
As a matter of public policy,  
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to the public good.139 Therefore, as a matter of public policy, it is 
imperative that access to oral contraceptives at pre-DRA prices 
be reinstated.
b. remeDieS
The Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
broadly construes a private federal right of action for damages 
and injunctive relief to redress violations by state officials of 
rights created by the United States Constitution as well as federal 
statutes.140 For example, a reading of the Public Health Service 
Act does not “reveal a precise or elaborate remedial scheme that 
would be obfuscated by allowing enforcement through a § 1983 
action.”141 Also, the statutory language and legislative history 
indicate an intent to improve and expand all aspects of family 
planning services by providing grants to public or nonprofit pri-
vate entities or state health authorities.142 Therefore, the Court in 
Planned Parenthood of Billings v. Montana concluded that the 
Public Health Services Act created federally enforceable rights 
in the plaintiffs and since no Congressional intent to preclude 
private enforcement existed, § 1983 provided a cause of action to 
remedy an alleged violation of the Act.143 
Relying on Supreme Court decisions, a U.S.  District 
Court recently held in Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia v. 
 Horizon NJ Health that a hospital’s claims against an insurance 
provider for deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 could proceed.144 The court noted that a symbiotic 
relationship was present because approximately 50% of funding 
received was federal and that the insurance company derived a 
substantial benefit.145 Additionally, the doctrine of third party 
standing and in turn associational standing was upheld because 
“the hospital had alleged facts sufficient to establish the third-
party standing of its doctors to bring their patients’ claims.”146 
Similarly, the DRA, because it is read in pari materia 
with Title X and Medicaid, creates federally enforceable rights 
in women who utilize clinics that qualify for federal funding 
and since no Congressional intent is presently precluding pri-
vate enforcement, § 1983 should be applicable. As in Children’s 
Hosp. of Philadelphia, a symbiotic relationship exists between 
the government and the pharmaceutical companies because the 
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available at www.NewsRx.com (reporting that sexual performance drugs like 
Viagra will be covered under Medicare’s new prescription drug benefit begin-
ning in 2006); Patricia Anstett, Medicare Limits Coverage for Viagra, Seattle 
timeS, Jan. 27, 2007, at A4 (limiting coverage of Viagra® through an amend-
ment to the Social Security Act, to allow reimbursement if a man takes Viagra®, 
Cialis®, or Levitra® for a primary medical condition not labeled erectile 
dysfunction).
3 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6001(b)(1) (2006).
4 Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceuticals, Inc., History of Birth Control 1-2, http://
www.thepill.com/thepill/aboutbirth-history.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) 
[hereinafter History of Birth Control)].
5 PBS, Timeline: The Pill, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/timeline/index.
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endnoTes
drug manufacturers derive a substantial benefit from the billions 
of dollars the government expends annually on prescriptions.147 
In addition, Congress knew of the denial of access to oral con-
traceptives and has not passed any legislation or enforced correct 
application of the AMP formula.148 
The pharmaceutical companies’ interpretations of Sec-
tion 6001 of the DRA to no longer offer oral contraceptives to 
federally funded and campus health clinics based on the AMP 
formula is also possibly unconstitutional. Federal courts have 
held that private corporations that contract with the government 
may not be entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.149 The 
Supreme Court, applying the nexus approach, held the appropri-
ate inquiry is “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between 
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that 
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself.”150 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis is an instructive example of 
the application of the inquiry.151 Focusing on the state’s involve-
ment, the challenged action was the lodge’s racial discrimina-
tion against private guests.152 The Supreme Court emphasized 
that a nexus would exist and state action would be present, if the 
state had “fostered or encouraged” the allegedly unconstitutional 
action.153 Applying this reasoning to the DRA and the “business 
decisions” made by pharmaceutical companies, it could be found 
that a “sufficiently close nexus” between the State, the pharma-
ceutical companies and the potentially challenged action exists 
to impose liability on both the State and the private companies 
under § 1983.
concLusion
There is no comparable situation for men. Women’s 
overall healthcare is at issue and this type of funding reduction 
of medical treatment options promulgated by the DRA is con-
stitutionally invalid. As shown, cutting funding for oral contra-
ceptives has far reaching implications for women including the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which embodies the notion that 
what is not good policy is also not good politics.
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JoneS v. bennet : The BifurcaTed LegaL sTaTus of  




In 1829, Henry Clay, then President of the American 
Colonization Society for the Free People of Color, pronounced: 
“Of all the descriptions of our population, and 
of either portion of the African race, the free 
people of color are, by far, as a class, the most 
corrupt, depraved and abandoned . . . . They are 
not slaves, and yet they are not free. The laws, 
it is true, proclaim them free; but prejudices, 
more powerful than any law, deny them the 
privileges of freemen.”1 
This pronouncement accurately describes the existence 
of Levi Jones. Jones, a free man of color, was emancipated by his 
master, William Chenault, on the 31st of May, 1830, in Madison 
County, Kentucky.2 Jones’ family’s story, told 
through the case of Jones v. Bennet, sheds light 
on the struggles faced by free persons of color 
in Kentucky. This struggle took place against 
the background of the first half of the 19th 
century before Lincoln signed the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation, freeing millions of black 
slaves.3 This paper will discuss the bifur-
cated status of early 19th century free blacks 
in Kentucky, both as “free blacks” under the 
eyes of the law and as second-class American 
citizens.
On May 8, 1840, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
decided the case of Levi Jones versus John and Samuel Ben-
net.4 Levi Jones’ master, William Chenault, emancipated Jones 
10 years earlier.5 Unfortunately, this colored man, husband, and 
father of four would face a new burden with his new legal status. 
The Jones family would find itself defending the family’s free-
dom on at least two occasions because of unpaid debts.6 
ii. 1801–1830: ProPerTy of  
wiLLiam chenauLT
William Chenault, Jr. was a member of one of the oldest 
families in Kentucky. His father, William Chenault, Sr., served 
in the Revolutionary war under General George Washington.7 
Chenault, Sr. was born in Albemarle, Virginia. Chenault was a 
descendant of Estienne Chenault, a French Huguenot who came 
to America with hundreds of others in 1701.8 
Before Chenault settled in Kentucky, and after the 
Revolutionary War, the government issued soldiers land grants, 
encouraging the rapid settlement of Kentucky following the war.9 
Kentucky became part of Virginia’s Fincastle County in 1772 and 
remained part of Virginia until officially gaining its statehood on 
June 4, 1792.10 Many of the “old issue” free blacks (those freed 
before the civil war) descended from Africans born during the 
colonial period in Virginia.11 Around 1786, William Chenault, 
Sr. settled in Kentucky with his slaves after purchasing a tract 
of land located near the present site of the city of Richmond, in 
Madison County. Chenault, Sr. died of the “cold plague” in the 
spring of 1813.12 
William Chenault, Jr. was just thirteen when his par-
ents brought him to Kentucky.13 He became influential in pub-
lic affairs, and in 1822 he served as a representative in the state 
legislature. William married Susanna Phelps, the daughter of 
Josiah Phelps, another pioneer of Madison County, Kentucky.14 
By 1802, Chenault was 27 years old. That same year, Levi Jones 
was born.15 According to the 1810 Census for Madison County, 
Chenault was listed as having eight slaves.16 
The African-American pres-
ence in early Kentucky was due primar-
ily to the transplant of Virginia’s model 
of slavery into the “trans-Appalachian 
West.”17 Kentucky had fewer slave laws 
than one might find in other slave states, 
but the patterns were similar. The first 
Constitution of the State in 1792 pro-
vided that all the laws then in force in 
the State of Virginia should be in force 
in Kentucky, with a few exceptions. 
“Similar to the laws of Virginia, Kentucky laws legally defined 
enslaved blacks as real estate, with no civil or human rights.”18 
Kentucky laws also promulgated the punishment for offenses 
committed by slaves; white legislators used the law to make 
sure that slaves could not travel freely, hoping thereby to curb 
the number of runaway slaves. Furthermore, if a captain hired 
or allowed a slave to travel on board a ship without the permis-
sion of that slave’s owner, his ship could be seized and sold. The 
law punished whites for selling liquor to blacks or assisting them 
in travel. The law also punished enslaved blacks for conspiracy 
against whites or for resisting whites. Several statutes, however, 
afforded slaves some religious standing, equal to some of the 
benefits enjoyed by free blacks, and also enabled owners to tes-
tify on a slave’s behalf.19 
Under these laws, some slaves preceded their owners 
into the Kentucky frontier; clearing the land, building homes, 
roads, and other structures, and planting and harvesting crops. 
Other slaves entered Kentucky with their masters and, once set-
tled, performed essentially the same domestic and agricultural 
tasks.20 As the white population increased, the black population 
increased proportionately. At the time of the first federal census 
in 1790, in Kentucky there were 11,944 African-Americans and 
114 of them were free people of color.21 
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iii. manumission:  
PaThway To freedom
Manumission was a method whereby enslaved blacks 
could be emancipated. One of the earliest Kentucky statutes on 
the issue passed in 1800, providing that the last will of any per-
son 18 years of age or older could emancipate slaves.22 Slaves 
could also try to buy their own freedom. Kentucky’s economic 
system of small farms and small slave holdings encouraged a 
practice of slave leasing. This activity worked to the benefit of 
slaves. Rental slaves, who were allowed to hire themselves out, 
might after a number of years save money and eventually buy 
their freedom.23 
Just as early as slaves came to Kentucky, some were being 
manumitted. In 1782, even before Kentucky officially became a 
state, an enslaved man named Monk Estill helped prevent the 
destruction, by American Indians, of Estill’s Station, his owner’s 
property. Monk attempted to find Captain James Estill to warn 
him of the attack, and found him near present day Mt. Sterling 
just as the ambush began. Though Cap-
tain Estill was killed, Monk brought his 
body back to the station. For his brav-
ery, Captain Estill’s oldest son freed 
Monk through a process of “manumis-
sion.” Monk moved to Fort Boonesboro 
wherein he became a skilled maker of 
gunpowder and the father of the first 
free African-American child to be born 
in Kentucky.24 
In 1830, William Chenault’s 
cousin, John Bennet,25 liberated a 
female slave named Sally Ann, the wife of Levi Jones and the 
mother of their four children.26 Bennet was at some point a slave 
owner but seemed to have been opposed to slavery in principle. 
Regardless of his age or condition, a slave in Kentucky could 
be manumitted provided that his or her master posted sufficient 
security that the slave would not become a public charge. From 
1794 to 1842 this posting of security was optional. Thereafter, 
and up until 1851, the posting of sufficient security was mandato-
ry.27 The omission of the bond provision after 1851 can be traced 
to the requirement that the ex-slaves leave the state. Other states 
such as Virginia had a certain period within which ex-slaves must 
leave; Kentucky did not specify such a time period. 28
The large number of slaves in Kentucky and the decreas-
ing profits of slavery might have encouraged the practice of man-
umission. As the economic demands for more slaves increased 
in southern states, both Kentucky and Virginia’s slave markets 
responded to the cotton belt’s demands. In 1840, Robert Wick-
liffe, the largest slave owner in Fayette County, Kentucky, bragged 
to the Kentucky Legislature that up to 6,000 slaves per year were 
being sold to southern states from Kentucky.29 Wickliffe’s manu-
mission of some of his slaves, sending them to Liberia, evinces 
the popularity of the practice. In a letter sent from Liberia, an 
octoroon woman, Milly—once owned by Wickliffe and who gave 
birth to a baby sired by Wickliffe’s stepson—wrote a long letter 
thanking her former owners for their benevolence. Milly arrived 
in Liberia on July 11, 1833, along with 145 other new settlers. 
According to the ship records, 119 of the passengers were from 
Kentucky: 16 born free, the rest manumitted.30 
It was not uncommon for emancipated slaves to leave 
Kentucky. Upon manumission, most southern states did not allow 
freed slaves to reside within their borders. In 1691, Virginia 
enacted a law insisting that no Negro be set free unless the owner 
paid for his transportation out of the colony.31 Similarly, starting 
in 1851, a Kentucky master could free a slave, over sixty-five 
years old or infirm, but only if he gave the freed slave the means 
for transportation out of Kentucky and enough money to support 
the freed slave for one year.32 During the same period, Louisiana 
enacted a law requiring emancipated slaves to leave the country 
within a year. The law required the owner to pay for the freed 
slave’s trip to Africa and for his support upon arrival.33 
Such statutes tended to discourage manumission. 
Undoubt edly, had Levi and Sally Ann’s story taken place in the 
1850’s, their manumission would have been unlikely because 
of the increased financial responsibilities placed on the owners. 
Between 1830 and 1850, the number of free blacks in Kentucky 
doubled, increasing from 4,917 to just over 10,000. According to 
the Federal Census of 1860, however, the number of free blacks 
stagnated, suggesting that few slaves were manu-
mitted after the laws were toughened in 1851.34 
While the date of Levi and Sally Ann’s 
union is unknown, marriage between free blacks 
would not become legal until 1825. Moreover, 
the law absolutely did not recognize marriages 
between free blacks and slaves. The progeny of 
such unions assumed the status of the mother. As 
a result, many male slaves who achieved finan-
cial success by hiring themselves out purchased 
the freedom of their wives first, preventing their 
children being born into slavery.35 Even if one 
had the means to do so, free persons of color could not purchase 
the freedom of their friends or extended family. The law provided 
that “[n]o free negro was capable of acquiring in fee, or holding 
for any length of time, any slave other than the husband, parent 
or descendant of such free negro.” 36 
The fact that free black owners, such as Jones, did not 
always emancipate their purchased relatives also proved prob-
lematic. Most free blacks purchased their slave relatives with the 
intent of emancipating them, but the threat of re-enslavement 
was possible.37 Few free men could afford to post the sometimes-
 required bonds to ensure that newly freed slaves would not 
become wards of the county.38 The possible fines for free blacks 
were plentiful; the homes of free families were often subject to 
raids by patrolmen searching for enslaved blacks illegally visit-
ing their friends and family.39 Fines were imposed for violators, 
such as having his or her slaves seized and sold for those slave 
owners who fell into debt.40 
iv: The noT so PreTTy exisTence of free 
BLacks in kenTucky
“The liberty of colored free men has not been 
sufficiently guarded by the laws of the United 
States, nor any of the separate states.” 41 
Around the date of Levi’s manumission, Bennet, who 
was about to move to Missouri, entered into an agreement with 
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Levi Jones to sell him his own children for 300 dollars, payable 
in three annual installments, with legal interest from the date of 
the contract.42 The contract however, was not committed to writ-
ing until sometime after the date of the verbal agreement and the 
delivery of the children to Jones.43 
When John Bennet returned to Kentucky in the autumn 
of 1831, Levi was unable to pay the first installment for the pur-
chase of his children.44 His financial difficulties were not unique. 
Because free blacks competed with slaves and white labor, their 
wages were less than they might otherwise have been. On the 
other hand, some freemen prospered, holding themselves out as 
ministers, teachers, barbers and tailors.45 
Almost a year later, in May of 1832, Bennet’s son, 
Samuel, who still lived in Kentucky, procured from his father a 
document purporting to be a bill of sale for the four children for 
the sum of three hundred and thirty-six dollars—the sum then 
due from Jones according to the terms of the contract.46 Shortly 
thereafter, Samuel Bennet abducted 
Levi’s three oldest children and detained 
them as slaves without Levi’s consent.47 
Free people of color in Kentucky 
constantly feared kidnapping. Although 
the state had enacted anti-kidnapping 
laws, they were scarcely enforced and 
thus of little use. Kidnapping cases were difficult to prosecute 
because they often involved interstate travel.48 Though sell-
ing free blacks into slavery became a crime after 1801, it was 
rumored that the practice continued throughout the antebellum 
period. As Marion B. Lucas explains, “corrupt patrollers” sold 
freemen to slave traders who took a policy of asking no questions 
about the status of the “slaves.” 49 Particularly, free blacks who 
worked along the lower Mississippi were intimidated and forced 
into slavery.50 
Levi instituted his case not in a criminal court, but rather 
in chancery, a court authorized to apply principles of equity as 
opposed to law. In 1836, Levi filed a bill in Chancery against 
John and Samuel Bennet. He prayed for a decree upon equitable 
terms, which would return his children to him as restitution. 
In court, free blacks operated from an inferior position 
to their white counterparts. Freemen did possess some important 
rights such as the right to trial by jury, the right to challenge jury 
selections, and the right to offer evidence in their own behalf.51 
In capital cases, however, free blacks could not testify against 
whites.52 These limitations did not intimidate Jones. He went full 
force ahead, “averring that he had offered, and was still willing 
to pay the full amount of the conventional price.” 53 Defendant 
John Bennet never answered the bill. His son Samuel resisted any 
decree for relief, insisting that the Chancellor—the judge of the 
Chancery—had no jurisdiction.54 He also alleged that:
the terms of the contract of sale to Levi, autho-
rized John Bennet to vacate the sale, in the 
event of a failure by Levi to make punctual 
payment of any one of the annual installments 
of the consideration; and which, as he averred, 
. . . John Bennet had done by selling the chil-
dren to Samuel for 336 dollars.55 
The Chief Justice from the Circuit Court for Madison 
County thought otherwise. He was of the opinion that Levi was 
entitled to relief. In regards to the jurisdiction argument, the court 
reasoned that: 
A court of equity has jurisdiction to enforce a 
contract for movable property, or to coerce its 
restoration to its rightful owner, from whom 
it has been taken, whenever the property is of 
such a peculiar character that the recovery of 
damages, in lieu of the specific thing, would be 
but an inadequate or inappropriate remedy . . . . 
And there can be no stronger case of that class, 
than where a parent brings a bill to coerce the 
restoration of a child that has been abducted 
from him, and is held in slavery.56 
The Court found that “the abduction and detention of the 
children by Samuel Bennet, were unauthorized and tortious.” 57 
The Court further held that Samuel Bennet 
should “be compelled to pay damages for the 
wrongful detention, and make restitution of 
the children, upon receiving the price which 
his father would have been entitled to receive 
from Levi, and the accruing interest thereon 
from the date of the contract in 1830.” 58 The 
Court declared: “One who has taken away and detained wrong-
fully the children of a colored man, is liable [to] him, for dam-
ages equal to the value of their hire.” 59 
The Jones family’s peace was short lived. In 1845, just 
five years after the chancery held that Levi was entitled to the 
return of his family, two of his children, Betsy, 23, and Emily, 19, 
along with Betsy’s two children, Spicy and Edmund, were in the 
Woodford Circuit Chancery Circuit Court suing again for their 
freedom.60 A 1789 Kentucky statute allowed Jones to bring suit 
before the court providing that enslaved blacks should receive the 
same judgment and stand in the same condition with respect to 
the benefit of clergy as free blacks or mulattoes.61 According to 
the petition, they asserted that Jones purchased Emily and Betsy 
“upon the express consideration that said Emily and Betsy were 
to be free whenever they should attain the age of twenty-one 
years as likewise all their children born before that time.” 62 
Unfortunately, Levi Jones’ children had been levied upon 
for debts and were about to be sold back into slavery to either 
Robert Adams or Benjamin Bailey to satisfy the judgments. They 
prayed to the chancery court for an injunction and a declaration 
of freedom.63 The outcome of this prayer is unknown. Accord-
ing to the 1850 Census, Emily and Betsy were living with their 
mother and father. In fact, Levi had managed to purchase more 
relatives. The records list a 73-year-old, Anny, residing with the 
Jones household.64 Levi, who was then 48, worked as a farmer in 
Versailles but owned no land.65 The desire to purchase more of 
his relatives and the cost associated with doing so had put a strain 
on his ability to acquire property.
Free blacks in Kentucky walked a thin line between liv-
ing as freemen and living in bondage. Freemen always had to 
be prepared to prove their legal status; they had to walk with 
their “free papers” or face jail time.66 They lacked the right of 
privacy; “watchmen” could enter their homes at anytime without 
a warrant.67 Moreover, if a free black was found to be loitering 
or “misbehaving,” they could be captured and hired out for up to 
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three months per instance.68 The rationale behind the policy was 
that the sight of free blacks encouraged slaves to seek their own 
freedom.69 
Free black children could also be bound out as appren-
tices if their parents were found to have no visible employment. 
Although when the Kentucky legislature enacted this law chil-
dren bonded out had to be provided education, by 1843 the legis-
lature had removed the requirement.70 Transportation in and out 
of Kentucky was heavily restricted. In 1818, a state law forbade 
the migration of free blacks from other states into Kentucky.71 
Railroads frequently refused free blacks passage even with their 
“free papers.” 72 
v. anTi-sLavery Pressure from The  
BaPTisT church
Undoubtedly, slave owners were motivated by a variety of 
factors—financial, religious, sentimental, moral and ethical—to 
free slaves. Baptists in Virginia expressed opposition to slavery 
as early as 1787.73 This may have influenced Chenault, who was 
a Baptist from Virginia, to free Jones. A number of the mem-
bers of Baptist churches, acting independently of the churches, 
organized an anti-slavery society called the Kentucky Abolition 
Society.74 Baptists and slaveholders hotly contested slavery in the 
Baptist church with emancipating Baptists consistently refusing 
to commune with slaveholders.75 It is quite possible that William 
was at least influenced by the anti-slavery movement in the Bap-
tist church.
Between 1829 and 1859, the Kentucky Colonization 
Society for Free People of Color helped 658 free blacks leave 
the state and settle in Liberia.76 Kentucky’s public opposition to 
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slavery was carried out primarily through the work of the Ken-
tucky Abolition Society and the Kentucky Colonization Society, 
the latter a branch of the National American Colonization Soci-
ety. Founded in 1808, the Kentucky Abolition Society defined 
African slavery as “a system of oppression pregnant with moral, 
national and domestic evils, ruinous to national tranquility, honor 
and enjoyment.” 77 The Kentucky Abolition organized local anti-
slavery societies in Kentucky. Eight local societies were reported 
by 1827.78 
“The colonization movement enabled influential slave-
holding politicians like Henry Clay to favor sending free blacks 
and manumitted slaves back to Africa, while allowing them to 
also distance themselves from supporting the principle of imme-
diate abolition.” 79 In addition to helping free blacks leave the 
country, abolition societies defended free blacks before the law 
and advocated to “ameliorate the condition of the slaves and to 
prevent the separation of families.” 80 
vi. concLusion
In Kentucky, when the state revised its constitution in 
1799, free blacks further lost rights. They were “discriminated 
against and excluded from enjoying key citizenship rights, 
including being prohibited from voting, holding public office, 
and serving in the militia and from bearing arms.” 81 The Jones 
family, suffering from many of these prejudices pronounced by 
Clay and by the State Constitution, did not leave the country or 
even their small town. While the Jones family could have fled 
to the North and its more lenient laws for free people of color, 
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roBusT exchange of ideas and The Presence of The 
african american voice in The Law schooL environmenT: 
a review of LiTeraTure
By 
Artika Tyner, Esq.*
People of color represent about 30% of the United States 
population, but less than 10% of lawyers.1 African-Americans 
represent approximately 13% of the United States population, 
but only 6.8% of enrolled law students.2 The rate of admission 
of African-Americans to law schools has experienced a continual 
decline, diminishing the racial diversity of the law student body 
and the legal profession.3 
The primary purpose of this literature review is to explore 
the research related to the enrollment of African-American stu-
dents in law school, the effects of low enroll-
ment on law school culture, and the evidence 
of successful initiatives that have increased 
the number of African-Americans admitted 
to law school. The search strategy explored 
the following key search terms: racism, law 
school, law-study and teaching, law social 
aspects and African-American law students. 
The search yielded 23 articles, 1 newspaper 
article and 1 book. 
In the first section, I describe the 
historical and current statistics related to 
low enrollment and I provide research related to the underlying 
reasons for the past and current enrollment trends. In the sec-
ond section, I examine the impact of low enrollment on the law 
school environment and classroom dynamics. The final section 
provides a summary of methods used to increase the enrollment 
of African-Americans in law school, focusing specifically on 
replenishing the pipeline of competitive applicants and removing 
barriers in the law school admission process.
hisToricaL raTes of african-american 
enroLLmenT in Law schooLs 
Segregationist policies in legal education were enforced 
from 1896 to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 
These policies created a barrier for African-Americans who 
sought to pursue a law degree and enter the legal profession.5 
Law schools were impacted by the doctrine of “separate but 
equal” that was adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson,6 which required 
separate White and Colored race designations in public institu-
tions and accommodations, including law schools. This doctrine 
directly impacted the enrollment opportunities available for Afri-
can-Americans to enter law school and later practice law. In order 
to create access to the legal profession, litigation was necessary.7 
For example, in the case of Murray v. University of Maryland,8 the 
State of Maryland was not able to provide a “separate but equal” 
law school for African-Americans. As a result of subsequent liti-
gation, they were required to admit an African-American male, 
Donald Murray. Simultaneously, “Blacks only” law schools were 
created to offer alternative opportunities for African-American 
applicants.9 
One such example was the establishment of Howard 
Law School.10 The training at Howard Law School focused on 
effectuating social change by dismantling racial segregation and 
defeating Jim Crow laws. For instance, on January 26, 1947, 
civil rights leaders met to brainstorm ideas and strategically plan 
for ending racially restrictive covenants. Those in attendance 
included Howard alumni who had become 
civil rights pioneers, like William Hastie, 
Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood Robin-
son, and James Nabrit. Howard alumnus 
Justice Thurgood Marshall also served as 
counsel of the landmark court case Brown 
v. Board of Education, which overturned 
Plessy v. Ferguson by holding that sepa-
rate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.11 
Although admission to law school 
is no longer limited by the “separate but 
equal” doctrine, these historical barriers have had a lingering 
effect.12 Presently, there are still a relatively low number of Afri-
can-Americans admitted into law school and practicing law.13 In 
recent years there has been a decline in the rate of enrollment 
of African-American law school applicants, down 8.6% since 
1992.14 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Commission on 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity has found that advances for people 
of color in the legal profession have stalled.15 The 2000 ABA-
sponsored Miles to Go report illustrates that there is still prog-
ress to be made. The report notes: “The legal profession—already 
one of the least integrated professions in the country—threatens 
to become even less representative of the citizens and society it 
serves.”16 
Law schools have voluntarily used affirmative action ini-
tiatives to address the declining enrollment of people of color and 
promote racial diversity.17 Justice Marshall in Bakke v. Regents 
of University of California,18 expressed the importance of using 
race as a consideration in admission due to the historical barriers 
that restricted African-Americans from pursuing opportunities in 
higher education. Justice Marshall referred to affirmative action 
plans as a method of remedying over 200 years in which the 
Constitution did not prohibit the most “ingenious and pervasive” 
forms of racial discrimination.19 The University of Michigan Law 
School has used race as a plus factor in its admission process to 
promote racial diversity. In Grutter v. Bollinger,20 the University 
of Michigan Law School’s practice passed muster of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause. The Court held that 
the plan was narrowly tailored to derive the educational benefits 
The rate of admission of 
African-Americans to law 
schools has experienced a 
continual decline, diminishing 
the racial diversity of the  
law student body and the  
legal profession.
38 The Modern AMericAn
of diversity.21 These educational benefits included the creation of 
a multicultural environment. 
imPacTs of Low enroLLmenT on  
Law schooL cuLTures
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that diversity of the law student body is essential to 
create the most “robust exchange of ideas.” 22 Many benefits will 
be derived through this “robust exchange of ideas,” including: 
promoting cross cultural understanding, helping breakdown 
racial stereotypes, and enabling students to better understand 
different races. In order to reap the many benefits derived from 
racial diversity, law schools must admit a “critical mass” of 
qualified applicants of color, including a representation of Afri-
can-American law students. Grutter v. Bollinger followed the 
precedent set forth in McLaurin v. University of Oklahoma Board 
of Regents, in which the Supreme Court held that the lack of 
exchanges across racial lines impairs 
the ability of diverse students to engage 
in discussions, exchange ideas, develop 
as a professional, and gain leadership 
skills.23 
Racial diversity is an impor-
tant factor for reaching the mission 
of higher education. As a result, it is 
necessary to bring students of diverse 
ideas, backgrounds and experiences 
together.24 The inclusion of law stu-
dents from different racial backgrounds creates a healthy debate 
derived from diverse opinions; the absence of diversity creates 
a void in the learning environment and a correlating void in the 
legal profession.25 In addition to the “robust exchange of ideas,” 
there is also a need for diversity in perspectives and life experi-
ences to prevent feelings of isolation and alienation experienced 
by students when they are separated from a “critical mass” of 
others that share their same racial heritage.26 
Law schools have a mandate to ensure racial diversity 
in the classroom.27 The ABA standards on equal opportunity and 
diversity require law schools to take “concrete action” to grant 
full opportunities for the study of law and professional oppor-
tunities to practice law to members of underrepresented popula-
tions, like African-Americans.28 
The benefits derived from diversity move beyond the 
classroom to the society as a whole since low enrollment of 
African-American law students leaves fewer attorneys of color in 
America’s history and less diversity on the bench and in the legal 
bar.29 Achieving diversity is important for ensuring the “survival 
of our justice system, which is the connecting link between the 
rule of law and society,” according to 2000 ABA President Wil-
liam G. Paul.30 Diversity in the law school student body will also 
alter the perception that the legal profession is not responsive to 
the needs of diverse populations.31 Former Detroit Mayor Dennis 
W. Archer stated that “[t]he strength of the justice system and our 
profession depends on the level of respect that people have for 
it.” 32 The lack of racial diversity threatens the future of the jus-
tice system because racial equality cannot be reached until access 
to legal education is made available to all members of society.33 
meThods for increasing The enroLLmenT of 
african-americans
The absence of a racially diverse student body in law 
schools across the nation has diminished the possibility of obtain-
ing the benefits derived from a diversity of opinion in the class-
room and collaboration outside of the classroom.34 Researchers 
have attributed this decline to the dwindling pipeline of African-
American students interested in pursuing a law degree35 and 
barriers in the law school admission process, specifically Law 
School Admission Test (“LSAT”) performance percentiles and 
U.S. News and World Report rankings.36 
PiPeLine of fuTure Law schooL aPPLicanTs
Due to the historical barriers to higher education that 
flowed from Plessy v. Ferguson, there is a need to implement 
measures that provide a large number of African-American stu-
dents with quality education to compete in 
higher education opportunities, such as law 
school.37 Despite the promise of equal opportu-
nity embodied in Brown v. Board of Education, 
a disproportionate number of African-American 
children today attend rural and under-funded 
schools that are predominantly Black and 
unequal to their suburban counterparts.38 Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall highlighted in Bakke v. 
Regents of University of California, the need to 
be intentional in promoting racial diversity by 
creating a racial class-based remedy to address America’s history 
of discrimination against African-Americans.39 
Class-based discrimination is evidenced by the unequal 
opportunities in primary and secondary schooling that have placed 
applicants of color at an academic disadvantage.40 Research in 
career choice and counseling psychology demonstrates that in 
order to encourage young people to pursue a particular career, 
they must be provided with the following opportunities: “career 
pathway education, career role models, social support and per-
suasion, and a chance to experience and enjoy career-related 
tasks.” 41 
successfuL PiPeLine iniTiaTives
A partnership has been established between the National 
Association for Legal Career Professionals (“NALP”) and Street 
Law Incorporated to offer career development opportunities to 
low-income school children.42 This program will pair NALP 
sponsored law firms with local high schools. Practicing attorneys 
will teach law-related topics at high schools, including substan-
tive areas of the law, the legal profession, and legal career paths. 
Street Law Inc.’s three decades of experience in academic train-
ing helps it provide ongoing support to participating law firms 
and high schools. Street Law Inc.’s efforts in improving diver-
sity have focused on increasing the number of young people who 
express an interest in legal careers. 
Advocates committed to replenishing the pipeline of 
African-American applicants strongly support mentorship pro-
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gram ming.43 Mentorship offers the guidance needed to aid youth 
in career development.44 These efforts should begin in elemen-
tary schools, focusing on fourth and fifth grades, while students 
have time to explore long-term career goals and see the prac-
tice of law as a realistic possibility.45 One such opportunity can 
be found in serving as a mock trial coach. Monte Squire sug-
gests that mentorship can help to prepare the next generation of 
lawyers.46 Squire’s work includes mentoring students at Howard 
High School and coaching their mock trial team. As a result of 
Squire’s involvement, students have expressed increased self-
confidence as well as interest in legal careers.47 Twelfth grader 
Terrance Potter is determined to become an attorney: “I want to 
be an attorney because I have an interest in the political and legal 
process.” 48 Gursimrat “Simmy” Kaur gained valuable skills to 
prepare for his future in higher education through Squire’s men-
toring. Simmy said “[Mock trial] challenges 
me academically and hones my group inter-
action skills, which are skills that I may need 
in college.” 49 
It is important to have lawyers and 
students of color involved as mentors.50 
Young students can then see themselves in 
the mentors’ images and adopt higher goals 
of academic success.51 Maya Harris, Execu-
tive Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Northern California, is devoted to 
mentoring students and describes her com-
mitment as a “responsibility.” 52 She acknowledges that others 
opened doors for her and she challenges attorneys of color to 
open the door wider for future generations. Community involve-
ment is an integral part of helping students to explore career 
options. Replenishing the pipeline requires a collective effort of 
the African-American community in encouraging African-Amer-
ican students to pursue a career in the legal profession.53
financing a LegaL educaTion
Socioeconomic barriers limit access to law school for 
African-American students.54 Law school is a substantial invest-
ment of at least $100,000; the average amount of law school debt 
is $85,000.55 Some initiatives have been successful in making law 
school accessible by providing financial support. For example, 
Seattle University admits 30 diverse students that demonstrate 
an “indicia of success” and offers financial and academic support 
for each.56 At a national level, the 2000 ABA President William 
G. Paul raised $1.3 million in less than a year to offer scholarship 
funds to students of color in need.57 These efforts address the 
financial challenges experienced by African-American students 
as they seek to finance a legal education.
Barriers in Law schooL admission
The decline of African-American law student enroll-
ment has been attributed to the over-reliance on standardized 
tests and influence of national rankings.58 According to Nuss-
baumer, efforts during the past ten years to further diversity 
by enrolling more African-American law school students have 
failed because law school admission and accreditation practices 
have in effect created a system of de facto racial segregation in 
America’s law schools.59 The majority of law schools use the 
LSAT scores as a factor in determining admission eligibility. The 
LSAT/UGPA index demonstrates a measure of cognitive ability 
but only predicts about 25% of a law student’s success during the 
first year.60 
African-American students tend to score lower on the 
LSAT than the national average.61 The average LSAT scores for 
African-Americans are 143–144,62 while the national average 
is 150.63 Okechukwu Oko argues that this poor academic per-
formance is not reflective of an innate lack of academic skills, 
but is caused by factors such as racial and socioeconomic bar-
riers.64 Oko attributes poor performance on the LSAT to poor 
academic training, lack of mentorship, and limited access to 
financial resources.65 Low scores serve as a 
bar to admission. When law schools receive 
pressure from ABA accreditors to limit the 
number of applicants with LSAT scores less 
than 141,66 this limits the number of Afri-
can-Americans that will enter law school.
A more holistic, individualized 
approach to the admission process would 
be to provide an in-depth analysis of each 
applicant’s qualifications.67 By applying 
this approach, Louisiana State University 
has made strides in increasing African-
American law student enrollment.68 Studies have shown that there 
are a number of alternative assessment measures of academic 
success in law school beside the LSAT: emotional intelligence 
(determining how a person can regulate, manage and perceive 
emotions), accomplishment record history (highlighting achieve-
ments in strategic planning, problem solving and research), 
situational judgment (evaluating one’s decision making skills), 
and moral responsibility (examining the evolution of one’s 
moral development).69 The use of alternative cognitive assess-
ment tools has decreased the difference in performance results 
between African-American and White-American students. Dr. 
Zedeck has used a variety of measures to test cognitive ability: 
instead of giving exams administered through traditional paper 
and pencil methods, he has used videotape demonstrations and 
then asked test participants to respond to the video.70 Through 
this method, he was able to reduce the performance gap between 
African-Americans and White-Americans by half of a standard 
deviation.71 
Universities have also tried alternative methods that 
offer a more individualized selection process without taking into 
account LSAT scoring. The University of Michigan has created a 
new special admissions program called the “Wolverine Scholars 
Program.” This program will not consider LSAT scores.72 Admis-
sion will be determined instead by a student’s grade point aver-
age, leadership experience, community service, and resilience in 
dealing with adversity.
LSAT scores also influence national law school rank-
ings for the U.S. News and World Report.73 This ranking system 
does not measure a law school’s ability to reach the most “robust 
exchange of ideas;” instead the rankings focus on numerical data, 
like the LSAT. This influences the admission selections of law 
schools as they strive to build a national reputation.74 
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concLusion
This literature review explored the research related to 
the enrollment of African-American students in law school, the 
effects of low enrollment on the law school culture, and evi-
dence of successful initiatives that have increased the number of 
African-Americans admitted to law school. The literature review 
began by examining the historical barriers of racial segregation 
in law schools which led to the birth of affir-
mative action and emphasis on racial diver-
sity. The key case in this analysis, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, created precedent by allowing law 
schools to use race as a plus factor during 
the admission process analysis. The underly-
ing goal of Grutter v. Bollinger was to create 
the most “robust exchange of ideas” through 
the inclusion of voices from various different 
racial backgrounds. Despite these efforts, the 
matriculation of African-American law stu-
dents has continued to remain comparatively low. 
The question then becomes: “How do law schools 
increase the presence of the African-American voice in the law 
school environment to create the most ‘robust exchange of ideas?” 
Researchers assert that law schools and attorneys alike must 
make a concerted effort to increase racial diversity by creating a 
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pipeline of qualified African-American law school applicants.75 
Researchers have also found barriers in the admission process due 
to LSAT scores and U.S. News World and Report rankings.76 
The literature available does not adequately address 
attrition rates. The literature challenges the validity of LSAT 
scores being a measure of future academic success but fails to 
offer data that either approves or disapproves this premise. There 
is still a need for studies that explore the role of the LSAT in pre-
dicting academic performance, bar pas-
sage, and ability to practice law. I would 
recommend additional research in these 
areas. The students recently admitted to 
the University of Michigan without taking 
the LSAT would make an ideal research 
sample. Researchers should monitor their 
performance from their first year at school 
through their bar passage.
In closing, the United States 
Supreme Court’s vision of creating a most 
“robust exchange of ideas” is an inspirational goal that should 
become a reality. The law school culture would benefit immensely 
from an environment where students of various different racial 
heritages can gather together to discuss the nation’s most chal-
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More mentally-ill women fill our jails and prisons every 
day.1 Within the past few years, the number of women entering 
our state prisons has increased at almost twice the rate of men.2 
Even more astonishing is that 73% of these women in state pris-
ons have a mental health problem, in striking contrast to only 
55% of male state inmates.3 Both male and female inmates are 
equally dependent on the state to provide mental health treatment 
and both have an equal right to care under the 
Constitution.4 However, women often receive 
mental health services inferior in quality and 
quantity to those received by men. 
If denied treatment, female inmates 
may have to resort to the courts. In 2005, sev-
eral female inmates at the Taycheedah Cor-
rectional Institution in Wisconsin filed Flynn 
v. Doyle5 with the assistance of the Wisconsin 
ACLU on behalf of all women incarcerated in 
Taycheedah. The lead plaintiff, Kristine Flynn, is a 48 year old 
woman who suffers from bipolar mood disorder and social anxi-
ety syndrome.6 She is considered seriously mentally-ill by the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections.7 According to the com-
plaint, Flynn was prescribed eight different psychotropic medi-
cations within one year, taking some of them simultaneously.8 
Yet she only had her blood drawn once to test her liver function 
during that year.9 In 2002, prison staff ordered her to be immedi-
ately taken off of all medications.10 Flynn attempted suicide six 
days later.11 After being taken to the hospital, she took one person 
hostage and assaulted a security guard.12 The court-appointed 
psychiatrist testified that her behavior was due to the interruption 
in her medication, yet an entire month passed after the assault 
before she was remedicated.13 Four years were added to her sen-
tence, she was housed in segregation, and she still did not receive 
her medication.14 Flynn was unable to eat, sleep, or take care 
of her basic needs during this period15 and she attempted sui-
cide again.16 She did not receive any group or individual therapy, 
despite having requested counseling several times.17 This case is 
still pending in the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin.
Flynn is representative not only of women in the Wis-
consin correctional system, but of mentally-ill women in cor-
rectional institutions across the nation who receive inadequate 
and ultimately harmful treatment. Imprisoned litigants, such as 
Flynn, will have to battle separately in each state for their mental 
health needs. And indeed, if the prison system ignores their needs, 
courts may be the best recourse. According to the Supreme Court, 
“[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty 
to protect constitutional rights.”18 Yet this promise may be mere 
talk: in reality, the courts have granted “substantial deference” to 
prison authorities19 and have perpetuated gender discrimination.
This paper will examine recent inmate equal protection 
cases and will argue that Flynn and similar plaintiffs nationwide 
stand little chance of success, given the impossible standard 
established by the federal appellate courts that defeats any equal 
protection claim brought by female inmates. Part I will introduce 
the problem of inadequate mental health treatment for female 
inmates, including the current level of illness in the female popu-
lation entering prison, and the gender-based differences in care 
that the women receive. Part II will examine the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in relation to the American correctional 
system. It will compare the most recent 
Equal Protection cases brought by prison 
inmates to the seminal case of United 
States v. Virginia, involving female col-
lege students. This section will also advo-
cate for a similar application of the law 
to the claims of female inmates. Part III 
will conclude that courts need to create 
a workable standard that ensures the constitutional equal protec-
tion rights of female inmates. 
i. The inadequaTe TreaTmenT of menTaLLy-iLL 
women Prisoners
Mental illness is a serious problem for the majority of 
America’s female inmate population. Inadequate mental health 
resources for female inmates affect more than just the residents 
within the prison walls: most inmates eventually leave the prison 
and return to the community from which they came.20 The fol-
lowing sections examine first the prevalence of mental health ill-
nesses among female inmates; second, gender-based differences 
in mental health treatment in prisons; and third, the constitutional 
right of inmates to adequate mental health treatment.
a. tHe mental illneSS oF ameriCa’S priSon 
population 
The mental health of America’s inmates is in a crisis: 
73% of women in state prisons have a mental health problem.21 
The cause of this crisis is clear: as public mental hospitals have 
emptied due to cost and other pressures, the mentally-ill, who 
rightfully should be treated in a hospital setting, have entered 
our prison systems.22 From 1955 to 2000, the number of patients 
housed in state mental hospitals dropped from almost 560,000 
to about 56,000.23 Between 2000 and 2003, the average number 
of residents in state- and county-run mental hospitals was less 
than 50,000.24 Similarly, the lengths of stays in private psychiat-
ric hospitals dropped from twenty-one days per episode in 1980 
to five or six days in 2004.25 Conversely, the adult population in 
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under correctional supervision grew from 1,842,100 in 1980 to 
7,211,400 in 2006.26 According to a recent Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics’ estimation, 705,600 inmates in state prisons had a mental 
health problem at midyear 2005.27 Assuming these numbers are 
correct, there are currently fourteen times as many mentally-ill 
persons housed in our correctional facilities 
as in our state mental hospitals. Women in 
particular are afflicted, as a greater percent-
age of female inmates are reported to have 
a mental health problem,28 while there is 
lesser availability of treatment.
In addition to their basic mental 
health needs, inmates with mental health 
problems also have a higher probability of 
substance abuse29 and self-harm, includ-
ing suicide.30 Drug abuse has serious public health implications, 
including the increased risk of disease transmission, such as HIV/
AIDS, as well as the risk of injury to any children the women 
may be carrying. A strong correlation exists between severe men-
tal disorders and suicidal inclinations31—suicide is therefore a 
substantial concern with any mentally-ill incarcerated popula-
tion and particularly with female inmates.32 Common methods 
of suicide attempts by inmates include hanging, overdose, lac-
eration, asphyxiation, and ingestion of toxic substances such as 
shampoo.33 
Female inmates across America are afflicted with men-
tal health problems that require attention. Without effective 
treatment, these women return to the community with the same 
illnesses, if not made worse due to the length of time without 
treatment.
b. genDer biaS in tHe proviSion oF mental HealtH 
ServiCeS in priSon 
Gender bias in prison has resulted in both over- diagnosis 
and under-diagnosis of mental illness. Historically, prison staff 
have used medication to sedate inmates and control disruptive 
behavior.34 Criminal women in particular have been “treated” 
because they exhibited “male” characteristics such as anger or 
aggression that did not fit the societal mold of the docile home-
maker.35 Conversely, female mentally-ill inmates often suffer 
from inadequate treatment because they are not correctly iden-
tified as mentally-ill or because the prison does not have the 
resources to treat them.36 Prisons that do not have the necessary 
resources frequently house the mentally-ill in disciplinary seg-
regation, limiting the inmates’ access to programming or social 
interaction.37 
A primary obstacle to the adequate treatment of men-
tally-ill female inmates is the lack of a national validated instru-
ment for mental health screening for adult prison.38 Each state 
has come up with its own system, with varying success. In gen-
eral, prisons’ tools for screening inmates with mental illnesses are 
faulty.39 Without a standardized, reliable system, prison staff are 
subject to the gender stereotypes that have been shown to affect 
treatment choices and they are more likely to overlook inmates 
who do need treatment. The inmates themselves may not know 
that they have a problem and therefore may not bring themselves 
to the attention of a mental health professional. For example, in 
a Bureau of Justice Statistics’ study in 1999, only 24% of women 
in state prison and local jails evaluated themselves as being 
mentally-ill.40 In comparison, in a 2006 study, when others within 
the prison were surveyed regarding symptoms demonstrated by 
the inmate population, 73% of the female state inmate population 
were identified as mentally-ill.41 Clearly, better screening tools 
need to be developed and used. 
Even when women are success-
fully identified by a screening instrument, 
men have better access to medical ser-
vices42 by virtue of their larger popula-
tion. Many treatment programs have been 
designed with men in mind43 and have not 
taken into account the unique needs of the 
female population.44 In addition, several 
state prison systems have facilities desig-
nated solely for use as a psychiatric hospital 
for men, but have no corresponding facilities for women.45 This 
is a primary basis for complaint in Flynn v. Doyle: in Wisconsin, 
only men have access to a facility providing round-the-clock care 
and individualized treatment.46 The prisons justify gender sepa-
rations in prison based on security reasons and limited finances. 
However, under the Equal Protection Clause, women should not 
be denied the same level of care available to men simply based 
on their gender.
C. tHe ConStitutional requirement For mental 
HealtH treatment in priSon
Under the Eighth Amendment, prisons are constitution-
ally required to provide medical health care for inmates.47 The 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have interpreted this obligation as inclu-
sive of mental health care.48 According to the Fourth Circuit,
[an inmate] is entitled to psychological or psy-
chiatric treatment if a physician or other health 
care provider, exercising ordinary skill and 
care at the time of observation, concludes with 
reasonable medical certainty (1) that the pris-
oner’s symptoms evidence a serious disease or 
injury; (2) that such disease or injury is cur-
able or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) 
that the potential for harm to the prisoner by 
reason of delay or the denial of care would be 
substantial.49 
The numerous phrases open to interpretation in the above stan-
dard render it useless for practical guidance to prison officials.50 
Thus, several district courts have provided more definite guide-
posts by which to judge a prison health care system:
The six components are: (1) a systematic pro-
gram for screening and evaluating inmates to 
identify those in need of mental health care; (2) 
a treatment program that involves more than 
segregation and close supervision of mentally 
ill inmates; (3) employment of a sufficient 
number of trained mental health profession-
als; (4) maintenance of accurate, complete, and 
confidential mental health treatment records; 
(5) administration of psychotropic medication 
only with appropriate supervision and peri-
odic evaluation; and (6) a basic program to 
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identify, treat, and supervise inmates at risk for 
suicide.51 
While this standard provides more definite boundaries for a 
prison healthcare program, it has not been affirmed by a higher 
court.52 Ultimately, female inmates’ constitutional right to and 
need for adequate mental health care is not being met.
ii. The unequaL ProTecTion of  
femaLe inmaTes 
Female inmates wishing to sue prisons based on their 
inadequate treatment will find that the federal courts have nar-
rowed prison-based equal protection law such that it is nearly 
impossible for female inmates to succeed. The courts have estab-
lished two barriers to a successful action: (1) splitting hairs over 
what constitutes “similarly situated” inmate groups and (2) def-
erence to prison finances. 
a. tHe CourtS’ DiSCriminatory appliCation oF  
equal proteCtion law 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires the government to treat similarly situated people 
alike.53 It prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of 
gender by state actors.54 Under this standard, discriminatory 
classification or treatment between men and women is subject to 
heightened scrutiny.55 For a gender-based classification to with-
stand the heightened standard of scrutiny, it must “serve impor-
tant governmental objectives,” and “the discriminatory means 
employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.” 56 To succeed on an equal protection claim, a 
plaintiff must pass a threshold showing that she is similarly situ-
ated to others who received more favorable treatment.57 The next 
sections will examine the recent history of equal protection juris-
prudence, providing an in-depth look at the courts’ reasoning. 
1. equal pRotection of female inmates
 Flynn’s biggest challenge in the Equal Protection arena 
is finding a “similarly situated” group to satisfy the courts. “Sim-
ilarly situated” has been broadly defined by the Supreme Court: 
the two groups do not have to be alike in every aspect.58 In fact, 
in City of Clebourne v. Clebourne Living Center, the Supreme 
Court said that even though the group home for the mentally dis-
abled, which was denied a permit by the city, was different from 
other facilities that were permitted permits, the main question 
was whether the proposed group home would affect the legiti-
mate governmental interests in a way that the permitted uses did 
not.59 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,60 a case involving students of different ages and 
races, and schools of different sizes, the question of whether the 
students were similarly situated did not even arise.
Female inmates, however, have received far different 
treatment in the lower courts. For example, in Klinger v. Dep’t of 
Corrections, the plaintiffs housed at Nebraska’s female institu-
tion stated for the purposes of litigation that they were similarly 
situated to a male facility.61 The trial court agreed that the two 
groups were similarly situated because they were both housed in 
Nebraska correctional institutions, the institutions had a similar 
range of custodial levels, and the purposes of incarceration were 
the same for both groups.62 The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed 
the lower court’s decision by highlighting the differences between 
the two institutions: the male facility housed six times as many 
inmates as the women’s; the average stay at the men’s facility was 
two to three times as long as at the women’s; the men’s facility 
was two security grades higher than the women’s; and the women 
had different characteristics from the men due to their paren-
tal status and likelihood of past abuse.63 Further, the appellate 
court highlighted economic limitations: “[W]hen determining 
programming at an individual prison under the restrictions of a 
limited budget, prison officials must make hard choices.” 64 Thus, 
the court was willing to allow inferior programming for women 
based on “limited resources.” 65 The court seemed to conclude 
that comparing male and female institutions is not just compar-
ing apples and oranges, but comparing apples and Volkswagens.
The Eighth Circuit also granted substantial deference 
to the prisons.66 The court concluded that doing any prison-to-
prison program comparison was “futile” and that doing such 
a comparison “places the burden on prison officials to explain 
decisions that resulted from the complicated interplay of many 
variables.” 67 The court stated that any such asking of explana-
tion would result in “micro-management” and worried that the 
facilities would end up providing only the “bare constitutional 
minimum of programs and services to avoid the threat of equal 
protection liability.” 68 The aim of the litigation was to show that 
the prison already was failing to provide the “bare constitutional 
minimum.” Thus, in providing its worst-case scenario of the 
prison sticking to the bare minimum, the court avoids forcing the 
prisons to abide by the Constitution so as to avoid litigation.
In the murkiness of prison-based equal protection litiga-
tion, at least one court has made clear what “similarly situated” 
does not mean: in Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Correc-
tions v. D.C., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
rejected a three-factor test that included similar custody levels, 
sentence structures, and purposes of incarceration.69 Instead, the 
court emphasized that there are “many considerations” and “innu-
merable variables,” including the characteristics of the inmates and 
the size of the institution.70 This standard is extremely vague and 
presents difficulties to future female prisoner litigants in choos-
ing a similarly situated group to which to compare themselves. 
Yet even after this rhetoric of innumerable variables, the court 
focused on but one: the fact that the men’s prison had 936 inmates 
and the women’s prison had only 167.71 The court concluded that 
“it is hardly surprising, let alone evidence of discrimination” that 
the smaller facility had fewer programs.72 This holding is disturb-
ing because it in effect denies to women inmates any potential 
success on equal protection grounds. Women compose a much 
smaller percentage of the total inmate population.73 The smaller 
number of female inmates allows most states to house all women 
in the same, multi-classification prison, while men by virtue of 
their greater population size can be broken into institutions by 
individual classifications.74 Under the court’s holding, even if 
the women were housed in separate institutions by classification, 
they would not be similarly situated to the men due to population; 
and if the women were housed together, they would not be simi-
larly situated due to classification. The court fails to acknowledge 
this reality.
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Other courts have also adhered to this belief that differ-
ing sizes in population necessitates differing number and qual-
ity of programs. In Keenan v. Smith, in which female inmates 
brought an equal protection action based on denial of post-
 secondary education programs and prison industry employment, 
the Eighth Circuit stated that “because 
women account for such a small proportion 
of the total prison population, their facilities 
are necessarily smaller in size than any of 
the male-only prisons.” 75 It further admitted 
that due to the small size of the institution, 
the most comparable in size of the male 
institutions is an institution of the highest 
security classification.76 The Keenan court 
concluded that two sets of dissimilarly situ-
ated inmates cannot be meaningfully com-
pared.77 At least in this case, Judge Heaney 
acknowledged the reality that under these 
standards, no group of female inmates could ever have standing 
for an equal protection claim.78 His is a lone voice. The logical 
extension of the court’s opinions is that women must wait until 
an equal number of women and men are incarcerated before they 
can ask for equal services and programs.
As a thought experiment, let us follow the courts’ logic 
to its conclusion. For women to establish themselves as similarly 
situated to men, they must compare themselves by either (1) secu-
rity classification or (2) population. Female inmates have a low 
chance of successful comparison under the first prong because 
while most of female prisons include prisoners of all classifica-
tions, the men’s prisons are often broken up into individual clas-
sifications due to the number of inmates at each classification 
level.79 Thus, no such similarly situated group exists. Under the 
second prong, if women were to use population size to establish 
a similarly situated group, they would be limited to the highest 
security men’s prisons. The highest security men’s prisons often 
house their inmates in solitary confinement for twenty-three 
hours a day and therefore offer few, if any, programs.80 Fight-
ing for these programs would not win the female inmates more 
programming than they already have. For the female inmates, it 
is a losing game.
In shocking contrast, when men raise the equal protec-
tion issue, the courts take an entirely different view. Only a year 
before Keenan, a male inmate brought an equal protection claim 
before the Eighth Circuit in Bills v. Dahm81 and received sig-
nificantly different treatment. In Bills, the male inmate alleged 
that he was denied overnight visitation from his infant son while 
female inmates were allowed such visitation.82 Instead of review-
ing its laundry list of differences between a male Level 2 facil-
ity and a female Level 4 facility—the same levels of facilities 
contemplated in Klinger 83—the court stated that “[b]oth prisons 
hold a significant number of maximum security offenders.” 84 Pre-
sumably, no drastic changes had occurred in the Nebraska cor-
rectional system, yet the court offered no analysis of the differing 
population sizes. Instead, the court concluded that “the make-up 
of the inmate population at each of the prisons are not markedly 
dissimilar,” yet allows, grudgingly, that it is “objectively reason-
able” for a prison official to have believed that the two groups 
of inmates were not similarly situated.85 This is a quite a change 
from the previous opinions that found an insurmountable differ-
ence between male and female prisons.
The court finishes with a parting lecture to the correc-
tional authorities on the constitutional rights of inmates—a lec-
ture notably absent from the cases involving female inmates. The 
court begins with the lofty statement that “[t]he great object of 
our Constitution is to preserve individual rights” and that “prison 
inmates are not completely stripped of 
these rights as they step through the 
prison gates.” 86 Further, the court chides 
that a “prisoner may not be denied equal 
treatment afforded those who share his 
relevant characteristics, simply because 
statistics show that he belongs to a group 
that typically does not bear those relevant 
characteristics.” 87 This is remarkable: in 
other words, a prisoner cannot be denied 
equal treatment afforded to others, “sim-
ply” because statistics and data demon-
strate that he is not actually equal to the 
others. No such allowance for numerical discrepancies was evi-
dent in the women’s cases. The gender discrimination evident in 
the courts’ opinions mars any chance that female inmates might 
have to bring a successful equal protection suit.
Even if the inmates could prove that they were similarly 
situated, they would still have to show that the statute or regu-
lation intentionally discriminated against them. In Canterino v. 
Wilson, the Sixth Circuit found that the female inmates “failed 
to prove that the denial of study and work release to members 
of their class is gender-based discrimination on its face, because 
both men and women are included in the class of people who 
may be denied study and work release.” 88 Under this standard, 
a claim based on the denial of programs could potentially fail 
simply because not all male inmates received care. 
In some cases, gender segregation in prison may provide 
sufficient evidence of gender discrimination so that discrimina-
tory intent need not be established. A Fourth Circuit opinion 
found that “discriminatory intent need not be established inde-
pendently when the classification is explicit.” 89 Prisons across 
the nation are segregated by gender and, although such segrega-
tion has been found to be constitutional,90 the practice of sending 
women to one prison and men to another facially classifies on the 
basis of gender.91 If the court finds that the resulting difference 
in access to services imposes a burden on the female inmates, 
discriminatory intent may not need to be established. 
Overall, the courts have created an unworkable stan-
dard, yet refuse to acknowledge that it effectively bars incarcer-
ated female litigants from recovery. Courts should not dismiss 
an Equal Protection case based on population differences, but 
should start from the premise that male and female inmates are 
similarly situated due to the equal dependence on the state to pro-
vide mental health services and both have an equal right to care 
under the Constitution. 
2. united states v. virginia: sepaRate  
But not equal
In United States v. Virginia, decided shortly after the 
above cases, the Supreme Court contemplated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in regard to gender segregated institutions of higher 
education, coming to a very different result. The Virginia Mil-
itary Institute (“VMI”) historically accepted only men into its 
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academy.92 VMI enrolled about 1,300 male cadets each year.93 
In response to litigation contesting its refusal of female candi-
dates, VMI proposed a separate, parallel program for women: 
Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (“VMIL”), which had 
an expected first-year class of twenty-five women.94 While the 
institutions would share the same mission, “the VWIL program 
would differ from VMI in academic offerings, methods of educa-
tion, and financial resources,” 95 largely based on the perceived 
differences and needs of a female population.96 The different 
population sizes and program options are analogous to those in 
male and female prisons, yet here the Court ruled in favor of 
the female plaintiffs, finding that VWIL was not an appropriately 
parallel program and that VMI must admit female cadets. A court 
has even more reason to make a similar ruling in favor of female 
inmates; students have the option of choosing whether to attend 
an inferior school whereas female inmates have no choice.
Justice Ginsburg began her opinion in Virginia with the 
core instruction of equal protection analysis: “Parties who seek 
to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for that action.” 97 The court 
“has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state govern-
ment acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when 
a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they 
are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, 
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their 
individual talents and capacities.” 98 Any justification of such a 
policy must demonstrate “important governmental objectives and 
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related 
to the achievement of those objectives.” 99 Sex-based classifica-
tions may not be used “to create or perpetuate the legal, social, 
and economic inferiority of women.”100 In Flynn’s case, the gen-
der differences in availability of treatment result in distinct dis-
advantages to female inmates: they receive inferior mental health 
services, which will affect their ability to participate in voca-
tional training and other programming integral to post-release 
success. When the prison denies them equal services, they are 
maintained in an inferior position relative to the men who receive 
the services, a disadvantage that affects the women even post-
incarceration.
In examining VMI’s justification for the male-only clas-
sification, the court stated that a justification “must describe 
actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact 
differently grounded.”101 The court rejected Virginia’s claim 
that VMI furthered diversity in educational institution choices; 
although single-sex institutions may in fact promote diversity, 
Virginia’s public institution history provided no evidence that 
VMI’s single-sex admission policy was intended to further this 
purpose.102 Applying this analysis to Flynn’s case, the primary 
reason for gender-segregation in prison appears to be popula-
tion management or security. Neither reason, however, bears any 
rational relation to the differing quality of mental health treat-
ment between the male and female institutions. 
Differences in institutional populations did not keep the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia from finding similarly 
situated groups. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
justified its holding denying programs to the smaller female cor-
rectional institutions by stating that parents of students at Smith 
College, an all-female institution, would not raise an eyebrow to 
discover that Harvard University, many times Smith’s size, offers 
considerably more classes.103 In contrast, the Supreme Court did 
not even discuss in Virginia the 1,300 student enrollment of VMI 
in comparison with the twenty-five student enrollment of VWIL. 
In addition, inmates have an even stronger claim for 
medical and mental health services than for educational pro-
gramming.104 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
stated that “an inmate has no constitutional right to work and 
educational opportunities.”105 Yet under an Eighth Amendment 
analysis in Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court declared that 
the government has an obligation to provide medical care for 
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.106 If the Supreme 
Court was dissatisfied with a facility that planned to enroll a mere 
twenty-five female students a year, surely the federal courts can 
do better for the 112,498 women in prison who are denied not 
just educational opportunities, but health care to which they have 
a constitutional right.
The second prong of the Virginia analysis focused on 
the proposed remedial measures to be taken by Virginia to rem-
edy the equal protection violation. Any remedy must “closely 
fit the constitutional violation [and] must be shaped to place 
persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advan-
tage in the position they would have occupied in the absence of 
discrimination.”107 In the context of prisons, the mental health 
resources currently available to men—such as separate facilities 
solely for the treatment of mentally-ill inmates and additional 
health staff and programs—must be made equally available to 
female inmates.
Overall, the federal circuit courts have largely dismissed 
female inmates’ suits based on a flawed notion of what consti-
tutes a “similarly situated” party. In contrast, the Supreme Court 
has always treated the similarly situated analysis as inclusive of 
groups with some differences and has applied it to higher educa-
tion institutions much more leniently than the appellate courts 
have to the female inmate litigants. 
b. tHe ‘important governmental obJeCtive’  
oF parSimony
The primary justification for a prison’s discriminatory 
policies often comes down to economics. If gender discrimina-
tion is established, it may still survive heightened scrutiny if the 
correctional authorities can establish important governmental 
objectives that are accomplished through this discrimination.108 
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has already 
declared that, even allowing that a burden has been imposed on 
female inmates due to gender discrimination, limited financial 
resources are enough reason to justify the prison’s discrimina-
tion.109 The Eighth Circuit has also found that any analysis of 
gender discrimination in female inmates’ programming must 
make allowances for the prison’s limited resources and economic 
constraints.110 Even in Bowring v. Godwin, a case that extended 
an inmate’s constitutional right to medical care to also include 
mental health care,111 the Fourth Circuit stated:
The right to treatment is, of course, limited to 
that which may be provided upon a reasonable 
cost and time basis and the essential test is one 
of medical necessity and not simply that which 
may be considered merely desirable.112 
Spring 2009 47
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (expected May 2009); B.A., The Ohio 
State University. Thanks to Erica Weisgerber for her superior assistance.
1 See, e.g., Lucy Adams, In jail . . . and no desire to get out, tHe HeRald,  
June 18, 2007, available at http://www.theherald.co.uk/misc/print.php?article= 
1477986.
2 BuReau of juStice StatiSticS, dePaRtment of juStice, PRiSon StatiSticS, 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm [hereinafter PRiSon 
StatiSticS].
3 BuReau of juStice StatiSticS, dePaRtment of juStice, mental HealtH 
PRoBlemS of PRiSon and jail inmateS, 1 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf [hereinafter mental HealtH PRoBlemS]. 
Individual states may have even greater discrepancies; see Act Relative to 
MassHealth Enrollment for Persons Leaving Correctional Facilities in Mas-
sachusetts: Hearing on S.B. 598 Before J. Comm. on Healthcare, 180th Gen. 
Ct. 2 (2003) (statement of Massachusetts Public Health Association) available 
at http://www.mphaweb.org/testimony/test_masshealth_enroll_prison.10_03.
pdf (“In Massachusetts state prisons, more than 17% of male inmates and more 
than 50% of female inmates have open mental health cases.”); noRtH caRo-
lina dePaRtment of coRRection office of ReSeaRcH, StatiSticS memo: 
mental HealtH diagnoSeS in tHe PRiSon PoPulation 3 (2007), available at 
http://crrp41.doc.state.nc.us/docs/pubdocs/0007052.PDF (“Comparatively, the 
percentage of female inmates with a mental health concern has consistently 
outpaced that of men (five year averages of 58.1% and 29.8%, respectively).”); 
oklaHoma dePaRtment of coRRectionS, mental HealtH fact SHeet (2007), 
available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/treatment/mental_health /fact_sheet.
html (reporting 79% of female inmates in Oklahoma state prisons have a history 
or are currently exhibiting symptoms of a mental health problem, compared to 
46% of men).
4 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“These elementary principles 
establish the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it 
is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat 
his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”).
5 Complaint at 3, Flynn v. Doyle, No. 06-539 (E.D. W.I. filed May 1, 2006), 





9 Id. Most drugs are predominantly metabolized by the liver; See generally 
alex j. mitcHell, neuRoPSycHiatRy and BeHavioR neuRology 401 (Saunders 
Ltd. 2004) (concluding that liver function needs to be monitored to ensure 
proper distribution of the drug into the patient’s system and because overmedi-
cation can result in liver damage).




No one would argue that gender or racial discrimination 
could exist in greater society based on financial considerations; 
consider the obvious costs of providing equal pay for equal work. 
The courts’ argument that a constitutional right can be limited 
by cost therefore seems inherently wrong and solely based on 
the prisoners’ incarcerated status.113 Thus, even when the female 
inmates have a winning hand in proving discrimination, they may 
still fail because the house is bankrupt.
iii. concLusion
Flynn should use United States v. Virginia to argue that 
differing populations and genders cannot be a basis for discrimi-
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however, is with the attitude of the courts toward inmates, and the 
allowances made for discrimination based on imprisonment sta-
tus. Tellingly, none of the Equal Protection cases found in favor 
of the inmates. The courts have erected serious obstacles to a suc-
cessful claim by creating an unworkable standard for “similarly 
situated” prison groups and allowing finances to limit constitu-
tional rights. Inadequate services for mentally-ill female inmates 
harm not just the women, but also the poor, urban communities to 
which many of these women return. Without mental health care, 
the women are at a greater risk of recidivism. The bottom line 
is that female inmates have a constitutional right to medical and 
mental health care and a right to equal treatment to that received 
by the male inmates, which is not currently being provided in 
America’s prisons.
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commenTary on ProPosiTion 8: much ado aBouT noThing 
or a wake uP caLL To do someThing 
By 
Lydia Edwards, Esq.*
On November 4, 2008, California voters passed Prop-
osition 8 (“Prop 8”), amending the California Constitution to 
declare, “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid 
or recognized in California.”1 On that same night Barack Obama 
was elected the first African-American Presi-
dent of the United States. The concurrence of 
these two events spurred emotionally charged 
accusations from the Lesbian, Gay, Bisex-
ual, and Transgender (“LGBT”) community 
towards the African-American community. 
Also telling about the night of November 4, 
2008 was the discourse about who was a vic-
tim and who was perpetrator of Prop 8. Much 
of the media reports and immediate reaction 
created a dichotomy of straight African-Americans discriminat-
ing against white gays and lesbians.
Background
In March 2000, California voters passed Proposition 
22, declaring that only marriage between a man and a woman 
would be valid or recognized in California. On May 15, 2008, the 
California Supreme Court ruled in a 4–3 decision that the statute 
enacted by Proposition 22, and other similar statutes limiting the 
definition of marriage, violated the equal protection clause of the 
California Constitution.2 The Court ultimately found that indi-
viduals of the same sex have the right to marry under the Cali-
fornia Constitution and that same-sex marriage should therefore 
be valid and recognized in California.3 In reaction to the Court’s 
decision, opponents to same-sex marriage put forward Proposi-
tion 8 to add the language of Proposition 22 to the California 
Constitution.
The campaign to pass Proposition 8 was largely led by 
two organizations: “Protect Marriage” and “Yes on Proposition 
8.” Their arguments for the passage of Proposition 8 were three-
fold.4 First, they argued that Prop 8 restored the definition of 
marriage to the same language Californians voted for in 2000.5 
Second, they stated that Prop 8 overturned the decision of the four 
California Supreme Court judges who acted undemocratically to 
ignore the will of the people and legislated from the bench to 
declare Prop 22 unconstitutional.6 Finally, the two proponents 
argued that Prop 8 protects children from being taught in public 
schools that marriage between members of the same sex is the 
same as “traditional” heterosexual marriage.7 They argued that 
Prop 8 would “prevent other consequences to Californians who 
will be forced to not just be tolerant of gay lifestyles, but face 
mandatory compliance regardless of their personal beliefs.” 8 
The campaign to defeat Proposition 8 was lead by “No 
on Prop 8, Equality for All.” This group argued that by defining 
marriage as between a man and a woman, Prop 8 eliminated the 
possibility of marriage for a targeted group and is, therefore, a 
violation of the civil rights of all Californians. They argued that 
because the California Supreme Court declared marriage a fun-
damental right, Prop 8 is a violation of state equal protection. 
Finally, they argued that domestic part-
nerships and civil unions are not compa-
rable to marriage because the doctrine of 
“separate but equal” is unconstitutional.
On election night, the Los Ange-
les Times (“L.A. Times”) reported that 
Proposition 8 passed with 52.2% of the 
vote.9 On November 5, 2008, the L.A. 
Times, along with several major news-
papers, cited an AP exit poll showing 
that 70% of African-American voters supported Proposition 8.10 
Along with religious organizations such as the Mormon Church, 
African-Americans were seen as one of the key components to 
the measure’s passage.11 
Reactions to the news that African-American voters 
had overwhelmingly supported Prop 8 were swift and emotional; 
eliciting pain, frustration, shock, and in some cases bigotry. Dan 
Savage, a gay columnist and civil rights activist, can summarize 
the frustration of many gay activists in this November 5 post:12 
I’m done pretending that the handful of racist 
gay white men out there—and they’re out there, 
and I think they’re scum—are a bigger prob-
lem for African Americans, gay and straight, 
than the huge numbers of homophobic African 
Americans are for gay Americans, whatever 
their color.13 
Blogs and news broadcasts throughout the country dis-
cussed the passage of Prop 8 in a dichotomous tone with African-
Americans on one side and gay men and lesbians on the other. As 
seen in this comment from Jeff Jacoby, a white columnist for the 
Boston Globe:
If black voters overwhelmingly reject the claim 
that marriage amendments like Proposition 8 
are nothing more than bigotry-fueled assaults 
on civil rights, perhaps it is because they know 
only too well what real bigotry looks like. Per-
haps it is because they resent the assertion that 
adhering to the ageless meaning of marriage is 
tantamount to supporting the pervasive humili-
ation and cruelty of Jim Crow.14 
Yet another example,
White gay media like to presume they are 
absolved from racism because they are steady 
Final analysis shows that the 
voting patterns of  
African-Americans mirrored 
those of other groups and  
broke down generationally.
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riding on the backs of the civil rights movement 
as if the victimization is of the same creed. As 
a black gay woman this is a conundrum that I 
live with daily, but in the end I agree with the 
larger black populace that is often resentful of 
how white gay America has hijacked the civil 
rights movement without any effort to create 
coalitions.15 
As the fervor of election night died off, people went 
back to examine the actual statistics from the exit polls. Fur-
ther analysis of the population of African-Americans in the state 
of California—6.2%—demonstrates that if 70% of African-
Americans did vote for the passage of Prop 8, it would still be 
highly unlikely that they alone would account for the initiative’s 
passage.16 Later polls threw suspicion onto the high numbers 
recorded at the exit polls. Final analysis shows that the voting 
patterns of African-Americans mirrored those of other groups 
and broke down generationally.17 
how BLacks Became sTraighT and  
gays Became whiTe
People could debate for an eternity as to why voters in 
California decided to overturn their state supreme court and void 
thousands of marriages, but that is not this article’s focus. Instead, 
we propose that the passage of Proposition 8 
and the subsequent media description of the 
issue as “black v. gay” was a call to action; 
a call to truly analyze the way the United 
States discusses sexuality and race and to 
point out that people in both the LGBT and 
African-American communities are in part 
to blame for the “black v. gay” dichotomy. 
This falsehood, based on stereotypes of African-Americans as 
wholly heterosexual and the LGBT community as mainly white 
and upper-middle class, has injured both movements’ quest for 
equality and silenced the voices of many LGBT people of color. 
As Wanda Sykes states in The Advocate, “We’re literally killing 
ourselves over this fear of homosexuality.”18 To provide any guid-
ance for better discourse it is necessary to understand how the 
discourse created the dichotomy that many observe today.
African-Americans have suffered extreme and often vio-
lent discrimination from the beginning of American history. One 
might expect a greater sense of empathy on the part of African-
Americans for the struggle for gay rights, and indeed much of the 
initial surprise and hurt over the reported disproportionate per-
centage of African-American vote for Proposition 8 arose from a 
belief that there should have been a greater sense of empathy. 
The relationship between African-Americans and the 
LGBT community is hard to characterize. Religion, family, 
experience, and education influence each person within a com-
munity. If one is going to generalize, however, that homophobia 
is prevalent in many black communities, this may stem in part 
from the lack of visibility of African-American LGBT people 
as leaders or prominent members of the community. That is not 
to say African-Americans are not as open about their sexual-
ity as White Americans—it is more a critique of the historical 
lack of African-American gay and lesbian leaders. Those civil 
rights activists and trailblazers who were gay were encouraged 
or required to stay in the closet and prioritize the struggle for 
race or gender equality. As scholars have noted, for many in the 
African-American community, homosexuality is not “black.”19 
Identification as gay or lesbian for many is viewed as representa-
tive of European society; being out as an African-American may 
be seen as race-negating.20 Far too often, homosexuality is con-
sidered comical, disgusting, or a form of betrayal. Books like On 
the Down Low,21 by J. L. King, continue to perpetuate the notion 
that homosexuality is a home-wrecking, AIDS-spreading virus 
that steals African-American men from their families. These ste-
reotypes result in homosexual people of color being perceived as 
less black, encouraging a form of in-group passing.22 
The role of religion should not be ignored for its contri-
bution to the ostracism of gay men and lesbians of all colors from 
the African-American community. Religious leaders in large 
churches often preach about homosexuality as one of the worst 
sins against God.23 This rhetoric spreads from the same pulpits 
that inspired the non-violent Civil Rights Movement. Donny 
McClerkin,24 for example, is a very popular gospel singer and a 
self-proclaimed “ex-gay,” who has described homosexuality as “a 
curse against which he must do battle.” 25 
Bayard Rustin is an evocative example of how an Afri-
can-American man is lauded for his commitment to civil rights, 
but encouraged to quiet his sexuality.26 Rustin was one of the 
primary organizers of the 1963 March on Washington but was 
kept out of public roles in the Civil Rights 
Movement and forced to downplay his 
sexuality. Rustin was a leading advisor and 
speech writer for Dr. Martin Luther King,27 
helped to integrate non-violent direct action 
into the Civil Rights Movement, and was a 
powerbroker for organized labor, the Amer-
ican Democratic Party, and world affairs.28 
“Few African-Americans engaged in as broad a protest agenda as 
did Rustin; even fewer enjoyed his breadth of influence in virtu-
ally every political sector of American life. Nevertheless, Rustin 
remained the quintessential outsider in black civil rights circles 
for much of his life due to his ‘deviant’ sexual identity.” 29 
Pauli Murray is another example of an African-American 
committed to causes of gender and racial equality, but conflicted 
about her sexuality, which she kept hidden from many people.30 
Murray was the co-founder of NOW (National Organization of 
Women),31 and the first black attorney to publish in an academic 
law review. Among many writings on civil rights, Murray drafted 
the States’ Laws on Race and Color, which Thurgood Marshall 
called the “Bible for civil rights lawyers.”32 She is also credited 
with coming up with the Fourteenth Amendment legal theo-
ries used by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the 1970s.33 Least known, 
but one of her greatest contributions to the African-American 
community and American legal thought, was her conviction to 
attack the essence of the long held legal theory of “separate but 
equal.”34 Yet, Murray never declared herself a lesbian. Between 
fighting for gender inclusion in the Civil Rights Movement and 
racial understanding in the Women’s Rights Movement, Murray 
may have felt overwhelmed. 
The African-American community’s reluctance to cel-
ebrate diversity among its leaders and heroes helps to perpetuate 
“We’re literally killing  
ourselves over this fear of 
homosexuality.”
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a heterosexual normalcy of the African-American experience. 
This refusal also allows negative stereotypes about gay men 
and lesbians to pervade unchecked. It is of no surprise, there-
fore, that the headlines following the passage of Proposition 8 
talked about the African-American community as though it were 
wholly heterosexual. As Marlon T. Riggs 
stated in Tongues Untied : “In the great gay 
mecca, I was an invisible man, still I had no 
shadow, no substance, no history, no place, 
no reflection.”35 
LGBT legal analysis evolves from 
parallel arguments advanced in gay and 
lesbian political activism.36 Gay and les-
bian Americans of all colors have suffered 
discrimination and ostracism from “main-
stream” American ideals and legal equal-
ity. Still, conversations about racial inequality are largely absent 
from LGBT discourse unless when comparing gay and lesbian 
quest for equality with that of African-Americans. This compari-
son and discourse contribute to the “black v. gay” dichotomy. 
Along with other factors, this comparison has helped to create a 
“white-washed” portrayal of the incredibly diverse LGBT com-
munity and the false dichotomy following the passage of Propo-
sition 8. 
This “white-washing” may be a result of conscious 
efforts in some of the LGBT leadership to ignore issues of race 
and gender. Richard Mohr, noted gay rights activist, urged gay 
organizations not to build coalitions with other groups, including 
African-Americans and women, because it was a wasteful drain 
on the movement.37 Others feel, in some respects, gays and les-
bians are more discriminated against than African-Americans. 
Andrew Sullivan, gay conservative columnist, explained such 
when comparing slavery for heterosexual African-Americans and 
white gays and lesbians. 
But even slaves, if they were heterosexual, 
were occasionally allowed the right to marry 
the person they loved. That right was often 
peremptorily taken away, but when it was, the 
hideousness of the injustice was clear. But that 
injustice is unavailable to homosexuals, because 
they haven’t even been deemed eligible for the 
institution of marriage in the first place; they 
have been, from one particular perspective, 
beneath slave. And they still are.38 
Many people believe the prioritization of marriage 
equality for the LGBT movement is a result of the lack of diver-
sity in LGBT leadership and the failure to listen to gay men and 
lesbians of color. As Paula Ettelbrick explains: “[T]hose closer 
to the norm or to power in the country are more likely to see 
marriage as a principle of freedom and equality. Those who are 
acceptable to the mainstream because of race, gender and eco-
nomic status are more likely to want the right to marry. It is the 
final acceptance, the ultimate affirmation of identity.”39 
The LGBT movement historically and presently seems 
to have prioritized becoming part of the American “mainstream.” 
People of color often meet comparison arguments, such as 
Andrew Sullivan’s above, with disdain. For many, the “use of 
racial analogies is suspect, coming as it does from a movement 
deeply splintered over the relevance of racism to the fight against 
homophobia.” 40 For others it seems to trivialize the experience 
of people of color in the United States. For still others, there is 
a sense of disgust and abhorrence for any likening of African-
Americans to gays and lesbians. As explained by Colin Powell, 
“homosexuality is not a benign . . . charac-
teristic such as skin color . . . . It goes to one 
of the most fundamental aspects of human 
behavior.” 41 
Like most civil rights movements, 
the LGBT movement uses the faces of aver-
age Americans to engender empathy. The 
face of the LBGT movement has been over-
whelmingly portrayed as white and middle 
class. As Devon W. Carbado explains, the 
movement seems to use “but for” gay peo-
ple.42 These are people “who, but for their sexual orientation, 
[are] perfectly mainstream.” 43 The use of the “but for” gay peo-
ple seems like a missed opportunity to be inclusive and obscures 
history. 
Perry waTkins: a case sTudy  
in whiTe-washing
A perfect example of the failure of the LGBT move-
ment to be racially inclusive is the case of Sergeant Perry Wat-
kins. Watkins was nineteen years old when he was drafted into 
the military.44 At the time he was drafted he acknowledged he 
was gay. Watkins again acknowledged his homosexuality in an 
affidavit after being subject to a criminal investigation. Watkins 
explained, “he had been a homosexual from the age of thirteen 
and that, since his enlistment, he had engaged in sodomy with 
two other servicemen.” The army ended the investigation due to 
“insufficient evidence.” 45 
Watkins performed in drag at official and unofficial 
military gatherings that were heavily attended.46 So it came as a 
surprise when in 1982, Watkins was separated from the Army for 
being a homosexual. In all Watkins served 14 years in the Army 
and became in the words of his commanding officer, “one of our 
most respected and trusted soldiers.” 47 Watkins fought back to be 
reinstated in the Army and he won. To this day, Watkins is the first 
openly gay serviceman to successfully challenge the military’s 
antigay policy. 
Despite Watkins’ significant civil rights milestone for 
the LGBT movement, he is virtually unknown. Instead of using 
Watkins as the face of the fight against the military ban on gay 
men and lesbians, the LGBT leadership chose to focus their cam-
paigns on white soldiers such as Keith Meinhold, Joseph Steffan 
and Margarethe Cammermeyer. Commenting on how the LGBT 
community promoted Cammermeyer, Watkins remarked “we’ll 
go with a [white] woman who lied for twenty years before we go 
with a black man who had to live the struggle nearly every day 
of his life.” 48 
For Watkins’ case, along with the cases of many others, 
race helps explain the lack of attention gay rights proponents paid 
to him and to his story.49 Tom Stoddard, the lawyer who directed 
the Campaign for Military Service, commented that there was a 
public relations problem with Watkins because he wore a nose 
ring and had a counter culture image, not because Watkins was 
Gay and lesbian Americans 
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black.50 This seems unlikely considering the PR problem with 
Watkins could have been solved by taking out his nose ring and 
putting him in a suit. More likely than not, 
Watkins’ case was more complicated than 
the “but for” gays the movement chose 
to promote.51 Watkins’ story would have 
required a discussion of race, complicating 
the LGBT movement’s strategy for fighting 
the military ban.52
When Watkins died of AIDS at the 
age of 47, he still felt a sense of betrayal 
by the national gay leaders who chose to 
promote white soldiers over himself. “It’s 
blatant racism,” said Watkins, when the 
same LGBT activists disinvited him from testifying at 1993 
Congressional hearings on the ban, even though he was the only 
openly gay service person to go to the top of the court system and 
emerge victorious.53 
so where do we go from here
An attempt to solve this discourse dilemma in one arti-
cle is impossible. However, by continuing the conversation about 
how we talk about race and sexuality in the United States, we 
hope to answer the call to action prompted by the passage of Prop 
8. We suggest to both groups to make conscious efforts to sup-
port one another in their common goal. We also suggest that each 
group individually assess its message and 
visible representation to ensure an inclusive 
discourse. 
A common expression of discrimi-
nation faced by the African-American and 
LGBT community alike is police brutality. 
It would be a positive step to see and hear 
from more LGBT organizations on issues 
of police violence and racial profiling of 
people of color. In addition, organizations 
that deal with race relations with the police 
should dedicate some of their message to 
the harassment that gay men and lesbians face. 
We suggest that organizations dedicated to racial equal-
ity make sure to be consistent in their message for equality for 
all Americans and support the LGBT community in its fight for 
equality. More importantly, we suggest that these organizations 
diversify their leadership and ensure that their leaders and role 
models are no less celebrated because they are gay or lesbian. 
Similarly, gay and lesbian organizations need to diversify their 
leadership to include more people of color. When presenting 
the face of the LGBT movement to engender empathy, LGBT 
organizations should make a conscious effort to include racial 
diversity. 
. . . “we’ll go with a [white] 
woman who lied for twenty 
years before we go with a  
black man who had to live  
the struggle nearly every  
day of his life.”
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On June 19, 1982, two white autoworkers killed Vincent 
Chin, a Chinese-American man whom they mistook as Japanese 
at the peak of anti-Japanese sentiments in Detroit. The American 
auto industry was going through a severe recession; Japan, its 
competitor, was blamed for the countless layoffs of U.S. auto-
workers as Japan’s auto industry was growing while the Ameri-
can auto industry was in a severe recession. Vincent Chin was 
brutally bludgeoned to death with a baseball bat during a night 
out when he was celebrating his bachelor’s party. Because of 
this hate crime, Vincent’s life ended at the young age of twenty-
seven. 
Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz, Vincent’s murderers, 
pled guilty to manslaughter and were sentenced to three years of 
probation and a $3,720 fine. Judge Kaufman said that imprison-
ing a man who has committed to the same company for 17–18 
years would not do any good for the society. This lenient ruling 
outraged Asian-Americans and galvanized them to organize a 
protest movement. Lisa Chan, an attorney, initiated “The Ameri-
can Citizens for Justice,” to help publicize the incident. Publica-
tion led to rallies and public outrage eventually became the drive 
for the 1984 federal civil rights case against the defendants. The 
jury gave Ebens a twenty-five year sentence and found him guilty 
of violating Vincent’s civil rights under 18 U.S.C. Section 245(b)
(2)(F). Nitz was acquitted of all charges. Eben’s case was over-
turned on appeal, however, because the trial court had refused 
to admit certain evidence. On retrial in Cincinnati, Ohio, a jury 
acquitted Ebens of all charges.
The documentary “Vincent Who?” directed by Tony 
Lam and produced by Curtis Chin, examines how Vincent Chin’s 
case has influenced the Asian-American community especially 
with regards to the recognition of their civil rights. The docu-
mentary focuses on a national town hall meeting memorializing 
the 25th anniversary of Chin’s death. “Vincent Who” includes 
interviews of Asian-Americans involved in the case and Asian-
American civil rights activists sharing their stories and reflec-
tions. The documentary suggests that the pan-Asian-American 
movement emerged after the murder. The biased court ruling for 
the defendants became a watershed event for Asian-Americans to 
recognize the need to call for protection of their civil rights. 
The Asian-American community was outraged by 
Chin’s murder. Not only was he killed because of his outward 
appearance, but the defendants’ sentences for his murder were 
unfairly lenient. One of the interviewees, Ms. Nhung Truong, a 
District Representative for California Congressman Adam Schiff, 
described her outrage when she heard the story for the first time. 
A person selling “V. Chin” t-shirts at a local festival told her 
about the murder. The case changed her life and motivated her 
into politics and community activism. She became an agent for 
preventing the abuse of Asian-Americans’ civil rights by seek-
ing to raise the Asian-American voice in the American political 
system. Ms. Troung expressed that Chin would have been alive if 
he were not Asian-American. She said that the ruling for Chin’s 
murderers would not have come out so unfairly if he were not 
Asian-American. 
The outrage of Asian-American community forced them 
to come together and fight for their rights. The documentary sug-
gests that the murder brought the Asian-American community 
together. The stark injustice perhaps tapped into a grudge subcon-
sciously harbored for feeling as outsiders in the American soci-
ety. The interviewees in “Vincent Who?” were amazed at how the 
murder fired up a local Asian-American movement that eventually 
sparked a national pan-Asian-American civil rights movement. 
Dale Minami, a civil rights attorney featured in the 
documentary, explained that the race issue in the U.S. is always 
framed as a dichotomy between black and white. “Asian-Amer-
ican” is not part of the discussion of civil rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment. This is partly because the immigration 
history of Asian-Americans is short, especially compared to that 
of African-Americans. Minami theorizes that, unlike African-
Americans, Asian-Americans are still influenced by the culture 
of their country of origin. Often, people regard Asian-Americans’ 
lingering ties to their country of origin as being disloyal to the 
U.S. This view may lead people, like Chin’s murders, to view 
Asian-Americans with suspicion. The autoworkers expressed 
their anger against the Japanese auto industry toward Chin, who 
they assumed was a Japanese-American.
This documentary suggests that the pan-Asian-Ameri-
can civil rights movement rejects the view that Asian-Americans 
are necessarily tied to their country of origin. They also reject the 
view that these ties reinforce the gap between Asian-Americans 
and the majority of U.S. society. Although some Asian-Ameri-
cans have cultural ties to their country of origin, this is not unique 
within U.S. society.1 The U.S. has traditionally been a melting 
pot of immigrants, who have always brought new cultures to this 
country.2 Yet, these cultures have been assimilated into the main-
stream. Relative to other immigrant groups, Asian-Americans 
are late arrivals to U.S. society.3 They are now going through the 
transition of full-fledged integration into society, as other immi-
grants did in the past.4 Thus, they should not be discouraged 
from melting into the U.S. mainstream.5 Once Asian-Americans 
become citizens, they should be treated equally in every aspect; 
origin or culture should not be grounds for discrimination. 
“Vincent Who?” describes an important historical land-
mark served by Vincent Chin, an unintended martyr. The discrim-
ination against Asian-Americans during the Chin trials inspired 
the pan-Asian-American civil right movement which continues 
to address the problems of discrimination. Through the efforts of 
this movement, realization of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protections Clause rights will become whole by rendering equal 
rights to every American citizen. 
movie review: vinCent wHo? 
Directed by  
Tony Lam and Produced by Curtis Chin, 2008
By Yeon Me Kim
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1 The Fundamentals of Identity and Culture, Asian American Alliance, http://
www.asianamericanalliance.com/The-Fundamentals-of-Identity-and-Culture.
html (last visited 3/16/09).
2 ‘Melting pot’ America, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/ 
4931534.stm (last visited 3/16/09).
3 Asian American History Timeline, http://www.cetel.org/timeline.html (Though 
very early Asian immigrants came to the U.S. continent in the 1600s, a large 
number of Asian immigrants started coming to the States in the 1800s.) (last 
visited 3/16/09); see also, Immigration History and Statistics, Asian American 
Alliance, http://www.asianamericanalliance.com/Immigration-History-and-
Statistics.html (last visited 3/16/09).
endnoTes
4 SRilata BHattacHaRyya, fRom “yelloW PeRil” to “model minoRity”: tHe 
tRanSition of aSian ameRicanS. 7-8 (2001), http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2sql/content_ storage_01/0000019b/80/19/db/ec.pdf (2001).
5 Asian American Alliance, Advancing Equality: Stopping Prejudice against 
Asian Americans, available at http://www.asianamericanalliance.com/ 
Advancing-Equality.html (last visited 3/16/09).
National South Asian Summit
Founder’s Celebration
April 24th – 26th, 2009
The 2009 South Asian Summit is hosted by the South Asian Law Students Association  
at the American University Washington College of Law & South Asian Americans  
Leading Together (SAALT).
The Summit provides an opportunity for South Asian organizational leaders, community  
members, and students to engage with policymakers in DC; to learn about issues of concern;  
and to strategize around best practices and future collaborations.  
This will be a great opportunity to meet lawyers, advocates, students, professionals, service  
providers, and non-profit staff members from around the country. 
The event is FREE for WCL Students, Faculty, Staff, Alumni, and Affiliates.
A Quick Look at the Agenda
w  Friday, April 24th/10AM–4PM:   Briefing to and from Congress, meetings with Congressional members,  
briefings with Administration officials, and DC site visits  
w  Friday, April 24th/7PM–9PM:  ChangeMaker Awards Reception (K&L Gates – 1601 K St. NW)
w  Saturday, April 25th/9AM–8PM:   Discussions and workshops on issues affecting the South Asian community 
as well as skills-building trainings (American University, Washington College 
of Law), followed by a reception (6:30–8PM)
w  Sunday, April 26th/9AM–12:00PM:  Regional Breakouts, Open Space, Closing Session (American University, 
Washington College of Law)
Register using this link: www.wcl.american.edu/secle
For more information: visit www.saalt.org or email summit09@saalt.org
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H.R. 11: Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was signed into law on 
January 29, 2009. It was passed by a House vote of 250–177 
and was promptly signed by President Obama, becoming Public 
Law No. 111-2. The Act amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 which prohibits discrimination in compensation on the 
basis of color, religion, sex or national origin. The Act provides 
that unlawful employment practice occurs when 1) a discrimina-
tory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, 2) an 
individual becomes subject to the decision or practice, or 3) an 
individual is affected by the application of the decision or prac-
tice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation 
is paid.1 The Act effectively overrules the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. In Ledbetter, in 
a 5–4 decision, the Court held that under Title VII, an employee 
may only seek redress against pay discrimination within 180 days 
of the alleged discriminatory act.2 This meant that an employee 
could not bring an otherwise valid pay discrimination claim 
against an employer if he or she did not discover the initial dis-
criminatory act within 180 days. The Court’s decision failed to 
address that often times employees will not learn that they have 
been victims of discrimination until after 180 days from the time 
when the employer decides to take such action. Under the Court’s 
ruling, an employee was left without recourse; the employer was 
then free to continue discriminating.
In her EEOC claim, Lilly Ledbetter argued that the 180-day 
statue of limitations should be renewed each time an employer 
issues an intentionally discriminatory wage or salary paycheck.3 
Congress agreed with Mrs. Ledbetter, recognizing that the Court’s 
decision “unduly restricted the time period in which victims of 
discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory 
compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent 
of Congress.” 4 Proponents of the Act maintain that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation in the Ledbetter decision was unrealistic 
and unfair. The Court’s interpretation ignored the real-world facts 
of discrimination and harmed thousands of women.5 Critics of 
the Act argue that it will encourage needless decades-old litiga-
tion against employers who may not have had committed the ini-
tial discriminatory act.6 However, the Act limits the amount of 
recovered back pay to those withheld within the two years pre-
ceding the filing of the complaint. This limitation discourages 
employees from delaying to bring their claims. The Act similarly 
amends provisions on the Age Discrimination Employment Act 
of 1967 and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990.7 
H.R. 2: Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2009 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2009, or SCHIP, was signed on January 14, 2009. It 
became Public Law 111-3 after passing the House with a vote 
of 290–135. The Act will allow 7 million children to continue 
receiving health insurance while extending this same coverage 
to an additional 4.1 million uninsured children. The SCHIP will 
assist children in low-income households which earn too much to 
qualify for Medicaid but are still unable to afford health insurance. 
The Act will extend Medicaid eligibility by changing the 
eligibility rules including documentation of citizenship. Rather 
than requiring documentation of citizenship, the Act gives States 
the option to verify an applicant’s citizenship through their Social 
Security number. This will allow an applicant to obtain coverage 
while being in the process of securing citizenship documenta-
tion.8 The Act will also provide States with the option to assist 
legal immigrant children and pregnant women without the 5-year 
legal residence restriction. 
The Bush Administration firmly opposed this legislation 
when it was first introduced in 2007, vetoing it on two sepa-
rate occasions.9 Like the Bush Administration, critics of the Act 
argue that it will provide needless health insurance to an esti-
mated 2.4 million children who would otherwise be covered by 
private health insurance.10 Sponsors of the Bill refute this claim 
by pointing to the estimated 4 million jobs which have reportedly 
been lost within the past year. The children within those house-
holds, in the end, will no longer receive private health insurance.11 
The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of expand-
ing coverage under the Act to average around $32.8 billion from 
2009–2013.12 Funding for the program will be provided through 
a 62-cent increase on cigarette tax which will raise the price of 
cigarettes $1.01 a pack. It will also require an increase in tax for 
other tobacco products.13 
H.R. 1064: “The Youth Prison Reduction  
through Opportunities, Mentoring, 
Intervention, Support, and Education Act” 
The Youth Promise Act seeks to provide alternatives to pros-
ecution and incarceration which have proven to be more effective 
in reducing crime and violence in young offenders.14 The Act is 
a bipartisan effort which acknowledges that excessively punitive 
juvenile justice policies increase long-term crime risks. Instead, 
the Youth Promises Act is aimed at intervention and preventive 
measures targeting at-risk youths as well as their families. It pro-
poses providing local communities with the resources necessary 
to develop all-inclusive plans designed primarily by representa-
tives from local faith organizations, law enforcement, schools, 
community organizations, and health and social service provid-
ers.15 The objective behind these community-based programs is to 
develop crime prevention, research, and intervention services for 
gang members and at-risk youths. This evidence-based approach 
to juvenile delinquency will furnish grants for the research of 
adolescent development through methods responsive to the needs 
and strengths of individual communities, focusing on cultural 
and linguistic differences.
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Proponents of the Act claim that this preventive approach 
will yield a greater decrease of recidivism of juvenile delin-
quents. Furthermore, this approach will be less costly than pun-
ishment-oriented approaches such as the Gang Abatement and 
Prevention Act. That Act seeks to deter criminal gang activity 
by imposing stricter criminal penalties on juvenile offenders.16 
Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
and Human Rights Watch have applauded the Youth Promises 
Act after noting that incarcerated offenders disproportionately 
belong to low income and minority communities.17 The ACLU 
has acknowledged that the Bill is a step towards “breaking the 
vicious ‘school-to-prison pileline’ wherein children, overwhelm-
ingly children of color, in elementary, middle and high schools 
are pushed out of the classroom and into the juvenile and eventu-
ally adult criminal justice system.”18 The Bill was introduced by 
Robert C. Scott (D-VA) and Mike Castle (R-DE) with 69 original 
co-sponsors in the House of Representatives. An identical bill 
was introduced in the Senate, S. 435, by Rover Casey (D-PA) and 
Olympia Snow (R-ME). 
H.R. 738: “Deaths in Custody Reporting  
Act of 2009” 
The Act requires States to report to the Attorney General 
information regarding the death of any person who is detained, 
under arrest, or being arrested, in a State-run prison or State-
run detention center (including immigration and juvenile deten-
tion facilities).19 Among the information required by the Act 
1 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, H.R. 11, 11th Cong. (2009).
2 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
3 Id. at 2164.
4 H.R. 11.
5 155 cong. Rec. H116-H117 (statements of Rep. Mazie Hirono and Rep. Steny 
Hoyer).
6 155 cong. Rec. H117 (statement of Rep. Howard McKeon).
7 H.R. 11.
8 SCHIP Reauthorization in 2009: An Update on the Debate and Side-by-Side 
of Key Bills Under Consideration, Georgetown University of Health Policy 
Institute Center for Children and Families, Jan. 29, 2009.
9 Christopher Lee, Bush: No Deal on Children’s Health Plan, WaSH. PoSt, 
July 19, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/07/18/AR2007071801434.html?referrer=emailarticle.
10 Id. See also 155 cong. Rec. H256 (statement of Rep. John Boeher).
11 155 cong. Rec. H256 (statement of Rep. Edward Markey).
12 congReSSional Budget office coSt eStimate, H.R. 2, Children’s Health 
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (Feb. 11, 2009).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Youth Promises Act, H.R. 1064, 111th Cong. (2009).
16 Human Rights Watch Calls on Congress to Support the “Youth  PROMISE 
Act,” H.R. 3846, April 6, 2008, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/ 
04/06/human-rights-watch-calls-congress-support-youth-promise-act-hr-3846.
are 1) a description of the person, 2) the date, time and loca-
tion of the death, 3) the law enforcement agency under which the 
death occurred, and 4) a brief description of the circumstances 
surrounding the death.20 The Act addresses certain deficiencies 
within the “Deaths in Custody Reporting Act of 2000.” The 2000 
Act, for instance, required only reporting from State-run and not 
federal detention facilities. It directed States to make only an 
initial report to the Attorney General concerning the death of a 
detainee. The proposed 2009 Act, in addition to this initial report, 
directs the Attorney General to conduct a study to “examine the 
relationship, if any, between the number of such deaths and the 
actions of management of such jails, prisons, and other specified 
facilities.” 21 Such a requirement will reject vague descriptions 
such as “unresponsive” or “undetermined” as reasons behind a 
person’s death.22 Proponents of the Act assert it will ensure trans-
parency and accountability by requiring proper documentation 
and inquiry into a person’s death while in government hands.23 
The Act comes at a time of mounting concern over the ques-
tionable deaths and alleged neglect occurring within federal-run 
immigrant detention facilities.24 Reports of the reprehensible 
treatment of immigrant detainees have resulted in increasing sup-
port for this Act by groups such as the ACLU.25 
Compliance with the Act shall be enforced through eligibil-
ity for federal funding. The Bureau of Justice as well as facilities 
currently receiving federal government funding will lose 10% of 
such funding if they fail to provide details regarding the death of 
a detainee in a timely manner.26 States in compliance with the 
program would receive this funding. The bill, introduced by Rep-
resentative Robert Scott (D-VA), has been referred to the Senate 
Committee after passing through the House with a 407–1 vote.
endnoTes
17 Id. See also Letter from Caroline Fredrickson, Director, and Jesselyn 
McCurdy, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union, to Congress in 
Support of H.R. 3846, the Youth PROMISE Act, December 17, 2007, available 
at http://bobbyscott.house.gov/pdf/ACLU.071217.pdf.
18 Letter from Caroline Fredrickson, Director, and Jesselyn McCurdy, 
 Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union, to Congress in Support of 
H.R. 3846, the Youth PROMISE Act, December 17, 2007, available at http:// 
bobbyscott.house.gov/pdf/ACLU.071217.pdf.
19 Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2009, H.R. 738, 111th Cong. (2009).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Report, Detainee Deaths 2004– 
November 2007, available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/ 
nyregion/ICE_FOIA.pdf. See also Nina Bernstein, Few Details on Immigrants 
Who Died in Custody, N.Y. timeS, May 5, 2008, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/05/05/nyregion/05detain.html?_r=1.
23 155 cong. Rec. H887 (statement of Rep. Michael Honda).
24 Nina Bernstein, U.S. Issues Scathing Report on Immigrant Who Died in 
Detention, n.y. timeS, Jan. 16, 2009, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/16/us/16detain.html. . See also Nina Bernstein, Ill and in Pain, 
Detainee Dies in U.S. Hands, N.Y. timeS, August 13, 2008, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/nyregion/13detain.html. 
25 American Civil Liberties Union, House Passes Bill to Expand Reporting of 
Immigrant Deaths in Detention, Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.aclu.org/
immigrants/gen/38668prs20090204.html.
26 H.R. 738.
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Announcing
PRogReSSive PeoPle of coloR caucuS
n  Progressive People of Color Caucus is a new initiative founded by students of color inter-
ested in creating a supportive space for color-and-politics consciousness at WCL. 
n  We invite any WCL community member who self-identifies as a person of color and who 
is passionate about the politics of race and ethnicity to join PPOCC.
n  We intend to sponsor several informal and formal conversations about our guiding prin-
ciples and future activities through semester’s end. 
n  As a self-governed group that depends on individual contributions rather than a chain of 
command we’ll need your involvement and input to sustain our vision.  
 
To join our listserve, please contact 
ppocc.wcl@gmail.com
Green Inks
